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OFFICIAL ENGLISH, NATIONALISM AND LINGUISTIC
TERROR: A FRENCH LESSON
Leila Sadat Wexler*
Despite the preeminence of English in international discourse and census data indicating
that ninety-nine percent of Americans speak English either very well or well, the Official
English movement has garnered significant political support over the last ten years. Divorced
from its political polemic, the objective of the Official English movement is the adoption of
an "English Language Amendment" (ELA) to the Constitution that would require the use of
English in public discourse as a matter of law. This Article approaches the question of what
legal difference an ELA would make by studying the French experience under a recently
adopted constitutional amendment to officialize its national language and comparing the
French linguistic regime to its American counterpart. The Article demonstrates that the French
approach to language regulation has not been particularly successful. Moreover, the degree to
which France has gone to protect its language requires a level of government intrusion into
speech that would not be tolerable under the U.S. Constitution. The Article concludes that the
French approach is both futile and unnecessarily repressive and suggests that the proposed
ELA is similarly ill-conceived and unwarranted.
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A French Lesson
The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who
speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the
tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready
understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced
by methods which conflict with the Constitution--a desirable end
cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
Meyer v. Nebraska'
I. INTRODUCTION
There recently have been several attempts to make English the official
language of the United States, both at the state and federal levels. This may
seem surprising given the rising preeminence of English in international
discourse2 and the fact that ninety-nine percent of Americans speak English
anyway? Nevertheless, this has become an issue for presidential hopefuls,4
and the Official English movement has garnered significant political support
1. 262 U.S. 390,401 (1923).
2. Indeed, Braj Kachru estimates that by the year 2000, non-native speakers of English will
outnumber native speakers. Braj Kachru, Introduction to The Other Tongue: English Across
Cultures 3, 3-4 (Braj Kachru ed., 1992). Indeed, although there are an estimated 350 million persons
whose mother tongue is English, English is generally accepted to have status as an official language
for 1,400,000,000 persons (making it the single most spoken language in the world). David Crystal,
The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language 287 (1987). For a classic, more sophisticated study on
the use of English in non-English mother-tongue countries, see Joshua Fishman et al., The Spread of
English 6-76 (1977).
3. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1990 Census of Population Social and
Economic Characteristics 13-15 (1993) (reporting that 99% of residents say they speak English
only, or speak English "well" or "very well"). Of course, the percentage of persons of English
linguistic heritage has been declining in the United States since the American Revolution. Walter J.
Landry, Comment, The Question of an Official Language: Language Rights and the English
Language Amendment, 60 Int'l J. Soc. Language 129, 130-31 (1986) (reporting decline from 49% in
1783 to 13% in 1986). Landry defines "linguistic heritage" as "the language tradition of a resident's
ancestors upon their arrival on U.S. territory or at the time the United States acquired territory on
which their ancestors were residing." Id. at 134 n.1. See also infra note 210.
4. For instance, former Senator Robert Dole has stated:
With all the divisive forces tearing at our country, we need the glue of language to help hold us
together. And if we want to ensure that all our children have.., the same opportunities in life,
alternative language education should stop and English should be acknowledged once and for
all as the official language of the United States of America.
Remarks of Senator Robert Dole to the American Legion Convention in Indianapolis (Sept. 4, 1995),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. See also, Susan Headden et al., One Nation One
Language, U.S. News & World Rep., Sept. 25, 1995, at 38.
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over the last ten years or so: Twenty-two states now recognize English as
their official language either by statute or constitutional amendment.'
Proponents of Official English assert that making Englih the "official
language" of the United States is essential to prevent America's
"balkanization." 6 Pointing to waves of immigrants who allegedly refuse
to learn English, and ignoring evidence that language differences in and
of themselves do not lead to the disintegration of national identity, they
argue that the elimination of bilingual government services (in particular,
bilingual education and voting ballots) is necessary to prevent the decay
and eventual collapse of American society.! Proponents seek not simply
to officially consecrate the symbolic importance of the English language
5. Ala. Const. of 1901, amend. 509; Ariz. Const. art. XXVIII § 3; Ark. Ccde Ann. § 1-4-117
(Michie Supp. 1993); Cal. Const. of 1879, art. III, § 6; Colo. Const. of 1876, art. II, § 30A; Fla.
Const. art. II § 9; Haw. Const. art. XV § 4 (making Hawaii bilingual); I11. Ann. Stat. ch. 5, § 460/20
(Smith-Hurd 1993); Ind. Code Ann. § 1-2-10-1 (West Supp. 1995); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2.013
(Baldwin 1995); Miss. Code Ann. § 3-3-31 (1972); Mont. Code Ann. 1995 Mt. Ci. 319 (1995); Neb.
Const. art. I § 27; 1995 N.H. Laws 157; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 145-12 (1994); N.D. Cent. Code § 54-02-
13 (1989); S.C. Code Ann. § 1-1-696 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 1-27-
20 (1995); Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-1-404 (1991); Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-212.1 (Michie 1993); 1996
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 34 (H.B. 154). A move to make English the official language of Texas recently
failed. See Jos6 R. Juarez, Jr., The American Tradition of Language Rights: The Forgotten Right to
Government in a "Known Tongue", 13 Law & Ineq. 443, 456 (1995). However, 16 other states have
legislation pending. Supreme Court Will Hear U.S. English Amicus Brief, U.S. Newswire, Mar. 25,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, USNWR File.
6. See. e.g., Brant A. Nelson, Am. Immigration Control Found., America Balka'zized (1994).
7. This argument was made during the 1984 Senate hearings on the English Language
Amendment (ELA). See, e.g., The English Amendment: Hearing on Sj. Res. 167 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1984)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Sen. Jeremiah Denton) ("[W]e are witnessing a steady
erosion in the use of the English language."); id. at 21 (statement of Sen. Walter D. Huddleston,
co-sponsor of S.J. Res. 167) ("The United States is presently at a crucial junctare. We can either
continue down the same path we have walked for the last 200 years, using the melting philosophy to
forge a strong and united nation, or we can take the new path, that leads in the direction of another
Tower of Babel."); id. at 44 (statement of Sen. Steven D. Symms, co-sponsor of S.J. Res. 167)
("Without a common tongue, the United States faces the prospect of balkanization and linguistic
separatism. Nowhere is this trend more ominous than in the case of bilingual ballots and so-called
bilingual education.").
Similar statements can be found in the 1988 House hearings on the ELA. See, e.g., English
Language Constitutional Amendments: Hearing on H.R.J. Res. 13, H.R.J. Res. .13, H.R.J. Res. 60,
and H.R.J. Res. 83 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1988) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Rep.
George W. Gekas) (recognizing "the importance of our common language in foslering unity among
the diverse backgrounds and cultures that are our heritage"). See also 133 Cong. Rec. 901 (1987)
(statement of Rep. William S. Broomfield); 137 Cong. Rec. E3143-44 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1991)
(statement of Rep. Ike Skelton); 139 Cong. Rec. H364 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Toby Roth) ("America is breaking up into different linguistic groups."); 139 Cong. Rec. H2188-91
(daily ed. May 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Roth); 140 Cong. Rec. E289-90 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Roth).
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in American life, but to eliminate the use of other languages-
transforming the "Official English" campaign into one for "English
Only."' Divorced from its political polemic, what proponents of Official
English ultimately wish to achieve is to require the use of English (which
is essentially the country's official, but not its only, language already9) in
public discourse as a matter of law. This would be accomplished by
amending the U.S. Constitution: 0 Since 1981, several versions of an
8. Although some proponents of Official English deny that they advocate "English Only," the
legislation they propose suggests the contrary. See infra notes 10, 286-311, 316-27 and
accompanying text. This is a debate that cannot be answered, however, without first defining what
one means by "official," which has not yet been done. See infra note 9; see also James Crawford,
Introduction to Language Loyalties 1, 7 (James Crawford ed., 1992).
9. None of the legislative sponsors have defined what an "official" language is. In the
international context, designating a language as official generally means that discussions and
documents will be in a particular language or languages. This does not necessarily mean other
languages are not permitted, but does invest the languages chosen as official with a certain prestige.
In addition to official languages, international conferences or agencies may adopt working languages
(generally fewer in number than the official languages), translation languages, and publication
languages. See Herbert N. Shenton, Cosmopolitan Conversation: The Language Problems of
International Conferences 248-69 (1933); see also Heinz Kloss, Comment, The Question of an
Official Language: Language Rights and the English Language Amendment, 60 Int'l J. Soc.
Language 169-71 (1986). In Jonathan Pool's insightful analysis of the way in which language and
politics influence each other, he observed that the term "official language" is used for "both
scholarly and activistic purposes . . . [and] is used inconsistently and to varying degrees
interchangeably with other terms." Jonathan Pool, Language Regimes and Political Regimes, in
Language Policy and Political Development 241, 254 (Brian Weinstein ed., 1990). Indeed, he
pointed out that in addition to the term "official language," governments recognize a wide variety of
languages under varying appellations, as follows:
administrative language; auxiliary administrative language; common national language;
diplomatic language; first official language; internationality language; international language;
judicial language; language of communication among nationalities; link language; national
language; official state language; principal language; provincial language; regional language;
second native language; second official language; state language; working language; zonal
language.
Id. at 254-55.
10. Since introduction of the first bill in 1990, proponents of Official English have also proposed
legislation that would make English the official language of government. Although the bills vary
from sponsor to sponsor, each have several common elements, typified by the first bill. Each bill
would:
(I) declare English the official language of the United States Government;
(2) require the Government to "preserve and enhance the role of English[;]"
(3) require the Government to conduct its official business in English;
(4) provide that no one shall be denied services by the Government because he or she
communicates in English, and allow anyone to use the 1964 Civil Rights Act to remedy any
discrimination suffered because he or she communicates in English;
(5) provide standing to enforce the provisions;
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English Language Amendment (ELA) have been proposed; none have
been reported out of committee."
Linguists and sociologists have extensively studied the "Official
English/English Only" movement, examining its causes, its effects, its
"ghosts, myths, and dangers."' 2 Their studies suggest that the
movement's assertions about the nonassimilation of current immigrants
(particularly Hispanic) and the evils of multilingualisra are largely
unsupported by the facts.'3 Indeed, facts appear to have little to do with
the politics of language. 4 As James Crawford points out in discussing
(6) provide that the Act applies to all official acts by all employees and officials of all branches
of Government; and
(7) exempt certain acts, such as those protecting health or safety, from the law.
H.R. 4424, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). Several versions were introduced in 1995. See H.R. 123,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 3345, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 739, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995) (going further by providing that "English is the preferred language of communication
among citizens of the United States"); H.R. 1005, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (also repealing
Bilingual Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3281 (1994) and § 203 of Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973aa-la (1994)); S. 175, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., (1995); S. 356, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
A joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment to require "converant" English as a
condition of U.S. citizenship also was introduced last year. See H.R.J. Res. 87, 104th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1995).
11. See infra part III.C.I.
12. See, e.g., Joshua Fishman, "English Only": Its Ghosts, Myths, and Dangers, 74 Int'l J. Soc.
Language 125 (1988); Geoffrey Nunberg, Linguists and the Official Langucge Movement, 65
Language 579 (1989); Calvin Veltman, The Status of the Spanish Language in tile United States at
the Beginning of the 21st Century, 24 Int'l Migration R. 108 (1990); Symposium, Spanish in the
USA: New Quandaries and Prospects, 84 Int'l J. Soc. Language 5 (1990); Sympo,,ium, The Question
of an Official Language: Language Rights and the English Language Amendment, 60 Int'l J. Soc.
Lang. 7 (1986).
13. Geoffrey Nunberg argues that there are probably "fewer speakers of foreign languages in
America now than there were [in prior times], in both absolute and relative rumbers. But what
matters symbolically is the widespread impression of linguistic diversity, particularly among people
who have no actual contact with speakers of languages other than English." Geoffrey Nunberg, The
Official English Movement: Reimagining America, in Language Loyalties, supra note 8, at 479, 492.
See also Suzanne Oboler, Ethnic Labels, Latino Lives 144-50 (1995) (noting that, of the 22
immigrants interviewed for her doctoral study of Latino experiences in the United States, all
emphasized the importance of learning English); Calvin J. Veltman, The Future of the Spanish
Language in the United States (1988) (concluding that Hispanic immigrants assimilate and learn
English at least as quickly as other linguistic groups).
14. Joshua Fishman writes:
The "English Only/English Official" movement may largely represent the displacement of
middle-class anglo fears and anxieties from the difficult if not intractable real causes of their
fears and anxieties to mythical and simplistic and stereotyped scapegoats.
It is the classical wrong solution to the wrong problem. Indeed, even were English in America
being threatened by other languages, the "English Only/English Official" forces have failed to
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the furor over bilingual education, "amid all the outrage over symbols,
there was little awareness of the practicabilities of bilingual eduction-
for example, its role in teaching English (which is demonstrably superior
to the brutal, sink-or-swim methods of the past) or its potential to nurture
vital skills in other languages."' 5
What has not been studied in any systematic or satisfactory fashion is
what legal difference an ELA would make. Writers who have addressed
the issue have generally employed either an equal protection analysis 6 or
recognize that such a language conflict, like all other language conflicts wherever they arise,
merely represents the tip of the iceberg of interethnolinguistic conflict based upon economic,
political, and cultural grievances. These grievances represent the real problems and not their
linguistic concomitants.
Fishman, supra note 12, at 132-34 (emphasis added).
15. Crawford, supra note 8, at 4-5. Similarly, a recent General Accounting Office report showed
that in spite of claims that the federal government was spending millions of dollars on foreign
language materials, only 265 out of over 400,000 government documents contained in the databases
of the Government Printing office and the National Technical Information Service's bibliographic
database for the five-year period 1990 through 1994, were in languages other than English. U.S.
Gen. Acct. Off., GGD-95-243R, Federal Foreign Language Documents, Sept. 20, 1995.
It is undeniable that large numbers of non-English speaking individuals have immigrated to the
United States in recent years and that their integration into American political, economic, and
cultural life presents challenges. What is questionable, however, is the assertion that a constitutional
amendment making English the nation's official language will make that integration easier.
Crawford writes:
Bilingual education figures nowhere in the immigrant myth: the bootstraps rise to success, the
fight for social acceptance, the sink-or-swim imperative of learning English. For many
Americans today, the idea of teaching children in other languages is an affront to sacred
traditions. Yesterday's immigrants allegedly prospered without special programs; glad to blend
into the Melting Pot, they struggled to master the language of their adopted homeland.
Operating in English only, public schools weaned students from other tongues and opened a
new world of opportunities.
Ancestral legends die hard. Undoubtedly, some early newcomers were quick to assimilate and
to advance themselves. But more often, "melting" was a process of hardships that lasted several
generations. The immigrants' children were typically the first to achieve fluency in English,
their grandchildren the first to finish high school, and their great-grandchildren the first to grow
up in the middle class. Moreover, language minorities who were also racial minorities never had
the option of joining the mainstream-whether they learned English or not-before the civil
rights reforms of the 1960s.
James Crawford, Bilingual Education: History, Politics, Theory, and Practice 18-19 (1989).
16. See, e.g., Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken Here,
24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 293 (1989); Laura A. Cordero, Constitutional Limitations on Official
English Declarations, 20 N.M. L. Rev. 17, 53 (1990) (evaluating state declarations on official
English and arguing that "they must be strictly scrutinized and narrowly construed to limit their
effect to the domain of symbolism"); Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on
American Languages, Cultural Pluralism and Official English, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 269 (1992);
Andrew Averbach, Note, Language Classifications and the Equal Protection Clause: When Is
Language a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 481 (1994). The major problem with the
equal protection cases and the commentaries based on those cases is that they attempt to equate
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a rights-based analysis, 7 neither of which has proven very satisfactory. 8
Many of these critiques are themselves colored by the polemic
characterizing the debate and cast the problem of language regulation
either in terms of discrimination on the basis of national origin or
affirmative rights to governmental services. Yet, what is really at stake is
the right to be free from governmental interference in spheres involving
fundamental freedoms: "The state cannot achieve unity by prescribing
orthodoxy."' 9
language with national origin in order to fit it into the suspect classification scheme adopted by the
Supreme Court. This is particularly true in the Title VII context. But these arguments are rather like
fitting a square peg (language) into a round hole (national origin). The fit is bad and the resulting
analysis artificial.
17. See, e.g., Bill Piatt, jOnly English? Law and Language Policy in the U'lited States (1990)
(Piatt's book and his rights-based analysis are critiqued in a fine essay by Rachel 17. Moran, Irritation
and Intrigue: The Intricacies of Language Rights and Language Policy, 85 N.W. L. Rev. 790 (1991)
(book review)); Juarez, supra note 5, at 449 (arguing that the Texas constitution ensures the right of
every resident of Texas to governmental services in a language known to that resident); Joseph
Leibowicz, The Proposed English Language Amendment: Shield or Sword, 3 Yele L. & Pol'y Rev.
519 (1985); Michele Arington, Note, English-Only Laws and Direct Legislatior.: The Battle in the
States over Language Minority Rights, 7 J.L. Pol. 325 (1991) (also raising7 equal protection
concerns); Joseph P. Gromacki, Note, The Protection of Language Rights in International Human
Rights Law: A Proposed Draft Declaration of Linguistic Rights, 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 515 (1992). The
difficulty of the rights-based approach is its failure to define both the right and the conditions under
which the right may be exercised.
18. Other approaches have been taken to address particular aspects of the Official English
movement. See, e.g., Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education As a Status Conflict, '75 Cal. L. Rev. 321
(1987); Andre Sol&, Official English: A Socratic Dialogue/Law and Economics Analysis, 45 Fla. L.
Rev. 803 (1993); see also Wendy Olson, The Shame of Spanish: Cultural Bias in English First
Legislation, 11 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1 (1991); Michael M. Pacheco, Does My Spanish Bother
You?: Language Based Discrimination As a Pretext for National Origin Discrimination, II
Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 53 (1991); Hiram Puig-Lugo, Freedom To Speak One Language: Free
Speech and the English Language Amendment, II Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 35 (1991).
19. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 946 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert.
granted, 1995 WL 761639 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996) (No. 95-974). Indeed, I would suggest that most
treatments of the subject unwittingly fall into a doctrinal trap. By employing classical constitutional
analysis, they are automatically obliged to adopt a language developed on th. basis of cultural
uniformity and universalism, when what they are really trying to achieve is cultural recognition.
Although the treatment of this problem is beyond the confines of this article, the question is
elegantly and persuasively treated in James Tully, Strange Multiplicity, Constituttonalism in an Age
of Diversity (1995). Professor Tully puts it thus:
No one reasonably doubts that ... claims for cultural recognition constitute one of the most
dangerous and pressing problems of the present age. The racial, linguistic, national, ethnic and
gender tensions of these struggles are a dimension of almost every social relation of modem
societies.... Culture is a way of relating to others in any interaction, a way of following or
challenging a social rule, and so a dimension of any social relation, from a cultural slur in the
workplace to the relations among nations.... What we need to understand today is the extent to




This article approaches the question of what legal difference an ELA
would make2 by studying the results in France, a country which recently
adopted a constitutional amendment to officialize its national language,
and by comparing the French linguistic regime to its American
counterpart." Like the United States, France has had large numbers of
Id. at 14-15.
20. This Article, the first in a series on this topic, is not an article about language planning; that is,
it does not claim to set out a blueprint for a U.S. language planning policy. Nor, admittedly, does it
completely address the legal, and particularly the constitutional, framework in which American
language planning might take place; again, that topic is best addressed separately. Finally, this
Article is not about why certain minority groups use language as a political rallying cry; thus, it does
not explore why Spanish-speaking elites, unlike elites of other language groups, have focused on
language as a political issue (although it has often been suggested that it is largely because Spanish-
speaking Americans have been unsuccessful in reaping the economic gains that previous immigrant
groups did when they abandoned their native tongues. See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 12, at 131-32).
My goals are more modest: to compare the majoritarian language regimes of two largely
monolingual nations and to comment on the proposed constitutional amendments in the United
States that would, in my opinion, effectuate an unfortunate rapprochement between the two nations.
21. Proponents of Official English often refer to Quebec as the comparative example to avoid.
See. e.g., Gingrich, Citing Quebec Referendum, Calls Bilinguilism Divisive, Int'l Herald Trib., Oct.
31, 1995, at 8. Indeed, I am often asked why I do not compare the United States to Quebec, rather
than to France. But the comparison to Quebec is much less appropriate than one might think.
Francophone Canadians are a linguistic minority with respect to Canada as a whole; thus, in terms of
political status and position, the best analogy to Quebec is probably Puerto Rico. Within the province
of Quebec, francophones are a linguistic majority, of course, and a strong argument can be made that
their demands for a unilingual Quebec are largely due to many years of repressive anglophone
policies. Those wishing to read further might consult Frank M. Lowrey, IV, Comment, Through the
Looking Glass: Linguistic Separatism and National Unity, 41 Emory L.J. 223 (1992). Lowrey
suggests that the potential exists for a linguistic separatist movement to arise in regions of the United
States where extensive Hispanic settlements exist. Id. at 308-09. His own study suggests, however,
that linguistic separatism is not the inevitable result of language differences, but is attributable to
underlying social and political problems. Indeed, although language differences may lead to
challenges to national unity, they do not necessarily do so; rather, it is the "presence of a perceived
inequality of social status, and unequal access to economic rewards or political power due to
language use which is crucial for the politicization of language use and its degeneration into
conflict." William R. Beer & James Jacob, Introduction to Language Policy and National Unity 1, 3
(William R. Beer & James Jacob eds., 1985). Lowrey also does not fully explore the diversity found
within the Spanish-speaking peoples of the United States: as has been explored elsewhere, the ethnic
label "Hispanic" masks the diversity of persons whose origin is South or Central America, the
Caribbean, or Mexico; Suzanne Oboler prefers "Latino," but even this may be overinclusive or
underinclusive, depending on the situation. Oboler, supra note 13, at 16. For more on Quebec, see
G.J. Brandt, Parties and Participants in Constitutional Litigation: The Minority Language Rights
Issue in Quebec and Manitoba, 35 U.N.B. L.J. 201 (1986); Henri Brun, Le territoire du Quebec: 6 la
jonction de l'histoire et du droit constitutionnel, 33 Les Cahiers du Droit 927 (1992); Jacques
Maurais, A Sociolinguistic Comparison Between Quebec 's Charter of the French Language and the
1989 Language Laws of Five Soviet Republics, 12 J. Multilingual & Multicultural Dev. 117 (1991);
Raymond Mougeon, Interventions Gouvernementales en Faveur du Franqais au Quebec et en
Ontario, 1994 Langage et soei~t6 37; Daniel Proulx, La Loi 101, la clause-Quebec et la Charte
canadienne devant la Cour supreme: un cas d'espice?, 16 Revue G~nrrale de Droit 167 (1985);
Alain Prujiner, Les decisions de l'Oflce de la languefranqaise en vertu de Particle 46 de la "Charte
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immigrants in recent years and is suffering from a tarnished world image
and troubled economy. Ironically, if the target of the American
movement is primarily the Spanish language, the French have taken aim
at English. The French have erected a linguistic regime that would shock
many Americans22-requiring not only the use of French in public, and
sometimes private, discourse (the nonrespect of which may be sanctioned
by criminal prosecutions), but policing the words used, in order to
eliminate foreign (mostly American) borrowings. They have created
Commissions on Terminology to eradicate foreign borrowings that
corrupt the language, and have attempted, with some exceptions, to limit
or to ban foreign tongues from, inter alia, advertising, television,
conferences and colloquia, employment contracts and offers, the schools,
and French universities.
Part II of this Article addresses language regulation in France; part III,
language regulation in the United States. Both parts dis;cuss in some
detail the histories of the French and English languages as well as their
places in the culture and political structure of France and the United
States, respectively. Although the history of language regulation and the
place of language in national culture are quite different in France and the
United States, there are enough similarities to make comparison
worthwhile.23 While the mythology of linguistic purity held dear by
many French is not part of American (English) culture, for many
Americans, English has become a kind of "truth language," considered
the only appropriate vehicle for the expression of the pol,,tical ideals of
American democracy.24 In addition, both the French and English
languages have held international hegemonies; both have been languages
of conquest; both have evolved by borrowing extensively from each
de la languefrangaise", 22 Les Cahiers de Droit 827 (1981); David Schneiderman, Dual(ling)
Charters: The Harmonics of Rights in Canada and Quebec, 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 235 (1992); Jos&
Woehrling, Les droits des minorit~s linguistiques et culturelles en cas d' venuelle accession du
Quebec 6 la souveraineth, 28 la revue juridique thmis 1035 (1994); Jcs6 Woehrling, La
modification constitutionnelle de 1987, la reconnaissance du Quebec comme socigtg distincte et la
dualit6 linguistique du Canada, 29 Les Cahiers de Droit 3 (1988).
22. That is not to say that many of the motivations behind the loi Toubcn, the French law
regulating language, would not receive a sympathetic hearing in the United Staies: the need to put
forth an alternative to the "Anglo-Saxon model of the world"; the need for the French language to
remain vibrant and vigorous; the need for a national language to maintain national unity; etc.
23. While neither treatment purports to be exhaustive, both hope to center the discussion of
language in context so that the ensuing legal analysis does not take place in a factual vacuum.
24. Nunberg, supra note 13, at 486-87. This echoes the sentiments expressed by the Nebraska
Supreme Court in Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100 (Neb. 1922), rev'd, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), see infra
notes 243-47 and accompanying text, which equated foreign language acquisition with subversive
political ideology. Nunberg, supra note 13, at 486-87.
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other; and both official language movements have a nationalistic25 and
xenophobic 6 bent, although they nevertheless appeal to a broad cross-
section of the population.
The results of this comparison are fascinating. Would we wish for
language laws backed by criminal sanctions? Should we adopt legislation
not only requiring that English be spoken or written in certain contexts,
but defining the kind of English we speak? Shall we, like the French,
have governmental commissions defining appropriate and inappropriate
(read: "legal and illegal") vocabularies for certain situations?27 If Official
English has any practical effect (i.e., if it is not purely symbolic28), it
would require a fundamental restructuring of the protections now offered
by the Bill of Rights in a way that would be antithetical to the American
constitutional tradition. Perhaps by temporarily removing the debate
from American soil it is possible to see Official English/English Only for
what it is: a movement, based largely on half-truths, that is at best
misguided; at worst, dangerous.
25. This is nothing new: At least since the nineteenth century, there has been an intimate
connection between language and nationalism. I Alexander Ostrower, Language, Law, and
Diplomacy 41 (1965). See also Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the
Origin and Spread ofNationalism (1983); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (1903).
26. For example, Dr. John Tanton, Chairman of the Board of U.S. English, a political organization
that advocates officializing the English language, has suggested that among the problems facing the
United States are the high birthrate, lack of respect for law, and Catholicism of "Latin American
migrants." Eleanor Bergholz, Bad Language over Official U.S. Tongue, Pittsburgh Post, Nov. 5,
1988, at 5. Tanton, one of the founders of U.S. English, also founded the Federation for American
Immigration Reform, which advocates immigration restriction. James Crawford, Official English
attracting bizarre followers, Mesa Trib. Oct. 22, 1988, at Al 1.
27. I do not suggest that current proposals go this far, only that, if an English Language
Amendment were enacted, they arguably could. See infra notes 359-70 and accompanying text.
28. Symbolism has an undeniable importance in the political life of a nation, but its treatment is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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II. LANGUAGE REGULATION IN FRANCE
"En France, la langue est une affaire d'Etat"29
A. Language Regulation and Development Prior to the French
Revolution
It is tempting to believe that modem languages, like modem nations,
always existed in current form. That is, of course, not so. The history of
modem French is one of conquest and change. What we now refer to as
"French" is a language essentially produced by a transformation of
Latin.3" Latin came to the territory that is now France with the conquest
of Gaul by the Romans.3 It took hold in the south and spread through the
north of a country then populated primarily by the Gauls, who, for the
most part, spoke Celtic.32 With the subsequent invasion of the now-
romanized territory of Gaul by peoples speaking germanic languages,
Germanic elements were introduced.33 Gaul disappeared and "France"
came into existence, at least in nascent form, with the ascendance to the
throne of Charles le Chauve (the Bald), grandson of Charlemagne,
following the battle of Fontenoy in 841 and the Treaty of Verdun in
843. 34 Under Charles's reign and in the eight centuries that followed,
29. "In France, language is an affair of State." Rapportfait au nom de la comnission des Affaires
culturelles (1) sur le projet de loi relatif 6i l'emploi de la langue franqaise, Journal Officiel de la
Rdpublique Frangaise [J.O.] Rapport No. 309, Sdnat, Sess. of Apr. 6, 1994, at 13 [hereinafter April
Senate Report].
30. Marcel Cohen, Histoire d'une langue: Le Frangais 20 (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1973). Of
course, this is an oversimplification. See generally I Ferdinand Brunot, Histoire de la Langue
Franaise 1-37 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966). Latin is, in turn, an indo-europ.an language, itself
influenced by Gaulish. Atlas de la Langue Frangaise 9 (Phillipe Rosillon ed., Paris: Bordas, 1995)
[hereinafterAtlas].
31. See Julius Caesar, The Conquest of Gaul (S.A. Hanford trans., 1951); Jean-Pol Caput, La
Langue Fran~aise 12 (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1972).
32. Celtic is also an indo-european language. It has survived in Scots and Irish Gaelic, Welsh,
Cornish, and Breton. Crystal, supra note 2, at 29&-99. The manner in which Latin spread throughout
Gaul is chronicled in I Brunot, supra note 30, at 17-37 and Caput, supra note 31, at 12.
33. 1 Brunot, supra note 30, at 57-60; Cohen, supra note 30, at 66-69. The people who most
influenced the French language were the Francs, who spoke Frankish, a germanic dialect (also
derived from Indo-European). Crystal, supra note 2, at 298-99. They eventually unified most of
Gaul in the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. Atlas, supra note 30, at 12.
34. Janet L. Nelson, Charles the Bald 1-18 (1992); Pierre Goubert, The Course of French
History, 2-3 (Maaten Ultee trans., 1988). The ascent of Charles the Bald to the throne of Western
Francia was chronicled by Nithard (a cousin of Charles) in Histoire desfils de Louis le Pieux. This
work, written in Latin, nevertheless contains a text written in Romane (a proto-French), the
celebrated Serments de Strasbourg (oaths of Strasbourg). Nithard recounts that three grandsons of
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Latin continued to be spoken and to be written, particularly by the
educated elite and the clergy. Alongside, the latinization of the country
produced the langue d'oc in the south and the langue d'oil in the north."
The latter, and more particularly, the Parisian dialect of the latter, rose to
preeminence and was adopted in the seventeenth century as "correct"
classical French.36 Several other languages continued to exist (and do to
this day) in regions of modem France-some of Latin or Celtic
derivation, others not.37
As political power in France became increasingly centralized,
France's rulers manifested a desire to impose the French language (i.e.,
the Parisian dialect of the langue d'ol) to the detriment of Latin and the
other languages spoken in France.3 8 Thus, in 1539, in the ordonnance of
Charlemagne, the sons of Louis the Pious, were to share his empire. Charles was to keep the Western
frankish domain, Louis was to take the germanic region, and Lothair was to keep an intermediary
region stretching from Wallonia to Italy. Lothair, however, wanted the entire empire for himself and
the other brothers allied against him. Louis and Charles brought their armies together at Strasbourg
on February 14, 842 to pledge their mutual fealty. Louis le Germanique read the text of a mutual
alliance and assistance pact to Charles's army in Romane; Charles pronounced the same discourse to
Louis's army in Germanic. Nithard, seeing the use of the language as important in and of itself,
recorded the oaths in the spoken languages (Germanic and Romane) rather than Latin. This text is
considered the oldest writing of French and one of the oldest writings of high German. I Brunot,
supra note 30, at 142-45; Cohen, supra note 30, at 71. The only known manuscript remaining of this
text is a copy made at Soissons around 1000 A.D. Cohen, supra note 30, at 432. See also Jacques
Chaurand, Histoire de la Langue Francaise 7 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972) (also
discussing "La Siquence de sainte Eulalie," the other early French text dated to this period); 1
Brunot, supra note 30, at 145 (discussing "La Siquence de sainte Eulalie," often referred to as "Ia
Cantilhne"); Caput, supra note 31, at 22-26. Even prior to the Serments de Strasbourg and the
Cantilne de sainte Eulalie, the common tongue was making headway against Latin in France, as
shown by the decision, in 813 A.D. of the Council of Tours that religious sermons should be
translated from Latin into either German or the "langue romane rustique." I Brunot, supra note 30,
at 142: David C. Gordon, The French Language and National Identity 22 (1978).
35. 1 Brunot, supra note 30, at 304-31. The names are derived from the different fashions of
pronouncing -out" ("yes") in the two regions. By 1000 A.D., "[French] simply meant the sum of the
various dialects derived from Latin spoken by the peoples of today's France." Gordon, supra note
34, at 22. Not for another eight centuries would a form of standardized "French" come to be
accepted as a common form of communication. Id.
36. Gordon, supra note 34, at 24-27.
37. Atlas, supra note 30, at 19-20; see also Maryon McDonald, We Are Not French! 6-7 (1989);
William R. Beer, The Unexpected Rebellion xvii-xxv (1980). There are seven regional minority
languages in France: Alsatian (about 1,260,000 speakers), Basque (80,000 speakers), Breton (about
550,000 speakers), Catalan (200,000 speakers), Corsican (about 162,500 speakers), Flemish (about
100,000) and Occitan (about 1,500,000 speakers). Instituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Comm'n of
the European Community, Linguistic Minorities in Countries Belonging to the European Community
119 (1986) [hereinafter Linguistic Minorities].
38. Early efforts to eliminate Latin apparently did not attempt to impose a single version of
French. Thus, the ordonnance of 1510 required only that criminal trials and investigations be held in
the "vulgaire langue du pays" (which one can translate roughly as "regional common tongue")
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Villers-Cotter~ts, a text that is still in force today, Frangois I proclaimed
"French"39 the official language of the courts, prohibiting the use of
Latin.40 Article 111 of the ordonnance provides:
It is... ordered that [all legal acts (arrests)] shall be written so
clearly that there be no ambiguity, uncertainty or need for
interpretation....
Since [misunderstandings] have often occurred regarding the
meaning of the Latin words contained in these acts, from now on it
is ordered that all acts (arrests) and all other procedures either of
royal, subordinate or inferior courts (cours souveraines ou autres
subalternes ou inferieures) or of registers (registres), surveys
(enquestes), contracts, commissions, sentences, testaments or any
other judicial acts or writs (exploits), or that which depends
thereon, shall be pronounced, registered and delivered to the parties
in the maternal French tongue and not otherwise."a
The ordonnance covered all official and administrative documents, 2
judicial proceedings and judgments, trials, and arguments, requiring that
they be in French, or, if presented in another language, translated into
French. This included the requirement that attorneys (avocats) present
their arguments in French. 3 Failure to comply with the ordonnance was,
rather than Latin. Vincent Delaporte, La loi relative d l'emploi de la lange frangaise, Revue
Critique de Droit International Priv6 [R.C.D.I.P.] 447, 451-52 (1976). See alo Richard Grau, Le
Statut Juridique des droits linguistiques en France, in Les Minorit~s en Europe 93, 93-94 (Henri
Gordon ed., 1992).
39. At that time, French was not yet standardized, and scholars debate whether the reference to the
"langue maternelfrangaise" permitted the use of a regional dialect (other than that of the king). It is
generally thought not. Cohen, supra note 30, at 159-60; Ren6e Balibar & Dominique Laporte, Le
Franqais National: Politique et pratiques de la langue nationale sous la R~volutionfrangaise 32-33
(Paris: Hachette, 1974) (pointing out that the inability to draft an act, a request, Dr any notarial act in
patois obliged those who were not of the "dominant" class to use translators in dealing with the
government or the legal system, creating a caste system); Jacqueline Picoche & Christiane
Marchello-Nizia, Histoire de la Langue Fran~aise 29 (Pais: Nathan, 3d ed. 1994).
40. See Philippe Malaurie, Le droitfranqais et la diversitg des langues, Clunet 565, 581 (1965).
41. 2 Ferdinand Brunot, Histoire de la Langue Frangaise 30 n.l (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967). Not
only are there many versions of the original in French writings, but there are many possible
translations of this text because it is written in old French.
42. Anne Judge, French: A Planned Language?, in French Today 7 (Carol Sanders ed., 1993).
Most of the legal scholars who have commented on the text confine its application to judicial
proceedings. Judge does not. She extends it to administrative and other text:;. Her interpretation
appears consistent with the text itself which refers to "arrests."
43. Malaurie, supra note 40, at 581-83 and cases cited.
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in principle, sanctioned by the invalidity of the offending act or
procedure,' but it does not appear that the law was rigorously applied.45
The stated purpose of the ordonnance was to avoid ambiguity and
uncertainty in the application of the law. Yet it was, above all, adopted
for political reasons--to reinforce as well as to symbolize the power of
the King.46 These provisions were extended over time (and with varying
degrees of ruthlessness) to new French territories: the B6am in 1621,
Flanders in 1694, and Alsace in 1685.4' Thus, the formation of the
modem French state entailed "the invasion and suppression of peoples,
who, in language and customs, had little in common with the French."4
By the seventeenth century, and particularly under the aegis of Louis
XIV, French became standardized and defined.49 The establishment of
the French Academy (l'Acaddmiefranqaise) by Royal Charter in 1635 is
44. None of the authorities consulted cite any cases prior to 1830 for this proposition. The cases
which are cited generally make reference to both the ordonannce and the laws passed during the
Revolutionary period, such as a few cases from Corsica, where Italian was in general use even for
public acts until the nineteenth century. The general approach of the French Court of Cassation,
when presented with the question, was to find invalid public acts written in Italian, where those acts
issued from a public official, see, e.g., Judgment of Aug. 4, 1859, Cass. req., 1859 Recueil
PNriodique et Critique [D.P.) 1 453 (nullit d'un exploit d'ajournementfait en italien par un huissier
corse); Judgment of Jan. 15, 1875, Cass. crim., 1875 D.P. 1 240 (nullitj d'un procds verbal rkdigg en
italien par un garde champdtre corse); Delaporte, supra note 38, at 453, n.18, but to uphold the
validity of notarial private acts such as wills or marriage contracts, see, e.g., Judgment of Jan. 22,
1879, Cass. req., 1879 D.P. 1219, (contrat de mariage); Judgment of Aug. 12, 1868, 1872 D.P. 1133
(testament authentique). See also Malaurie, supra note 40, at 583 (approving the court's solution as
required by national linguistic unity and the administration of justice); Grau, supra note 38, at 96-
97, (disapproving the court's solution and pointing out that the texts themselves do not require the
invalidity of the offending act, unlike other statutes which applied to certain French territories).
45. It was apparently difficult to stop judges and lawyers from using Latin, as such had been their
custom for a long time. Delaporte, supra note 38, at 452. The universities continued to use Latin in
teaching and for books. 2 Brunot, supra note 41, at 31.
46. Philippe Malaurie writes: "[F]or France under the monarchy, national unity could not allow
for the diversity of official languages-nor of religions-although it left a multiplicity of laws to
flourish." Malaurie, supra note 40, at 578. This may, however, be a reconstruction of the past
influenced by the present. This image of nation-building grows out of concepts of nationality which
did not exist until some 200 years after the adoption of the ordonnance. Moreover, it seems clear that
in 1539 the ordonnance was not directed towards the masses (the "ruled and uncultivated") but the
elite. McDonald, supra note 37, at 5. See also Delaporte, supra note 38, at 451 (agreeing with
Malaurie that this text was designed not only to eliminate Latin but also regional dialects).
47. Grau, supra note 38, at 94. See also Judgment of Aug. 4, 1859, Cass. req., 1859 D.P. 1 453,
454.
48. Beer, supra note 37, at 2; see also Lars Olsson, La Politique Culturelle de la France d l'6gard
de ses minorits linguistiques, 74 Modema Sprdk 237, 240 (1980).
49. See 3 Ferdinand Brunot, Histoire de la Langue Francaise pt. I (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966).
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perhaps the best known result of this effort." Article 24 of the
Academy's charter (statuts) provides that its mission is to "work, with all
possible care and diligence to give clear rules to our language, and to
render it pure, eloquent and able.",
5
'
To accomplish its task, the 40 members of the Academy were to
produce a dictionary of the French language, as well as works on
grammar, rhetoric, and poetics. 2 The first two volumes of the first
edition of the Dictionnaire were presented to the King on August 24,
1694; the first volume of the ninth edition (A-Enzyme) was published in
1992 by the national printing office of France.53 As the official
commemoration of three centuries of Academy dictionaries put it in
1994:
Even though the notion of usage rests on a broader basis today than
[it did] in the 17th century, respect for proper usage (le bon usage)
is needed more than ever. It is riot the Academy's intention either
simply to reflect the language or to reflect just any language.
[Rather,] the Academy reminds us that there is a community of
human beings who share the French language and are therefore
responsible for it .... If, three hundred years after being presented
to the king, the Dictionnaire de l'Acadgmie has remained a living
work, it is because it symbolizes the rather exceptional link that
unites a nation to its language, many nations to their common
tongue.5
While the Academy has virtually no legal control over the French
language, other than its own status as a public institution, its moral
50. The Academy was at first unofficial, being a literary society that met at the home of Valentin
Conrart (who became the Academy's first permanent secretary). It was Cardinal Richelieu who
decided to officialize the Academy, out of a love of literature, certainly, but more importantly to
further his political desire to unify and centralize the government of France. The Academy was
granted its letters patent in 1635 by the King, who named Richelieu as its head and protector, and
was registered with the Parlement in 1637. Le Dictionnaire de l'Acadimie Frang-2ise: 1694-1994 sa
naissance et son actualitM 19 (Paris: Institut de France, 1994).
51. Id. at23.
52. Id. (citing art. 26 of the Statuts).
53. Dictionnaire de l'Acadimie Franfaise (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1992,. The version more
commonly available was published in 1994. Dictionnaire de lAcad~mie Fran!aise A-Enz (Paris:
Juilliard, 1994). The new dictionary, containing 45,000 words, with only about 13,000 new terms, is
expected to be finished by the end of the century. By way of comparison, the new Oxford English
Dictionary, containing 616,500 words in 20 volumes, took seven years to complete. Joseph Harriss,
Qu'est-ce que c"est? A Social Club or a Cultural Bastion?, 20 Smithsonian 144, 152 (1990).
54. Le Dictionnaire de l'Acadimie Frangaise: 1694-1994 sa naissance et son actualitY, supra
note 50, at 8.
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authority and symbolic value to the French people are clear.5 Its creation
during the seventeenth century coincided with a period in which French
became more than simply "a medium of personal self-expression";
indeed, French elites came to see their language as "a function of
civilization, a weapon against nature. 56 And, although the rules of bon
usage may not have been legally enforceable, they were certainly
indirectly enforceable "through access to posts of influence." 57 This
preoccupation with language has remained particularly strong in French
culture. Indeed, this view of French as pure, as civilized, as supreme,
has not only been held by the French. Classical French spread throughout
Europe, becoming the language of diplomacy and the educated elite. It
was thus in 1783 that Antoine Rivarol could write his famous essay on
"The Universality of the French Language" for which he was awarded
the Prize of the Academy of Sciences and Letters of Berlin. 9
B. The "Linguistic Terror" of the French Revolution
The importance attached to language took a different turn during the
French Revolution. No thorough synthesis of the complex relationship
between law and language can be made in so short a space as this Article,
55. Joseph Harriss writes:
Apart from tinkering interminably with a dictionary to keep the French language pure, [the
Academy] serves no visible purpose. Yet, it seems to fulfill a French need for grandeur. Its
coveted, theatrical uniform has long symbolized the crowning achievement of a distinguished
career for the country's writers, academics, scientists, jurists and other Establishment figures. Its
40 members constitute the officially recognized fine fleur of French civilization, though the
French themselves are hard put to say why.
Harriss, supra note 53, at 145.
56. Gordon, supra note 34, at 4.
57. Judge, supra note 42, at 12.
58. Gordon, supra note 34, at 4, 7; Harriss, supra note 53, at 145 (noting that "Paris is still the
only city that I know of where until fairly recently you could list your profession in the phone book
as 'Homme de Leltres.'); Nunberg, supra note 13, at 481 (noting that:
[i]t strikes the French as perfectly natural that government should pass laws to limit the amount
of airplay given to foreign-language songs; that it should spend fiilly half its foreign-service
budget to subsidize the teaching of the French language abroad; or that recent spelling reforms
should have been announced at prime-ministerial press conferences.)
59. Antoine Rivarol, L'Universalit de la Langue Franqaise (Paris: Arla, 1991). The essay
addressed a subject proposed by the Academy of Berlin in 1783:
What is it that has rendered the French language universal?
Why does it deserve this prerogative?
May one presume that it will keep it?
Id. at 27.
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but linguistic questions of both vocabulary and idiom preoccupied the
revolutionaries. 6 Both as a celebration of the Revolution amd as part of
the generally anticlerical tendency of the Revolution's philosophy, the
Revolutionaries abolished the gregorian calendar in 1793: The new year
starting in September had twelve months of thirty days each, with
evocative names such as "brumaire," 'florgal," and 'fruc.idor."' They
also abolished the French Academy during the Tenor62 (it was
reestablished in 1795)3 and adopted their own set of language laws, to
make French a "national" language. The report of Jacobin leader Barre
concluded that the aristocracy had erected a linguistic barrier between the
masses and themselves, thereby controlling access, in particular, to the
legal system and all the organs of government. Bar~re wrote:
Despotism maintained the multiplicity of languages: a monarchy
must resemble the Tower of Babel; there is only one universal
language for the tyrant: that of force, to be obeyed and that of taxes,
to collect money. On the contrary, in a democracy, control of the
government is a task entrusted to each citizen; to control [the
government] one must know it, and most of all, one must know its
language.... To leave citizens ignorant of the national language is
to betray the country; to let the flow of the enlightenment be
poisoned or obstructed; to ignore the benefits of the printing press,
each printer being a public teacher of the language and of the
60. See generally Peter Flaherty, The Politics of Linguistic Unifornity During the French
Revolution, 14 Hist. Reflections 311 (1987); Jacques Guilhaumou, La Langue Politique et la
Rivolution Frangaise (Paris: M~ridiens Klincksieck, 1989); Les Id~ologues, Sgm,'otique, theories et
politiques linguistiques pendant la R~volution francaise (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins
et al. eds., 1986); Michel de Certeau et al., Unepolitique de la langue, La R~volutionfranqaise et les
patois: L'enqudte de Grigoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1975). For a novel analysis of the Jacobin approach
to language, see David A. Bell, Lingua Populi, Ligua Dei: Language, Religion, and the Origins of
French Revolutionary Nationalism, 100 Am. Hist. Rev. 1403 (1995) (arguing provocatively that the
Revolution's preoccupation with language stemmed from its preoccupation with religion).
61. Or, "foggy," "flowery," and "fruity." The five days left over were originally known as the
"sansculottides," and later "complementary" days. The names of the months were ntended to "evoke
the seasons, but defy easy translation. Scornful British contemporaries, however, rendered them:
"Slippy, Nippy, Drippy; Freezy, Wheezy, Sneezy; Showery, Flowery, Bowery; Heaty, Wheaty,
Sweety." William Doyle, The Oxford History of The French Revolution 442-43 (1989). See also A
Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution 538-47 (Frangois Furet & Mona Ozoufeds., 1989).
62. It was said to be infected with "the incurable gangrene of aristocracy." Harriss, supra note 53,
at 147. Three members were guillotined on the Place de la Concorde, two comritted suicide, and
three died in prison. Id. See also George A. Kelly, Victims, Authority, and Terror 208-10, 289
(1982) (describing the decision to destroy the Academies).
63. Judge, supra note 42, at 12 (noting that "[the Academy] was reconstituted in a diminished
form in 1795 and re-established in its original form in 1816").
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law.... Citizens, the language of a free people must be one and the
same for all.
As soon as men think, as soon as they can share their thoughts,
the empire of despots, priests and conspirators is close to its ruin.
Let us thus give to the citizens the instrument of public thought,
the surest revolutionary agent, the same language.'
If Bar~re attacked foreign and regional languages, the Abb& Grrgoire
saw the patois (dialects) of France as barbaric at best, subversive at worst
(and to be eliminated)." According to the report he prepared for the
Revolutionary Convention, at the time of the Revolution twelve million
people, being one-half of the population of France, still did not speak
"French" and only three million were capable of speaking it "correctly,"
i.e., according to the rules set forth by the grammarians under the
monarchy."
The Convention essentially agreed with its reporters and promulgated
the law of 2 thermidor an II (July 20, 1794), providing:
Article 1. As of the date of publication of this law, no public act
may, in any part of the territory of the Republic, be written other
than in the French language.
Article 2. [forbids the registration of any documents, even private
acts (sous seingpriv6), not written in the French language]
Article 3. Any civil servant or public officer.., who from the date
of publication of this law, draws up, writes or subscribes, in the
64. Le Rapport Barere, Rapport du Comitd de Salut Public sur les Idiomes, Archives
Parlementaires, I' s6rie, T. LXXXIII, sbance du 8 pluvi6se an 11, n'18, at 713-17 (Paris, Ed.
C.N.R.S., 1961), reprinted in Certeau, supra note 60, 291, 296-97. Bar~re directed his attacks
mostly against regional and foreign languages that were then spoken in France: "Federalism and
superstition speak Breton; emigrant aristocracy and hatred of the Republic speak German;
counterrevolution speaks Italian; and fanaticism speaks Basque." Id. at 295. Barrre did not consider
it necessary to attack the "patois" (dialects of French) spoken mostly in the countryside: "[Patois]
did not prevent knowledge of the national tongue. If [the national tongue] is not equally well-spoken
everywhere, at least it is easily understood." Id. "Patois" is a term that is difficult to define. Bell uses
it to refer to regional (provincial) languages as well as dialects, but Barre did not. See Bell, supra
note 60, at 1404-05.
65. Grbgoire's objective was to totally eliminate les patois, because of his belief that, among other
things, "knowledge and use of the national language [French) are important to the maintenance of
freedom." Le Rapport Gr~goire, Convention Nationale, stance du 16 prairial an 11 Rapport sur la
Necessitd et les Moyens d'An~antir les Patois et d'Universaliser l'Usage de la langue Franvaise,
reprinted in Certeau, supra note 60, at 300, 303.
66. Balibar & Laporte, supra note 39, at 32.
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exercise of his duties, any minutes, judgments, contracts or other
acts ... in dialects (idiomes) or languages other than French, will
be brought before the criminal court (le tribunal de police
correctionnelle) of his domicile, sentenced to six months in prison,
and discharged from his office.
Article 4. [applies the punishment of article 3 to registrations of
documents].67
Although this law was later suspended,68 it was subsequently
reenacted (in less severe form) by the arrt of 24 prairial an X69 and
remains in force today. The Jacobin philosophy of "one people, one
nation, one language"7° has been extraordinarily successful: In the few
cases presented to it on this question, the Court of Cassation has
consistently held that the ordonnance of Villers-Cotterts and the
Revolutionary texts require that any public act not drafted in French be
invalidated, the mandatory use of the French language being an
"essential principle of public law" (and a matter of ordre public),
required for the sound administration of justice and national linguistic
unity.7
C. The Law of 1975 on the Use of the French Language (loi Bas-
Lauriol)
French in the "Century of English "7 2-- "[le]juge pnal... devenu
l'arbitre du langage"73
The ordonnance of Villers-Cotter6ts and the texts adopted during the
French Revolution had as their effect the official imposition of French as
the language of the law. French became mandatory for the courts, for the
67. Reprinted in Balibar & Laporte, supra note 39, at 96-97. See also Delaporte, supra note 38, at
452; Malaurie, supra note 40, at 583-84.
68. By the decree of 16 fructidor an 11. See also Delaporte, supra note 38, at 452.
69. The patois and regional languages of France have nonetheless pertisted in spite of
governmental policies ranging from benign neglect to aggressive suppression. See, e.g., Martyn
Lyons, Politics and Patois: The Linguistic Policy of the French Revolution, 18 Austl. J. French Stud.
264(1981).
70. Olsson, supra note 48, at 241.
71. See, e.g., Judgment of Aug. 4, 1859, Cass. req., 1859 D.P. 1453.
72. Fishman, supra note 12, at 129.
73. "The criminal judge as arbiter of the language." Delaporte, supra note 38, at 466.
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government (l 'administration), and even for notarial acts.74 Yet, unlike
many other European nations, there was no constitutional provision
making French the official language of France75 nor, other than the
Academy's tireless surveillance, was there any attempt to legislate the
content of French. As one French writer notes:
There is no sovereign body that determines what is or what is not
the true language; notably, the Acadgmie frangaise is only,
according to the proverbial saying, the traditional guardian and
scribe of the language; [the Acad6mie] does not exercise any public
authority when it collects words or creates grammatical rules....
Our language is not codified.... [P]idgin French (le petit nogre),
low class French (le style concierge), gibberish (le charabia),
franglais, are bad French, but French nevertheless.76
This changed abruptly during the last thirty years.
During the nineteenth century and the early part of this century,
French had enjoyed an international hegemony as the language of
international affairs and conferences-of "cosmopolitan conversations"
of all kinds." But as France's position in geopolitics eroded, so did the
perceived utility of its language, and English quickly replaced French as
the chief language of international discourse, particularly as the United
States assumed a leading role in the world economy.7"
74. Malaurie points out that it was notarial acts, and particularly wills, which created the biggest
problem, for, unless the notary was completely bilingual (and could therefore hear the will in a
foreign language, write it in French, and then read it back to the testator in the foreign language) the
formalities of the notarial act, requiring that the testator dictate and read the will, could not be
complied with. Indeed, because the notary had to control the accuracy of the testament, no translator
or interpreter was permitted to intervene, leaving the testator without a remedy. Malaurie, supra note
40, at 584-85 (citing Judgment of May 4, 1807, Cass. civ., Jur. Gen. V° Disposition No. 2874;
Judgment of Aug. 3, 1891, Cass. Civ., D.P. 1893.1.31; Judgment of Dec. 18, 1956, Cass. Civ., J.C.P.
57,11, 9718, note de M. Jacquillard; Code Civil [C. civ.] art. 972).
75. Malaurie, supra note 40, at 567-68 (pointing out that one cannot have a legal definition of
French because "the laws which govern it are not those of any State").
76. Id. at 569.
77. The phrase is Herbert Shenton's. See Shenton, supra note 9.
78. Although French was one of the only two languages made official by the League of Nations
and was the dominant language of the League, Shenton, supra note 9, at 378, it was not originally
proposed as a working language of the conference convened to Organize the United Nations in San
Francisco in 1945. When the Heads of Delegation met to organize the conference, the French
delegation requested that both English and French be used as working and official languages because
"it was essential not to give support to the efforts which have been made to eliminate as an
international language, French, the traditional language of diplomacy, and one of the great languages
of civilization, by any action taken at [the] Conference." U.S. Dep't of State, The United Nations
Conference on International Organization 7 (1946). Some countries then stated that they would be
willing to accept French in addition to English as a working language but requested that their own
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As English began to dominate international commerce and affairs,
English words increasingly appeared in French. This is not an unusual
linguistic phenomenon, but as early as the 1950s the French began to
fight back. Dubbed 'franglais," this French laced with anglicisms was
the subject of newspaper articles and books denouncing this "pollution"
of the French language. The call to arms came in 1964 with Professor
Etiemble's work, Parlez-vous franglais?,79 which argued that the
appearance of franglais was a symptom of the cultural and economic
imperialism of the United States following World War 11.80 He wrote, for
example, about the "liberation":
The yankee soldiers distributed everything liberally, with a
varying mix of generosity, childishness and imperialistic
afterthoughts....
language be included as an official language. Id. Eventually, English, Russian, Chinese, French, and
Spanish were adopted as the official languages of the conference, French and English being the only
working languages. Id. at 265. The rules adopted at the conference were later adopted as provisional
rules of procedure of the U.N. General Assembly. 1946-47 U.N.Y.B. 63, 31"', U.N. Sales No.
1947.1.18. The provisional rules became final, so that French and English are now the only two
working languages of the U.N. Nevertheless, only one-tenth of the documents produced by the
Secretariat of the United Nations are in French, and almost all of its computer programs are now in
English. Mind Your Language: France, The Economist, Mar. 23, 1996, at 54.
Shenton collected some interesting information on the linguistic practices of the League of
Nations. According to his data, obtained by counting the speeches made in plenary sessions in 1920,
1924, and 1927, the use of English declined over time, so that:
[A]lthough the League [was] legally bilingual, a situation exist[ed] in practice which
amount[ed] to a virtual control by French. Outside of the English-speaking group, almost all
other countries express[ed] themselves in French. . . . Delegates to the League Assemblies
[were] trained experts and diplomats, and apparently the knowledge of French [was] not a major
difficulty in selection of delegates.
Shenton, supra note 9, at 381.
79. Etiemble, Parlez-vous franglais? (Saint-Amand: Gallimard, 1964). Etierrble raged against
what he referred to as the "sabir atlantique, cette vari[t4 new look dufranglais (roughly translated as
'jargon from the [other side of the] Atlantic, this new look variety of franglais"). .d. at 33. Thus, he
cited with approval a study on "clandestine americznisms and anglicisms":
The truly pathological anglicisms and americanisms do not appear in their natural state,
completely raw or completely naked, which would already denounce them and put us on our
guard against their use, but under a mask which disguises their hideousness from us. With their
innocuous air, who would believe them to be so frightening? The more insidicus they are, the
more they are harmful, because we are less suspicious.
Id. at 36-37 (quoting from a study by M. Victor Barbeau, Cahiers de l'acadimie canadienne-
frangaise (1960)).
80. Thus he wrote that the American "liberators" of Paris would never have er tered the war had
not millions of Russians already died in fighting the Nazis, and had not the American economy,
ruined during the Great Depression, needed shoring up. Id. at 289-90.
A French Lesson
... At the last minute, the Americans agreed not to assume direct
administration of the country. They thus presented themselves as
disinterested liberators. The Marshall plan, an idea that was in
effect open and generous, aggravated the generally favorable
prejudice [toward the Americans]....
Apart from brief interludes our purported governors, our so-called
leaders, were only, after the resignation of General [Charles] de
Gaulle, the agents of the will of Washington.8
The solution, he argued, was to struggle against, to become allergic to,
this "yanquisation."' 2
Although controversial, Etiemble's work struck a sensitive chord. The
French government responded to combat the "invasion" in two ways.
First, government committees were established to devise ways to defend
the language 83 and to recommend the replacement of English borrowings
by French words.84 Second, legislation was adopted in 1975 requiring the
81. Id. at 290-99.
82. Id. at 296.
83. In 1966, President de Gaulle signed a decree establishing the "High Committee for the
Defense and Expansion of the French Language." Decree No. 66-203 of Mar. 31, 1966, J.0. Apr. 7,
1966, at 2795. That decree was amended in 1973 when the "High Committee of the French
Language" replaced the "High Committee for the Defense and Expansion of the French Language."
Decree No. 73-194 of Feb. 24, 1973, J.0. Feb. 28, 1973, at 2204. It was amended again in 1980 by a
decree which expanded the mission of the High Committee, whose task became, not only to
encourage the defense and expansion of the French language, but also "to establish necessary links
with competent public and private entities notably with respect to cultural and technological
cooperation, to provoke or encourage any initiatives with respect to the defense and expansion of the
French language and to evaluate its results." Decree No. 80-414 of June 11, 1980, J.0. June 13,
1980, at 1451.
Finally, the amended 1966 decree was abrogated by Decree No. 84-91 of Feb. 9, 1984, J.0. Feb.
10, 1984, at 554. Decree No. 84-91 created a Consulting Committee of the French Language, as well
as a General Commissariat. Art. 1. The Consulting Committee's mission was to study questions
relative to the use and diffusion of the French language, as well as questions relative to la
francophonie, languages in France, and France's policy with respect to foreign languages. Art. 2.
The Commissariat's function was to create and coordinate the actions of administrative agencies and
public and private entities that participate in the diffusion and defense of the French language. Art. 6.
84. A few years after the creation of the High Committee for the Defense and Expansion of the
French language by Decree No. 66-203 of Mar. 31, 1966, J.0. Apr. 7, 1966, at 2795, Decree No. 72-
19 of Jan. 7, 1972, relative to the enrichment of the French language, J.0. Jan. 9, 1972, at 388, was
enacted. This decree created commissions on terminology, attached to each administrative agency,
which would establish an inventory of gaps in French vocabulary and propose new terms either to
"designate a new reality" or to replace "undesirable borrowings from foreign languages." Art. 2.
These commissions would report to the High Committee, which would coordinate their activities.
Art. 4. Eventually, each minister would establish official lists of either mandatory ("list 1") or
recommended ("list 2") expressions and terms. Art. 5. Terms appearing in list I had to be used in all
legal documents and correspondence issued by the State, in all contracts to which the State (or a
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use of French in certain contexts, and prohibiting the use of foreign
(read: "English") terms to the extent that officially approved terms had
been created to replace the offending words or phrases."
The 1975 law, also known as the law of Bas-Lauriol after its
legislative sponsors, requires the use of French in areas that were thought
to have been particularly corrupted 6 by the influence of English: Article
1 covers the marketing of goods and services, and advertising in
public institution) was a party, and in all educational materials or research publications used in
institutions either operated or controlled by the State or receiving State funding of any kind. Art. 6.
The 1972 decree was abrogated in 1983 by a decree that provided that commissions on
terminology would be created on the proposal of the "High Committee of the French Language,"
after consultation with the Minister of National Education. Decree No. 83-243 of Mar. 25, 1983, art.
I, J.O. Mar. 29, 1983, at 955. The commissions would still establish an inientory of gaps in
vocabulary and propose new terms for new situations, but their missions no long.er included the task
of proposing new terms to replace undesirable foreign terms. The commissions' new tasks were to
harmonize terms by taking advantage of French as spoken outside of France anti also to encourage
diffusion of new terms among the population (the users). This 1983 decree was abrogated by a 1986
decree that was virtually identical to the previous one. See Decree No. 86-439 of Mar. 11, 1986, J.0.
Mar. 16, 1986, at 4255. The commissions are still functioning and have been very busy. A list of the
terminology established by their decrees can be found in the 462-page Dictionnaire des Termes
Ogciels de la Langue Frangaise published by the Journal OJficiel de la R~publique Franvaise in
January 1994.
85. Law No. 75-1349 of Dec. 31, 1975, J.0. Jan. 4, 1976, at 189.
86. According to popular wisdom in France, only certain kinds of borrowings from foreign
languages are "permissible." See, e.g., Delaporte, supra note 38, at 455; see also infra note 99. That
is, some are compatible with the morphology, lexicography, and syntax of French, but others are not.
Thus "hamburger" or "sandwich" is permissible, but "minivan" is not. (The official French term for
the latter is "monospace.") Dictionnaire des Term s Oficiels de la Langue Frangaise, supra note 84,
at 260. Although Etiemble and others have attempted to explain why this is so, and why English
borrowings corrupt more than, for example, Arabic borrowings, their explanations appear tied to a
concept of the purity of the classical French language, a theory of dubious linguistic validity. This
point was eleoquently made by Senator Frangoise Seligmann during the debates on the loi Toubon.
Quoting from Fnelon, she stated: "Of what importance is it whether a word is born in our country,
or comes to us from a foreign land? ... Let us borrow from all sides all that we require to render our
language clearer, more precise, more concise and more harmonious." J.O., D~bats Parlementaires,
S~nat, Sess. of Apr. 12, 1994, at 967. A more scholarly treatment of the subject can be found in
George Thomas's excellent work on linguistic purism. Thomas writes:
[P]urism [is] an attitude to language which labels certain elements as "pure" (therefore
desirable) and others as "impure" (therefore undesirable). For the professional linguist ... even
this basic distinction is questionable. Equally dubious is the assertion that to remove the
'impure' elements is to render the language "pure."
George Thomas, Linguistic Purism 19 (1991). As Professor Thomas adds, however, the interesting
question is "not whether purists are right or wrong to structure their thinking abcut language in this
way, but rather why they do so, and what actions stem from this thinking." Id. Ore of the clear links
that Professor Thomas makes is between nationalism and linguistic ptuism. He writes:
"[N]ationalism and purism share many core features.... Both phenomena seek to affirm or discover
what is truly native by the exposure, eradication or diminution of precisely those elements which
threaten to undermine the prestige, unity or autonomy of native institutions." Id. at 136.
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particular; 7 articles 4 and 5 address offers of employment and
employment contracts covering work to be performed in France;88 article
6 addresses signs in public buildings;89 and article 8, contracts entered
into by public entities or collectivit~s in France.9" The constitutionality of
the law was assumed. After all, the lack of a constitutional provision
notwithstanding, ever since the ordonnance of Villers-Cotter~ts, it has
been a fundamental principle of public law that French is the language of
the Republic of France.9
Even without questioning the practicality of the 1975 law, one
immediately sees that it presents many legal difficulties in its application.
First, many of the law's commands lack sanctions. This is the case with
respect to the provisions on employment contracts.92 For example, if an
employment contract were drafted by an employer in English, in
violation of article 4, and the employee sought to enforce the contract,
87. Article 1, paragraph 1, line 1, provides:
Use of the French language is compulsory with respect to the name, the offer, the
presentation, the advertising, written or spoken, the instructions for use, the description of the
scope and the conditions of [the] warranties of a good or a service, as well as with respect to
invoices and receipts. The use of any foreign term or expression is prohibited if there exists any
term or expression approved according to the conditions set out by Decree No. 72-19 of 7
January 1972 relative to the enrichment of the French language.
Line 2 provides that one or more translations into foreign languages may accompany the French
text, and paragraph 2 applies these rules to advertising or presentations of programs on the radio or
television.
88. Article 4 requires employment contracts to be drafted in French, and like article 1, forbids the
use therein of any foreign terms or expressions if there exist officially authorized French equivalents.
It does permit a foreign worker, however, to request a translation of his or her employment contract,
and states that in the case of conflict between the two texts, the text in the language of the worker
prevails.
Article 5 completes article 4 by requiring that offers of employment be written in French (without
the use therein of any foreign terms or expressions if there exist officially authorized French
equivalents). It specifies that even if the job requires a perfect knowledge of a foreign language, and
even if the employer is not of French nationality, the job description must still be in French. Two
exceptions are permitted: publications principally in a foreign language may receive offers of
employment in that language, and offers of employment expressly intended for foreign residents may
be written in a foreign language.
89. In buildings and locales frequented by foreigners, however, as well as in public transportation
which could be used by foreigners, foreign language translations may accompany the mandatory
French inscriptions. Art. 6.
90. "Collectivits" is a term referring to regionally based local governmental entities such as
d~partements (somewhat akin to counties) or communes (which resemble municipalities). They have
legal personality and are entrusted with local government administration. Gerard Cornu, Vocabulaire
Juridique 148 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987).
91. See Grau, supra note 38, at 94-95.
92. See April Senate Report, supra note 29, at 35.
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could the employer defend itself by arguing that the contract was invalid
because it violated article 4?93 What a curious result for a law
purportedly intended to protect French consumers and workers!94
Second, the sanctions that are indicated are difficult to apply. Article 3
provides that anyone failing to comply with article I" will be punished
under the law applicable to commercial fraud, i.e., could be subject to a
significant fine.96 The problem, of course, lies in the fiact that it is a
criminal court (lejuge p~nal) that will determine whether or not a text is
drafted "in French." But what criteria will the judge apply? The
legislature stopped short of requiring that the text be drafted in "good
French"; 97 thus, a certain number of foreign borrowings ought to be
permissible (as long as they are not officially prohibited by the
Terminology Commissions).98 But how is the judge to know?99
93. For an excellent analysis of how one might handle this sort of problem, :ee Delaporte, supra
note 38, at 469-70. Thomas Carbonneau points out that the law would not require an employment
contract between a French company and French employee who was to work abroad to be written in
French, but would require that an employment contract between a foreign employer and foreign
employee who was to work in France be written in French--even if the employee did not speak
French! Thomas E. Carbonneau, Linguistic Legislation and Transnational Commercial Activity:
France and Belgium, 29 Am. J. Comp. L. 393,404 (1981).
94. As Delaporte points out, the law does not actually ask whether the person whose protection is
invoked (i.e., the worker or consumer) actually speaks or understands either French or the prohibited
foreign language. Thus, because the law does not distinguish between, for example, offers of sale
made to the public at large, and offers to individuals, the latter would presumably have to be made in
French. This would be true even if the particular individual in question did not understand French.
Delaporte, supra note 38, at 474. In any event, the consumer protection rationale was, to some
extent, a legislative afterthought. Although certain aspects of the law were inter ded to have as their
result protection of the French consumer, the bill started out as an "attempt to thwart the
'degradation' and 'contamination' of the French language." Carbonneau, supra note 93, at 398.
95. See supra note 87.
96. It is no easy task to establish what the precise fines were under the 1975 law. The Law of 1975
refers one to article 13 of the Law of August 1, 1905 on commercial fraud. (This law is now incorporated
in an appendix to the Code de Consommation). This law, in turn, punishes infie.ctions as third class
contraventions. Prior to the enactment of the new criminal code in 1992, which entered into force on
March I, 1994, third class contraventions were punishable with fines ranging from 600 to 1300 francs.
Code Pnal art. R.25, J.0. Mar. 30, 1993, at 5559 (incorporating Decree No. 85-956 of Sept. 11, 1985,
art. 3). Perhaps one reason that the law has been so infrequently applied is that the fines are cumulative,
so that if an article is labeled or advertised in violation of the law, each offending a-tile (of which there
might be hundreds or thousands) would give rise to a separate offense. This possibility is discussed by
Paul Pigassou, V0 Fraudes etfalsifications, in Rep. Pgnal Dalloz §§ 370-371 (1995).
97. Early drafts of the law did not. They would have prohibited any words "derived from foreign
words" or "linguistic forms not in conformance with French syntax." Delaporte-, supra note 38, at
466.
98. Id. at 466-67. Delaporte also points out that, although such was not the legislature's intent, by
prohibiting use of anything other than the "French language," the law technically outlaws the use of
the regional languages of France. Id. at 467-68. To this author's knowledge, no such application of
the law was ever made, however, and during the law's reenactment and expansion in 1994, its
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Because of its difficulties in application, the 1975 law was very
infrequently applied-indeed, it was generally ignored.'00 A few cases
were brought by private citizen groups, in particular AGULF (the
Association Ggnjrale des Usagers de la Langue Frangaise), which
challenged companies that failed to use French in selling their
products.' Thus S.E.I.T.A., a French national tobacco company, was
successfully prosecuted for advertising a brand of cigarettes called
"NEWS" in English only, 0 2 even though the packets themselves were in
both French and English.'0 3 Similarly, in the "Quick Affair, " the Belgian
restaurant company "Quick" was successfully prosecuted for using
English words (such as "giant," "big," "bigcheese," "Fishburger,"
inapplicability to the regional languages in France was made clear. See Law No. 94-665 of Aug. 4,
1994, art. 21. J.0. Aug. 5, 1994, at 11392.
99. Prime Minister Raymond Barre promulgated a Circulaire on March 14, 1977, attempting to
clarify aspects of the 1975 law. In addition to reiterating the consumer protection aspects of the law
as its principle objectives, the Circulaire attempts to define with more precision the permissible and
impermissible uses of foreign terms. Thus, article I of the Circulaire states:
The French language has annexed, over the course of time, a certain number of foreign words
that have entered into common use, some of which appear in ordinary dictionaries; they are only
permissible if they have no French equivalent.
Such is the case, for example, with terms such as:
With respect to food products: beefsteak or bifteck, golden (apple), sandwich, spaghetti, toast;
With respect to textile products: blue-jean, short: ...
Circulaire of Mar. 14, 1977, J.0. Mar. 19, 1977, at 1483. Article 2 of the Circulaire adds that
"When there are gaps in French vocabulary, it may be enriched according to the procedures [set out
in] Decree No. 72-19 of 7 January 1972 concerning the enrichment of the French language." Id. As
has been noted elsewhere, this "explanation of the role of the work of the commissions on
terminology is elliptical." Carbonneau, supra note 93, at 400.
100. Prosecutions under the law have been few. In the years 1990 to 1993, 963 infractions were
reported, 487 warnings were issued, 476 cases were sent to prosecutors, but only 37 convictions
were obtained. April Senate Report, supra note 29, at 37. Even though some prosecutions were
successful, the courts were not generally favorably disposed towards the law. For example, a sewing
machine company, Fox France, was prosecuted for importing sewing machines that included two
notices in English only, a "Parts list" and an "Instruction Book," in violation of article 1. Because the
discovery of the offending material was made during a customs inspection prior to the marketing or
sale of the machines to French consumers, however, the Court of Appeals of Rouen held that as
article I was intended to protect French consumers, it would not apply as the machine had not yet
been put on the domestic market. This decision was upheld by the Court of Cassation. Judgment of
Oct. 22, 1985, Cass. Crim., available in LEXIS, Priv6 Library, Casscr File.
101. For a description of litigation brought from 1978 to 1981, see Carbonneau, supra note 93, at
408-10.
102. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1982, Court of Appeals of Paris, available in LEXIS, Priv6 Library,
Appel File. This decision was upheld by the Court of Cassation. Judgment of Mar. 12, 1984, Cass.
Crim., available in LEXIS, Priv6 Library, Casscr File.
103. Id. The advertising used only the English words "20 Filter-tip cigarettes." The French would
be "20 cigarettes d bout filtrant," or at least "20 cigarettes filtres."
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"cheeseburger,"' 4 "softdrink," etc.) to designate the foods and beverages
it offered for sale, even though each customer was given a menu in
which the words were accompanied by pictures of the items for sale, as
well as a description in French of the exact composition of the items and
their prices. Interestingly, the court of appeals overturned the conviction
(r~laxer) on the basis that the photos and description of the products
sufficed to protect the consumer and thus effectuated substantial
compliance with the law. The Court of Cassation reversed, however,
holding that:
In reducing the aim of the law of December 31, 1975 to consumer
protection ... whereas this text, of a general character and which is
intended to- safeguard the French language contains no such
limitation, the Court of Appeals has misunderstood the sense and
the scope of [this law] .... ."
One would not be complete without mentioning the tendency for the
law to be used, occasionally in bad faith and generally unsuccessfully, to
challenge otherwise valid contractual obligations. For instance, a French
company sought (unsuccessfully) to avoid payment for advertisements it
had placed in a Swiss professional journal on the basis that the contracts
between the two companies (as well as the advertisements themselves)
were written in English rather than French. 6
104. Jacques Neher, Ad Firms Meet French 101, Int'l Herald Trib., June 29, 1994
("Cheeseburger" cannot be used because it is not French, but "hamburger" is fine). See supra note
99.
105. Judgment of Oct. 20, 1986, Cass. Crim. (I'affaire Quick), available in LEXIS, Priv6 Library,
Casscr File. In a followup decision, the High Court was presented with the issue whether the correct
approach would not have been to research whether in fact there were any equiva ent French terms to
replace the offending americanisms, or, in the alternative, whether they were trademarks (which
would not be subject to the law). The Court did not reach the issue, holding that it had not been
preserved for appeal. Judgment of Apr. 25, 1989, Cass. Crim., available in LEXIS, Priv6 Library,
Casscr File.
106. Judgment of Apr. 3, 1987, Court of Appeals of Lyon, available in LEXIS, Priv6 Library,
Appel file. In a similar vein, a company was prevented from relying on the: fact that manuals
accompanying the sale of a computer were in English to avoid payment of the purchase price, the
court holding that although the 1975 law does require the manuals be in French to avoid criminal
sanction, this requirement is not "an element of the validity of the contract entered into between
individuals." Judgment of Mar. 14, 1985, Court of Appeals of Lyon, available in LEXIS, Priv6
Library, Appel File. (The court may have been influenced by the fact that a French translation of the
manual was made available and that the company did not protest until two months after delivery.) In
another case, an insurance company was prohibited from relying on an exclusion clause to avoid
payment where the clause was not drafted in French. Judgment of Nov. 24, 1993, Cass. Crim.,
available in LEXIS, Priv6 Library, Casscr File.
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D. The Law of 1994 on the Use of the French Language (loi Toubon)
We currently see more English words in Paris than we saw German
words under the Occupation.
Michel Serres'
07
Linguistic protectionism remained on the back burner for some time
after the adoption of the loi Bas-Lauriol, but several factors coincided in
the late 1980s and early 1990s to once again make linguistic legislation a
"hot" political item. While an exhaustive enumeration is beyond the
scope of this article, a brief recapitulation follows.
To begin with, the domination of English in the fields of science and
computers had become increasingly apparent. 8 International scientific
colloquia held in France often used English as the only official language.
Although this was certainly a practical solution, given the expense of
translation and the fact that, often, few of the participants were French-
speaking (and virtually all could communicate in English), it
understandably rankled the French." 9 To add insult to injury, in 1989,
the prestigious Institut Pasteur (located in Paris) decided to change the
title of its journal from "Annales de l'Institut Pasteur" to "Research in
Microbiology, Immunology and Virology," and to publish in English."0
107. As quoted by Jean-Pierre Peroncel-Hugoz, "La francophonie dans la Constitution?", Le
Monde, May 8, 1992.
108. As Brian Weinstein put it:
Since France's traumatic defeat in 1940 and the divisive and humiliating years following that
disaster, French elites have feared the decline in the instrumental value of their language would
mean they would be cut off from useful information; that French would be a poor vehicle for the
expression of their own ideas and discoveries; and that it would be an inadequate qualification
for employment. By 1970, for example, it was a well known fact that less than 10 percent of all
scientific publishing was in French; another sign came from NATO where 90 percent of the
technical documents are now written in English, the language which also dominates commercial
aviation and satellites.
Brian Weinstein, Francophonie:A Language-Based Movement in World Politics, 30 Int'l
Organization 485, 487 (1976).
109. Of course, one might take as a compliment the fact that people from all over the world would
like to use one's capital city as a conference site, in spite of the fact that they did not speak the
language.
110. Jean-Paul Dufour, M. Alain Decaux veut inciter les scientjfiques h utiliser le frangais dans
leurs travaux, Le Monde, Jan. 12, 1990. This provoked an outcry. Thus, the institute announced it
would also issue a review destined for a larger audience and entitled "Annales de I'Institut Pasteur-
Actualits" which would be in French. See Jean-Pierre Peroncel-Hugoz, La dbfense de la science en
frangais: En dpit de l' motion soulev&e en 1989 par la r~daction en anglais des publications de
l'Institut Pasteur, le diclin dufrangais comme langue scientifique se poursuit, Le Monde, Mar. 25,
1992 (complaining that French scientists cannot be promoted unless they publish in English).
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On the artistic front, American movies and television programs had
been inundating French screens for decades. At the same time and for a
variety of reasons, the French cinema was in trouble. The French made
this an issue both at the European Community level"' and in multilateral
trade negotiations, eventually obtaining a watered down "cultural
exception" in the latest round of GATT negotiations." 2
Third, and perhaps most importantly, European integration was
proceeding at a pace which was frightening to some. The narrow
approval of the Treaty of Maastricht by the French people in the popular
referendum held in 1992 evidenced a certain schizophrenia about
l'Europe, although France's political leadership at the time was strongly
pro-European. With the reunification of Germany and its increased
leadership role in the European Union (EU), as well as the proposed
accession of new Member States that would presumably prefer English
I 1. Led by the French, the audiovisual industries of Europe successfiully petitioned the European
Parliament to pass a resolution supporting the inclusion of a general "cultural exception" clause in
the 1994 GATT Uruguay round. This clause would allow member states broad discretion in
protecting their audiovisual industries in order to "preserve and promote the sub-national, national or
regional cultural identities." GATTIAudio-Visual: European Parliament "Supports" Cultural
Exception, Tech Europe, Oct. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, EURCOM Library, ECNEWS File.
However, faced with strong opposition from Amrica, European Community negotiators abandoned
their insistence on a general "cultural exception" clause and settled for th. exclusion of the
audiovisual industry from GAIT rules. EU: EP Approves Changes to Community Trade
Regulations, Reuter Textline Agence Europe, Dec. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, EURCOM
Library, ECNEWS File. For an explanation of the various strategies considered to exempt the
audiovisual industry in Europe, see GATT/Audiovisual: Update on an Increasingly Controversial
Dossier, Tech Europe, Nov. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, EURCOM Library, ECNEWS File. The
French protest against the American film industry goes back to the 1920s, according to a study by
Diana Quintero, American Television and Cinema in France, 18 Fletcher F. of World Aff. 115
(1994).
112. The European Council passed the directive known as "television without frontiers" on
October 3, 1989, Council Directive No. 89/552, 1989 O.J. Eur. Comm. (L 298) 23, stating that
"[m]ember states shall ensure where practicable... that broadcasters reserve for European works...
a majority proportion of their transmission timz." Art. 4. As a result of the ambiguous "where
practicable" clause, compliance with the directive has ranged from strict enforcement in France,
where the government has repeatedly fined television stations for violating the quota, to substantial
avoidance in Britain, where a movie channel was exempted because the quotas were not
"practicable." Janet L. Conley, Hollywood's Last Hurrah? "Television Without Frontiers" Directive
May Close Borders to the European Community's Broadcast Market, 14 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 87,
99 (1993). For a history of European attitudes t.ward American broadcasting, see Lawrence G.C.
Kaplan, The European Community's "Television Without Frontiers" Directive: Stimulating Europe
To Regulate Culture, 8 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 255 (1994). This directive does not directly cover films,
only television, although it does address films shown on television! See Alan Riding, TV Cold Bath
for French Cinema, Int'l Herald Trib., Jan. 10, 1996, at 10.
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to French as a second language, it also became clear that French was
losing the hegemony it once had in the Community Institutions.'
These factors combined to create a perception to some of a French
Republic that had not only lost any vestiges of empire it once had, but
was being Americanized," 4 invaded by immigrants, and attacked by
Eurocrats in Brussels (who were not only taking more and more power
away from national governments, but were talking about giving more
power to regions within nation states). This view was held not only by
right wing fanatics, although they may have had more militant ideas
about what to do about it. On July 11, 1992, an appeal to the government
to "do something" appeared in the French newspaper Le Monde. Entitled
"The future of the French language" and signed by 300 well-known
individuals, the notice read:
There exist in France fanatics of le tout-anglais [English for
everything] who are more and more daring. They are making the
French doubt their own language and... are weakening its worth
in other countries.
These angloglottes ... forget, above all, that language is not a
varnish, a merchandise, is not a material like any other; it is what
carries and structures thought. It is through language that we
experience the world and [have] the simple pleasure to be
oneself."5
Thus attacked from without and from within, politicians eager to
capitalize on these feelings of insecurity fought back.
1. La Francophonie
On the one hand, the loose grouping of French-speaking states and
regions known as la Francophonie"6 was proferred once again as a new
cultural (and, eventually, political and economic) empire. Perceived as a
113. Although French remains an official language of the EU and is still the working language of
the European Court of Justice, many new institutions, such as the European Monetary Institute, use
English as their working language.
114. See Dominique Noguez, La Colonisation Douce 126-27 (Paris: Le Rocher, 1991).
115. Appel--Lavenir de la languefrangaise, Le Monde, July 11, 1992, at 5.
116. The term, according to Le Monde, can be attributed to French geographer Onesime Reclus,
who coined it in 1880. Depuis plus de cent ans, Le Monde, Nov. 20, 1991. It translates roughly as
"French-speaking nations".
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sort of French "commonwealth," the idea behind la Francophonie is that
French-speaking nations should cooperate in international affairs to
increase the prestige and use of the French language and culture and, in
the process, raise their own political and economic status."7 President
Charles de Gaulle had been particularly instrumental in taking up the
leadership of this movement in 1965, with his promotion of "le Quebec
libre.,,' " Since the creation of the "Haute Comitg de la languefrangaise"
in 1966 by de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou (then his Prime
Minister)," 9 the movement has become increasingly institutionalized,
culminating in the elevation of the Secretary of State for la
Francophonie, a post created in 1986,120 to a cabinet position, the
Minister for Cultural Affairs and la Francophonie.12 1
Had the Francophonie movement become organized and cohesive, it
probably could have taken on an important transnational role in world
politics. 2 It did not, however, probably because the movement attempts
to ally many individuals and groups with different, often competing,
interests. For example, there is an obvious competition be-tween France
and her ex-colonies, the elites of which often speak French, but who wish
to pursue goals independent of France.'23 To constitute a cohesive
117. Weinstein defines it as "a worldwide movement of interlocking elites working toward
permanent association on linguistic grounds." Weinstein, supra note 108, at 485. For a fine critique
of the francophonie policy, see Paulin G. Ditj6, The French Revolution and the French Language: A
Paradox?, 16 Language Probs. & Language Plan. 163 (1992).
118. Atlas, supra note 30, at 118.
119. See supra note 83; see also Atlas, supra note 30, at 118; Depuis plus de cent ans, Le Monde,
Nov. 20, 1991.
120. This position was attached to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and charged with the
orientation, support, and coordination of the governments and organizations of francophone
countries. Decree No. 86-730 of May 2, 1986, J.0. May 6, 1986, at 6045.
121. Decree No. 93-797 of Apr. 16, 1993, J.0. Apr. 20, 1993, at 6432 (relatifaux attributions du
ministre de la culture et de lafrancophonie). See generally Haute Conseil de la Francophonie, ,tat
de lafrancophonie dans le monde (Serge Briand ed., Paris: La Documentation frangaise, 1994).
122. Weinstein, supra note 108, at 486.
123. Weinstein writes:
[Slome ethnic francophones such as Qu6becois and Walloons resent any implications that
Francophonie is a way for France to bring enlightenment to the French-speaking world. They
are proud of themselves as North Americans and Belgians and many express strong dislike for
French "arrogance" and disdain for French technical "backwardness." Further, although de
Gaulle's "Vive le Qudbec libre" and later attempts to help minorities were viewed with
enthusiasm by many Walloons, Jurassians, and Valdotains, the Africans perceived such slogans
to be a call for division which, translated to the African stage, could have disastrous finales.
Another potential and deeper crack in Francophone solidarity widens when :he ethnic French
complain about being lumped together with Africans [i.e., non-whites].
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political movement, la Francophonie has had to construct a belief system
based on the purity of French, on the superiority of French (notably over
English), and on sentimental attachment to French as the shared language
of a community of states many of which have nothing in common other
than the fact that some of their citizens speak French (or some version
thereof).'24 Finally, promoters of la Francophonie have conveniently
overlooked the inconsistencies between France's often ruthless
suppression of minority languages in France and its promotion of French
as a minority language in states such as Canada or Belgium. All this has
made it difficult for France to create out of la Francophonie a French
"commonwealth" having any kind of real political or economic clout."2 5
2. The Constitutional Amendment of 1992 and the loi Toubon
"La France aux Frangais " 26
As part of the package of amendments to the French Constitution
necessitated by the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, article 2 of
the Constitution was amended in 1992 to make "French" the official
language of France.'27 Inserted between the national flag (le tricolore)
and the definition of the French Republic as "indivisible, secular,
democratic and social,"'28 the addition of this provision, while having
Id. at 492-93.
124. And, Weinstein adds, on the standardization of French, a proposition that is demonstrably
incorrect. Id.
125. President Jacques Chime's controversial decision to resume testing nuclear weapons in the
South Pacific symbolizes this French desire to set an independent "French" course in world politics.
Ironically, however, President Chirac distressed many of his compatriots by recently appearing on
the Larry King television talk show to demonstrate his fluent English. (It is reported that Frangois
Mitterand never spoke English to anyone.) See Jim Hoagland, Sacred Blue! The French President
Spoke English, Int'l Herald Trib., Oct. 26, 1995.
126. "France for the French!" exclaimed Senator Raymond Courrire during the legislative debate
on the "lo! Toubon," evoking the Ptainist slogans of the Vichy era. See J.O., Dtbats Parlementaires,
S~nat, Sess. of Apr. 13, 1994, at 1001.
127. Constitutional Law No. 92-554 of June 25, 1992, J.0. June 26, 1992, at 8406.
128. Article 2, after the amendment of 1992, read:
The French Republic is indivisible, secular, democratic and social. It ensures equality before the
law for all its citizens regardless of origin, race or religion. It respects all [religious] beliefs.
The language of the French Republic is French.
The national symbol is the tricolore flag, blue, white and red.
The national hymn is "the Marseillaise."
The Republic's motto is "Liberty, Equality, Brotherhood."
Its principle is: government of the people, by the people and for the people.
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little direct legal effect, nevertheless raises to a constitutional principle
what was already the law under the ordonnance of Villers-Cotter&s and
the law of 2 thermidor--that all public acts of the French Republic must
be in French. It remains to be seen how this provision will affect the
status of the regional languages of France.'29 It is also not clear how it
will interact with the provisions of the Constitution protecting the liberty
of expression, although the decision of the Constitutional Council on the
loi Toubon, discussed below,3 ° suggests that its effect wi.ll certainly be
more than just symbolic. It is also interesting to note the similarity
between this provision and the constitutional amendments proposed by
the Official English movement in the United States.'
Most significantly, the Minister of Culture and la Francophonie,
Jacques Toubon,3 2 (nicknamed "Jack Allgood" by irreverent members of
the French Press!) proposed revisions to the 1975 law in order to try,
once more, to eliminate the creeping use of English from French life and
French commerce and science, in particular.'33 Public support for such a
move was far from unanimous, particularly given the lackluster
Article 2 was amended again in 1995 and the first paragraph placed in a separate article which
became article I. Constitutional Law No. 95-880 of Aug. 4, 1995, J.0. Aug. 5, 1995, at 11,744.
129. In a recent response to a parliamentar/ question as to the effect of the Constitutional
amendment declaring French to be the official language of the Republic on the status of legal texts in
German in Alsace-Lorraine, the Minister of Justice stated that neither legislatioa nor governmental
decrees may be promulgated or published in a foreign language anymore. Ministerial Response No.
21345, Nov. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, Loireg Library, Repmin File. Notwithstanding, as the
constitutional amendment did not have as its aim to invalidate pre-existing legislation, such would
remain in force, although it would necessarily have to be translated. Id. Thi3 principle may be
applied in a manner that is a bit more flexible in practice, however, than this response would
indicate-it is reported that in January, 1993, Minister of Education and Culture Jack Lang signed an
agreement that recognized German as an official language, along with French, in Alsatian schools.
Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz, Constitutions of the Countries of the World, at vii (Fr. Supp.
1994).
130. See infra part II.D.3.
131. See infra notes 296-312 and accompanying text.
132. Toubon is a close ally of Jacques Chirac, who was, at the time, mayor of Pails, and who became
President of France. Toubon's goal is to develop French culture abroad--to propose an alternative to the
Anglo-Saxon model of the universe. Edward Mortimer & David Buchan, Mine! Your Language-
Jacques Toubon, The Fin. Times, Nov. 29, 1994, at 20.
133. A bill was initially proposed by Catherine Tasca, Secretary of State for la francophonie
under the government of Pierre Beregovoy. Je&n-Pierre Peroncel-Hugoz, La premiere annde de
Mine. Tasca t lafrancophonie "Une bataille pour lefrangais est indispensable dnns les sciences, au
sein des organisations internationales, et mime sur les murs de nos villes"; nous d~clare la
secr~taire d'Etat, Le Monde, July 15, 1992. The bill died and was resuscitated by Toubon. See Jean-
Pierre Peroncel-Hugoz, Des pans entiers de l'activit6 nationale deviennent bilingues, " Le Monde,
July 20, 1993. See generally La languefrangaise, L'Express, Jan. 13, 1993.
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performance of the loi Bas-Lauriol,'34 and the British and American press
had a field day with Toubon's proposal.'35 Toubon nevertheless moved
his legislation forward, receiving the approval of the Council of
Ministers on February 23, 1994,136 and introducing the bill to the French
Senate on January 27, 1994.
31
The legislation, known as the "ioi Toubon,"'38 went through various
drafts and was extensively debated by both the Senate and the National
Assembly, but there were few fundamental differences in either the law's
overall structure or philosophy between the version introduced in
January and the law finally approved July 1, 1994. 9 The principles
134. Jean-Pierre Peroncel-Hugoz, Mme. Tasca va demander une session extraordinnaire du
Parlement pour examiner son projet de loi sur "1'emploi du Frangais en France," Le Monde, Dec.
10, 1992 (noting that public opinion was divided on the advisability of Mine. Tasca's projet de loi,
especially with respect to the sanctions). The permanent secretary of the French Academy agreed
that there had been significant "pollution" of the French language but recommended better education
rather than legislation. Jean-Claude Lamy, Le " 'accuse" de Maurice Druon, Le Figaro, Mar. 16,
1993 ("Let it be known that I am not fighting against English, which is an allied language, but
against Anglo-American gibberish (un sabir anglo-ricain).") (quoting the secretary). See also Paul
Bogaards & Johan Matter. Lefrangais mal illustrh, mal difendu, Liberation, July 1, 1993 (The
authors point out that they have never met any of the fanatics of the tout-anglais. They also bemoan
the isolationism of French linguists who will not attend linguistic conferences in either Greece or the
Netherlands and will publish only articles written in French in their linguistic journal, Etudes de
linguistique appliqu, which excludes those who can read but not write French from participation in
the journal, making it in fact a journal franco-franqaise.); Laurent Lemire, Dictionnaires: Du
nouveau pour le Petit Robert, La languefrangaise n 'a jamais 916 aussi inventive, La Croix, Sept. 14,
1993 (interviewing Josette Rey-Debove and pointing out that French has become very inventive
lately, creating many new words such as "enarque," which means someone who graduated from the
Ecole Nationale d6 l'Administration (ENA) and which combines an acronym and a Greek root).
135. One British politician proposed a law banning words like croissants and baguettes from
everyday use and included a provision to fine anyone 10 pounds if they were caught speaking French
in public. Paul Gould, British Lawmaker Seeks French Ban, UPI, July 5, 1994, available in LEXIS
NEWS Library, UPSTAT File. The Economist wrote:
If the French laws on speeding, smoking in public places or dog dirt are anything to go by, the
critics [of the law] should have little to worry about. The new law on the French language is
likely to be blithely ignored by the vast majority of French people-just as the radical changes
in French spelling, announced three years ago, have been. General de Gaulle always said that his
countrymen were an ungovernable lot-Dieu merci.
The Economist, Comkdiefrangaise, July 9, 1994, at 54. See also Sharon Waxman, C'est What? A
Language Barrier; France Proposes Ban on English Expressions, Wash. Post, Mar. 3, 1994, at Cl.
136. Nathaniel Herzberg, Toubon boute l'anglais hors dufrangais, Liberation, Feb. 24, 1994, at
17; Jean-Pierre Peroncel-Hugoz, Projet de loi sur l'emploi du Frangais Avances et lacunes, Le
Monde, Feb. 25, 1994.
137. Projet de Loi relatifei l'emploi de la languefrangaise, No. 291, J.O., S~nat, Sess. of Jan. 27,
1994.
138. Law No. 94-665 of Aug. 4, 1994, J.O. Aug. 5, 1994.
139. The bill was first debated by the Senate on April 12-14, 1994. J.O., D~bats Parlementaires,
S~nat, Sess. of Apr. 12, 13, 14, at 948-73, 982-1007, 1078-97, 1137-49. It was presented to the
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underlying the law's adoption were clear: (i) to protect the French
language by mandating its use in French territory and (ii) to ensure its
"linguistic purity" by outlawing the introduction of foreign (read:
"English") elements into its lexicon. Not content merely to make French
the official language of France, which was presumably achieved by the
law of 2 thermidor and the ordonnance of Villers-Cotter.tss, the 1994 law
attempts to do what the 1975 law was unable to do: require that French
be used by private citizens in France in all aspects of public discourse.
Moreover, not just any French will do. The government (indeed, the
criminal courts) will be the arbiter of what will be considered "French"
or not.
To support the legislation, the government cited the need to protect
France's identity and the identity of the French people; to maintain
French participation in the sciences and the world economy; and to
eliminate the "contamination" of French culture by the English
language 4 and American ideas. 4 ' In the words of the Commission on
Cultural Affairs:
Today, according to fashionable magazines, the young and
energetic modem executive encounters "les challenges" in the
course of "le meeting" where he spends his time "dispatchant" his
appointments, his schedule being "surbookg" between "un concert
live" and "un happening" at the theater.... Laziness, indifference
and also very often a desire to look cool ("dans le coup") are
responsible for the increasing degeneration of our language,
Assembly on May 3, 1994, J.O., D6bats Parlementaires, Assembl~e Nationale [J.O.A.N.], Sess. of May
3, 1994, at 1359-71, 1375-1411, then returned to the Senate for discussion on May 26, 1994, J.0.,
Dbats Parlementaires, S~nat, Sess. of May 26, 1994, at 1891-1919, and revisi:ed by the National
Assembly on June 13, 1994. J.O.A.N., Sess. of June 13, 1994 at 2886-95. The Commission Mixte
Paritaire was convened to resolve some relatively minor differences between the Assembly and Senate
versions of the Bill. Rapportfait au nom de la Commission Mixte Paritaire, No. 1429 A.N., No. 547
S~nat, June 23, 1994. The Commission's report was accepted by the National Assembly on June 30,
1994, J.O.A.N., Sess. of June 30, 1994, at 3898, and by the Senate on July 1, 1994, J.O., Dbats
Parlementaires, S~nat, Sess. of July 1, 1994, at 3338. The bill was given final legislative approval on
July 1, 1994. Id. at 3337-38.
140. The supporters of the legislation claim that they are not "anti-English," rather, that they are
against the English generally used in intemationel affairs, which they refer to as "basic American,"
Rapportfait au nom de la Commission des affaires Culturelles, Familiales et Scciales sur le projet
de loi relatif a l'emploi de la langue franqaise, Rapport No. 1158, A.N., Apr. 21, 1994, at 13
[hereinafter April Assembly Report], and which they claim is contributing to the decline of the
French language (and by implication, the decline of France).
141. Secondary justifications were also presented: First, a need to act prior to the enactment of
any EU legislation that might be less favorable to the French language; second, a need to stop the
French from relying too heavily on English, which the April Senate Report predicted would take a
backseat to Spanish by the year 2010. April Senate Report, supra note 29, at 26-28.
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through a complex mix of snobbery, pseudo-culture and fear of
looking old-fashioned because of one's inability to juggle foreign
words.'42
Although both Minister Toubon and the Commission claimed that the
bill's real purpose was multiculturalism,' the law contains very little in
the way of protection for or promotion of the minority languages of
France.' Indeed and rather ironically, both the government and the
legislators relied on a somewhat distorted account of the successes of the
American "Official English" movement to support the proposition that it
is both necessary and appropriate for nations to "protect" their national
languages from contamination by foreign tongues. 4 ' Citing the need to
lead the francophone countries in their quest to create a French-speaking
commonwealth, as well as the need to force private individuals to cherish
their language (and ignoring the well-reasoned criticism of the law, in
particular from the Socialists),'46 Toubon made a passionate appeal for
protection of the French language on the Senate floor: "The French
language is a language of liberty, of democracy. It is the language of
dreams for many persons imprisoned, who, for years, have dreamed of
democracy, of liberty, of independence."' 47
142. April Assembly Report, supra note 140, at 9.
143. See April Senate Report, supra note 29, at 7; Speech of Jacques Toubon to the Senate, J.O.,
D.bats Parlementaires, S~nat, Sess. of Apr. 12, 1994, at 949; see also April Assembly Report, supra
note 140, at 15. The legislative history suggests, and subsequent government efforts do emphasize, a
campaign favoring "le plurilinguisme europken," see Etat de lafrancophonie dans le monde, supra
note 121, at 42, and the 1994 law does make knowledge of two languages, in addition to French, a
goal of French education. Art. 11(11).
144. Various attempts were made to amend the law to shore up protection for the minority
languages of France. These were all rejected both by the government and the parliament. Article 21
of the law as adopted provides: "The provisions of this law apply without prejudice to the legislation
and regulations in force concerning the regional languages of France."
As various spokespersons for the regional languages of France pointed out, however, there is
virtually no legislation in force on the status of minority languages in France except for the Law of
January I1, 1951 (lot Deixonne). See Olsson, supra note 48, at 245-46. That law permitted for the
first time an optional teaching of I hour per week of four regional languages: Basque, Breton,
Catalan, and Occitan. Law No. 51-46 of Jan. 11, 1951, on the teaching of local languages and
dialects, J.O. of Jan. 13, 1951, at 483. Corsican was also extended this privilege by decree in 1974.
Olsson, supra note 48, at 245. The French government has refused to sign the European Charter on
Minority Languages. Atlas, supra note 30 at 23, stating that it is "manifestly impracticable because
of its complexity and the obligations it imposes." J.O., D~bats Parlementaires, Snat, Sess. of Apr.
13, 1994, at 983 (statement of Minister Toubon).
145. See April Senate Report, supra note 29, at 6.
146. The Socialists abstained from voting when the Assembly adopted the bill and later brought a
constitutional challenge to it. See infra part IL.D.3.
147. J.O., D~bats Parlementaires, S~nat, Sess. of Apr. 12, 1994, at 950.
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The legislation substantially expanded the provisions of the 1975 law,
which already required that private individuals and public entities use
French in specific situations. 4 8 Not only is the use of French mandated in
offering goods or services to the public (article 2), 9 " but failure to
comply with these requirements is punishable as a fourth class
misdemeanor (contravention) by a significant fine. 5 ' Obstruction of a
148. The text of the 1994 law is set out in the Appendix to this Article.
149. Although the legislature's intent may have been to remedy the general ineffectiveness of the
1975 law by assuring that the provisions of the loi Toubon were associated with appropriate
sanctions, in fact, very few articles of the new legislation are accompanied by spezific sanctions, and
those which are provided are not always clear. For example, one commentator has suggested that
article 2 (which is accompanied by criminal sanctions, see art. 23) could be applied to international
contracts for the sales of goods or international financings. Gilles Kolifrath, Les consequences de la
loi Toubon en matitre de contrats definancement internationaux, 44 Banque & Droit 14, 17 (1995).
Although he may be correct insofar as those contracts are to be carried out in France, one wonders
whether it would be arguable nevertheless (and in spite of the proclamation in art cle 20 that the law
is a matter of public policy (ordre public)) that the law could not be applied to inttrmational contracts
under the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation in Messageries maritimes (Cass. Civ., Judgment of
June 21, 1950). Messageries maritimes suggests that international contracts may under certain
conditions escape the application of French ordre public, or at least that the force of such ordre
public would be lessened (attenu6) in the international arena. Too, nothing in the legislative history
suggests specifically that application of the loi Toubon to all the international financial contracts, for
example, drawn up by international lawyers working in Paris law firms was intended, and the
presence of article 5 (applying specifically to public sector contracts) suggests that had the
legislature wished to address this problem, it would have done so directly. While a detailed
discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this Article, given the inclusion of article 20 in the loi
Toubon, and the fact that a violation of article 2, if found, would be punishable by criminal
sanctions, caution may be advisible with respect to such matters.
150. Contraventions are divided into 5 classes of offenses according to the punishment imposed
(which increases from first to fifth class). Currently, the penalties are:
1 a maximum fine of 250 francs for a 1st class contravention;
2* a maximum fine of 1000 francs for a 2d class contravention;
30 a maximum fine of 3000 francs for a 3d class contravention;
40 a maximum fine of 5000 francs for a 4th class contravention;
50 a maximum fine of 10,000 francs for a 5th class contravention, [and,] in case of repeated
violations, the fine may be increased up to 20,000 francs.
Nouveau Code penal [N.C. pen.] art. 131-13.
When the 1994 law was originally introduced, the government proposed that violations of the
requirement to use French be punished as second or third class contraventions, depending on the
case, except for the requirement to use French in advertising goods or services, a -violation of which
would have been punishable as a fifth class contravention. This would have made the maximum
penalty 10,000 francs (per violation), which could have been doubled to 20,000 francs for
recidivists. April Senate Report, supra note 29, at 59. The implementing decree punishes infractions
of the 1994 law as fourth class contraventions. Decree No. 95-240 of Mar. 3, 1995, J.0. Mar. 5,
1995.
As one commentator has noted, the criminal sanctions imposed upon private parties do not apply
to public entities (or private persons acting in a public capacity) that violate the mandate of article 5
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police investigation into violations of the 1994 law is punishable by up to
six months in prison and a fine of 50,000 francs.15' Although the intent of
the new law was, at least in part, to clarify the existing law in order to
render it more easily enforceable, the recent issue of an interpretive
Circulaire by Prime Minister Alain Jupp6 attempting to explain various
provisions of the 1994 law suggests that the new law will no less difficult
to apply than the old.
52
The law also makes explicit that any public announcement (a notice of
a concert, a meeting, or a job, for example) posted in a public place or in
a place open to the public, such as a caf6, must be in French." 3 Article 6
addresses conventions and colloquia held in France, providing that
"[e]ach participant in a demonstration, colloquium or convention
organized in France by . . . French nationals has the right to express
himself in French" and requiring that any program distributed prior to or
during the meetings be written in French. 54 This provision was the
subject of great debate by the legislature. The government's initial
position was that any non-French communications during a conference
had to be accompanied by summaries in French.' This was
to use French in contracting with other parties. Line 4 of Article 5 provides that a party violating this
requirement will be deprived of being able to rely on a provision in a foreign language if so doing
would harm the other party. Also, pursuant to article 15, the violator would be required to refund any
public subsidies received. Kolifrath, supra note 149, at 14-16.
15 1. Art. 17. See also April Senate Report, supra note 29, at 92.
152 Circulaire of Mar. 20, 1996, J.C.P. G III 67,891 (Apr. 3, 1996).
153. Art. 3. The legislative history suggests that translations of such notices may be furnished,
see, e.g., April Senate Report, supra note 29, at 65-66, as does the text of article 4 itself. Article 4
adds that any translations furnished by public entities or private persons performing a public service
must be made in at least two languages. Art. 4. The requirement of two languages (as opposed to
one) was an amendment proposed in the Senate and adopted over the objection of the Commission
on Cultural Affairs and the government. J.O., D1bats Parlementaires, Snat, Sess. of Apr. 13, 1994,
at 991-92. Its intent was to avoid favoring English. Finally, although this is not clear from the law,
the implementing decree renders violations of article 3 punishable as a fourth class contravention.
Decree No. 95-240 of Mar. 3, 1995, art. I, J.O. Mar. 5, 1995, at 3514.
154. Art. 6. Paragraph 3 excepts conventions that involve only foreigners or which are held to
promote French trade. Id. 3. Sanctions for failure to observe this law include the possible loss of
government subsidies, art. 15, as well as substantial fines, Decree No. 95-240 of Mar. 3, 1995, art. 2,
J.O. Mar. 5, 1995. For example, article 2 of the implementing Decree makes it a fourth class
contravention to fail to include a French summary in the preparatory or working documents
distributed to the participants of a conference covered by article 6 of the 1994 law. Art. 2. The
provision is not limited to conferences held by public agencies, nor is it limited to conferences of any
particular size. See id. Thus, a small, private conference that did not fall within the very limited
exceptions of article 6 would presumably be subject to the law, even if all the participants were non-
French-speaking residents of France (and therefore not foreigners within the meaning of the law).
See Art. 6.
155. April Senate Report, supra note 29, at 69, 104.
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subsequently attenuated 5 6 as it became clear that its general effect would
be to make France (and particularly Paris) a much less desirable location
for international conferences.
57
Articles 8 through 10 of the 1994. law expand upon articles 4 and 5 of
the 1975 law by requiring not only that employment contracts to be
performed in France be written in French, but that all work-related
documents, such as collective bargaining agreements and the company's
r~glement int~rieur,"' be written in French.'59 Like the 1975 version of
the law, a foreign employee may request his employer to provide him
with a translation of his contract in his own language.160 And, to meet the
criticism that the 1975 law was ineffective because it did not provide for
appropriate sanctions for violations, article 8 of the 1994 law provides
that if an employer does not comply with the linguistic regime governing
employment contracts in France, the employer cannot "iavoke against
the employee [any] clauses of an employment contract written in
violation of [article 8]. ' ' l6l
Article 11 of the law is new. It provides: "French is the language of
teaching, of examinations and competitions, and of theses and
dissertations in public and private educational institutions, except where
necessary for the teaching of regional or foreign languages and cultures
or where the teachers are associated or visiting foreign professors."'16
2
Although this provision appears to state the obvious, it prohibits the
use of foreign languages in university courses, for example in medicine,
where there might be large numbers of foreign students present (who
might wish to study in English). It also, by its text, prohibits a professor
156. French summaries are required only at the publication stage under article 6 of the law as
finally adopted.
157. April Senate Report, supra note 29, at 70-71. The Socialists tried to further reduce the scope of
article 6, by limiting its application to publicly funded colloquia, but they were outvoted. J.0., D6bats
Parlementaires, S6nat, Sess. of Apr. 13, at 996-1007.
158. A r~glement intirieur is an official company document setting forth the company's internal
working rules. See Comu, supra note 90, at 675.
159. Arts. 8-10.
160. Art. 8. Failure to provide a worker with a French copy of any document defining his work
obligations is punishable as a fourth class contravention. Decree No. 95-240 of Mar. 3, 1995, art. 3,
J.O. Mar. 5, 1995.
161. Art. 8.
162. Art. 11, 1. Paragraph 2 of article I I excepts from this requirement: foreign schools, schools
for foreign students, and educational institutions where the instruction is intended to be of an
international character (such as the International Lyc6e at St. Cloud). April Assembly Report, supra
note 140, at 47.
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from accepting a thesis in a foreign language, even if he or she has a
perfect understanding of the language.'"3
Finally, the 1994 law increased the restrictions on advertising job
offers in any other language than French,'" on the registration of non-
French trademarks by government entities,"'6 and on the use of protected
marks (such as Nike's "Just do it" slogan) to avoid the ban on the use of
English in advertising.'66 And, to encourage private enforcement actions,
the new law codified the jurisprudence of the French Courts, 67 by
providing that private associations could, under certain circumstances
defined by decree,' 68 bring an action as a partie civileI69 to enforce the
obligations imposed by certain of the law's provisions. 7
163. The law is thus regrettable because it closes the door to students from other EU countries
who cannot complete their studies in French (and is in direct contrast to other member states who
have attempted to provide education in other languages, particularly English, to attract students from
other EU countries). Responding to criticism that what is wrong with French is not the invasion of
English but the failure of the French education system to adequately instruct students in French, the
Senate included a final paragraph in article 11 providing that mastery of the French language and
knowledge of 2 other languages were part of the fundamental objectives of education. The 1996




166. Art. 2, 4. The legislative history indicates that a main concern for the supporters of the bill
was the use of anglicisms by French Public Services and the French government itself. See April
Assembly Report, supra note 140, at 9. The Report notes that in recent years many new services
offered were given "English-sounding" names, such as "Chronopost" (spelled without a silent "e,"
whereas the French word for "post" is spelled "poste"), "France Telecom" (removal of the "accent
aigu" from the letter "e" in the word "Telecom," an abbreviation of the word "t0lcommunications"),
"le Shuttle" (name given to the train traversing the Channel Tunnel), and "Authentics" (name given
to securities issued by the French Postal Service). Id. at 9-10.
167. See April Senate Report, supra note 29, at 93-95.
168. Decree No. 95-240 of Mar. 3, 1995, arts. 9-14, J.O. Mar. 5, 1995 (decreeing that associations
will be approved, taking into consideration, inter alia, the number of members, purpose, and
activities of the association).
169. The French criminal code specifically permits private parties and certain groups to bring a
civil action for damages (action civile) based on a criminal offense and to initiate a criminal
prosecution if the state fails to do so. In the civil action, the private citizen must choose between
bringing the action separately in civil court or "piggybacking" it on a criminal prosecution. The
private citizen (or group) must have an interest in the case and may, but need not, ask for damages.
See Leila Sadat Wexler, Reflections on the Trial of Vichy Collaborator Paul Touvier for Crimes
Against Humanity in France, 20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 191, 213 n.l 18 (1995); 2 Roger Merle & Andr6
Vitu, Trait de Droit Criminel 78-97 (Paris: Editions Cujas, 4th ed. 1979).
170. See art. 19 (allowing qualifying private associations to enforce articles 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 10).
Washington Law Review Vol. 71:285, 1996
3. The Constitutional Council's Ruling on the 1994 Law
There was substantial objection to many provisions of the 1994 law,
particularly by the Socialists, who abstained from its passage in the
National Assembly.' 7 1 While all agreed with the general goal of the
government (increasing the prestige of French and France in the world),
many thought that the legislation was simply not an effective means of
doing so and would, in fact, be counterproductive.' 72 In addition,
members of the opposition pointed out that the legislation appeared to go
hand in hand with other measures to which they were opposed, in
particular the tightening of immigration and nationality laws and the
generally restrictive attitude towards foreigners often exhibited by the
Balladur government. 73 Finally, the reliance of the 1994 law, like the
1975 law, on words officially approved by governmental commissions
on terminology was too much for many: The recently published
"Dictionnaire des Termes Officiels de la Langue Frangaise,"'74 with its
often turgid neologisms, proved uninspiring at best, and Orwellian, at
worst. It was not surprising, then, that a challenge was brought pursuant
171. They also abstained from the votes on earlier versions in the Senate. See J.0. D~bats
Parlementaires, S6nat, Sess. of Apr. 14, 1994, at 1147; J.O.A.N., Sess. of May 4, 1994, at 1490
(abstentions by the Socialists in the National Assembly and the Senate on the bill's first reading); for
the vote on the second reading, see J.0. D6bats Parlementaires, S6nat, Sess. of May 26, 1994, at
1916-19 (Socialists abstain); J.O.A.N., Sess. of June 30, 1994, at 3898 (Socialists and Communists
abstain); for the final vote, see J.O.A.N., June 30, 1994, at 3898 (Socialists abstaining); J.0. S~nat,
Sess. of July 1, 1994, at 3338 (no abstentions recorded).
172. J.O. D~bats Parlementaires, Srnat, Sess. of Apr. 14, 1994, at 1146-47. Indeed, each side
tried to claim French nationalism as its own, producing some very acrimonious debate. See, for
example, the colloquy between Senator Seligmann and Minister Toubon during the second reading
of the law on May 26, 1994, J.0. D~bats Parlementaires, S~nat, Sess. of May 26, 1994, at 1897-99.
Too, the debate was often not without a certain irony. At one point, Minister Toubon accused the
Socialists of fracturing the "social fabric" of France in the name of diversity or minority rights,
suggesting a parallel between the "political correctness" (he used both the English phrase and a
French translation) movement in the United States and the objections of the Socialists to the
proposed language legislation. J.O.A.N., Sess. of May 3, 1994, at 1383. In a similar vein, the
Senate's Reporter of the bill, M. Jacques Legendre, professing surprise that the bill could evoke so
much debate, suggested that the problem was perhaps the tendency known in the United States as "le
politically correct." J.0. D~bats Parlementaires, S6nat, Sess. of May 26, 1994, at 1894 (another
Senator intervened to instruct him to "Speak french, please!" Id.). Senator Seligmann retorted that
the Minister's law sanctioned the use of certain words---today English, tomorrcw slang, or some
other novelty-indeed, she suggested that Toubon's bill was its own form of "political correctness."
Id. at 1897.
173. See, e.g., J.0., D~bats Parlementaires, S6nat, Sess. of Apr. 12, 1994, at 967 (statement of Sen.
Frangoise Seligmann).
174. See supra note 84.
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to article 61 of the French Constitution, by sixty deputies of the National
Assembly. 75
The challengers raised several objections, the most important of
which, for our purposes, were that the law violated article 11 of the
Declaration of the Rights of Man 76 by (a) hampering the free
communication of thoughts and opinions by prohibiting the use of
certain words (i.e., by regulating the content of the French language) and
(b) restricting freedom of expression in teaching and research.'77
175. This possibility has only existed since 1974. Gilles Lebreton, Libertdspubliques et droits de
l'homme 189-93 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1995). Previously, only the President of the Republic, the
Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly, or the President of the Senate could refer the
question of an ordinary law's constitutionality to the Constitutional Council. Id. The reform of 1974
has increased constitutional review of ordinary legislation enormously; from March 1959
(constitutional review of legislation was first possible in France under the 1958 Constitution) to the
end of 1974, the Constitutional Council issued nine decisions, as opposed to 203 decisions (of which
200 were referred by the Parliament) during the period from the end of 1974 to March 1994. Louis
Favoreu, Origines et Bilan Statistique, in Vingt ans de Saisine Parlementaire du Conseil
Constitutionnel 15, 19 (Paris: Economica, 1995). See also Bernard Poullain, La Pratique Franfaise
de la Justice Constitutionnelle 19-30 (Paris: Economica, 1990) (describing the evolution of
constitutional controls on French legislation).
176. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was adopted by the self-
proclaimed National Assembly in 1789. Lebreton, supra note 175, at 69. Although not technically
part of the French Constitution, it is essentially incorporated by reference into it (and has been since
1791, see Albert P. Blaustein, Constitutions of the World 19 (1993)) by the preamble of the
Constitution of 1958 (France's current constitution) which provides: "The French people hereby
solemnly proclaims their attachment to the Rights of Man and the principles of national sovereignty
as defined by the Declaration of 1789, reaffirmed and complemented by the Preamble of the
Constitution of 1946." Fr. Const., Prmbl., translated in VII Constitutions of the Countries of the
World 21 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1993). Although this reference has been
considered sufficient to endow the Declaration with legal force, the use of the word "attachment"
originally gave rise to some question of the legal efficacy of the preambular reference. Fortunately,
the Constitution of 1958 also created the Constitutional Council and endowed it with the right to
review laws for "constitutionality." French Const., art. 61. On July 16, 1971, the Constitutional
Council, in a celebrated decision, endowed the word "attachment" in the preamble with legal effect.
Thus, the word "Constitution" in article 61 gave the Council authority to review legislation with
regard to four sources: the 1958 Constitution, the 1789 Declaration, the Preamble of 1946, and
"fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic." Judgment of July 16, 1971, Con.
const., reprinted in Jean Rivero, Le Conseil Constitutionnel et les Libert~s 24-26 (Paris: Economica,
2d ed. 1987). The decision's significance is noted in Rivero, id. at 9-24, and in Lebreton, supra note
175, at 92-94.
177. Judgment of July 29, 1994, Con. const., 1994 D.S.L., No. 94-345, at 2 (on file with author.) The
challengers also argued that the law unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedom of commerce and
industry, as well as violated the principles of proportionality and equality in imposing excessive
punishments. Id. These arguments were rejected along with various procedural infirmities alleged by the
complainants. Id.
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a. Regulating the Content of the French Language
The version of the 1994 law that was originally presented to the
French Senate differs from the text as promulgated. Several articles of
the original text proposed that in addition to making French mandatory in
various contexts (advertising, notices, etc.), foreign terms were to be
forbidden. In a sense this was uncontroversial-the 1975 law had the
same requirement. Article 1 of the 1975 law provided:
Use of the French language is compulsory with respect to the name,
the offer, the presentation, the advertising, written or spoken, the
instructions for use, the description of the scope and conditions of
[the] warranties of a good or a service, as well as with respect to
invoices and receipts. The use of any foreign term or expression is
prohibited if there exists any term or expression approved
according to the conditions set out by Decree No. 72-19 of 7
January 1972 relative to the enrichment of the French language.'
The bill presented to the Senate in 1994 would have extended the
scope of this provision by revising the last sentence as follows: "The use
of any foreign expression or term is prohibited if there exists any French
expression or term having the same sense, in particular an expression or
term approved according to the conditions provided for in the regulations
(dispositions r~glementaires) on the enrichment of the French
language.' 17
9
The addition of the words "in particular" was, of course, crucial, for
they would essentially outlaw any foreign term if a French equivalent
existed, leaving to the judge the task of determining whether a particular
word had a French equivalent or not. The Senate Commission on
Cultural Affairs objected to the proposed change, pointing out that it
would introduce uncertainty into the legal definition of the French
language (which was the basis for the criminal sanctions irrposed by the
law). 80 The government thereupon withdrew the proposed change and
returned to the original text, and the law was passed as such. The
requirement to use the terms approved by the Commissions on
Terminology appeared in articles 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, and 12 of the 1994 law as
finally adopted.
178. Law No. 75-1349 ofDec. 31, 1975, art. 1, J.O. Jan. 4, 1976, at 189.
179. Projet de Loi relatifdt l'emploi de la languefrancaise, No. 291, S6nat, Sess. of Jan. 27, 1994,
at 5 (emphasis added).
180. April Senate Report, supra note 29, at 46-47.
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The challengers alleged that this requirement violated article 11 of the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, by infringing on the
right of free expression.' 8' The French Constitutional Council agreed.
Pointing out that the rights protected under article 11 of the Declaration
are fundamental freedoms (liberts fondamentales), the Council noted
that article 34 of the French Constitution permits the legislature to
regulate these liberties only in order to render their exercise more
effective or to reconcile them with other constitutional principles. 2
Significantly, the Council held that, as article 2 of the French
Constitution proclaims French to be the official language of France, the
legislature may reconcile that article with article 11 of the Declaration by
imposing the use of French, even on private citizens. What article 11
forbids, however, is any regulation of the kind of French private citizens
choose to speak or to write:
[Article 11] implies for everyone the right to choose the terms he
judges the most appropriate to best express his thoughts; the French
language evolves, as any living language does, in integrating into
its normal vocabulary terms from different sources, whether they be
regional expressions, popular sayings, or foreign words. 3
Thus, the Council held that the legislature could not impose the use of
particular French terms and expressions, under penalty of sanctions, on
private citizens.'84 It was, however, entitled to impose a particular
linguistic content upon public entities (personnes morales de droit
public) or private individuals or entities undertaking a public service
mission."' Because the requirement in articles 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, and 12 of
181. Article I I provides: "The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most
precious rights of man; every citizen may therefore speak, write and publish freely, provided he shall
be liable for the abuse of this freedom in such cases as are determined by law."
182. Judgment of July 29, 1994, Con. const., 1994 D.S.L., No. 94-345, at 3.
183. Id.
184. Id. It also held that this provision was unconstitutional as applied to radio or television
stations (whether public or private). Id.
185. Id. The public/private distinction made by the Council was not unusual in French law. What
was interesting about the decision, however, was that this was the first time that the Council was
forced to consider the application of article 2 of the Constitution in light of article II of the
Declaration of the Rights of Man. Its holding (that it was essentially up to the legislature, within
certain constraints of course, to reconcile the two provisions) was consistent with its prior
jurisprudence. See Jean-Pierre Camby, Le Conseil constitutionnel et la languefrangaise, Revue du
Droit public et de la science politique 1663, 1669 (1994); Patrick Wachsmann, Note, 1994
L'actualit6juridique-Droit administratif 734.
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the law did not distinguish between the obligations imposed upon public
entities and private individuals, it was unconstitutional.
8 6
b. Restricting Freedom of Expression in the Context of Teaching and
Research
It is interesting to note that article 11 of the 1994 law, which affects
teaching and education, was not challenged, nor did the Council refer to
it in its ruling. 7 What were challenged, however, were the requirements
of article 7 that: (i) publications, reviews, and communications in a
foreign language, distributed in Frarce either by public entities or private
persons receiving public funds or acting in a public capacity, be
accompanied by a summary in Frerch; and (ii) those receiving research
and teaching grants from public entities ensure either that their work be
published or distributed in French or, if their publications are in a foreign
language, that they be translated into French. 8
The challenge to the first part of article 7 was not successful. The
Council pointed out that if article 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of
Man guaranteed freedom of expression and communication in teaching
and in research, it nevertheless had to be reconciled with "other rights
and principles of constitutional value."' 89 The second paragraph did not
withstand constitutional scrutiny, however, the Council holding that:
[Whereas] even taking into consideration the dispositions of article
2 of the Constitution aforementioned the legislature has imposed,
by the second paragraph of article 7, on teachers and researchers,
whether they be French or foreign, constraints of such a nature so
as to injure the free exercise of the freedom of expression and
communication in teaching and research; and [whereas] the option
to grant exceptions [to this rule] conferred upon the Minister of
Research (ministre de la recherche) to which are altached no
conditions relative, in particular, to an evaluation of the scientific or
educational interest of the work [in question] do not constitute
enough of a guaranty to preserve this freedom; therefore the second
186. Judgment of July 29, 1994, at 5. Article 14's requirement, however, tiat French public
institutions refrain from using foreign trademarks or tradenames (accompanied by the restriction that
foreign terms or expressions could not be used if there exist officially designated French equivalents)
was, by the same token, held to be constitutional. Id.
187. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
188. Projet de Loi relatifi I'emploi de la languefranqaise, No. 502, SUnat, Sess. of June 14, 1994,
art. 5; Judgment of July 29, 1994, at 7.




paragraph of article 7 of the law must be regarded as contrary to the
Constitution. 90
Although the decision of the Constitutional Council softened the
impact of the loi Toubon, it did not touch the law's basic structure or
affect its fundamental premise: The French, whether private citizens or
public employees, may be compelled by their government to use French
in all aspects of their public life.' 9'
III. LANGUAGE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The English Language
Whereas France used law to enshrine the French language with
primacy as the language of public discourse, Britain took a different
course. Like French, the English language has had a checkered history of
conquest and change.9" Indeed, modem English was considerably
190. Id. at 7-8. This was the first time the Council applied article II of the Declaration to protect
the liberty of teaching and research, see Camby, supra note 185, at 1669, although it has protected
this liberty in other contexts, see Rivero, supra note 176, at 85-99.
191. Although it is too soon to know whether the 1994 law will be any more successful than its
1975 predecessor, the government, see Jean-Pierre Proncel-Hugoz, La politique de la langue
fran~aise va 4tre reprise en main par M. Douste-Blazy, Le Monde, March 27, 1996, at 28, and
private citizen groups have repeatedly reiterated their commitment to carry out the obligations
imposed by the loi Toubon. For example, a brochure entitled, Langue Frangaise, Son Emploi en
France, Guide de l'Usager, was recently published by the non-profit group "Avenir de la langue
francaise." The brochure exhorts citizens to report violations of the loi Toubon to the group and
promises to take action or to help the victim to do so himself. As an example of an actionable
violation, the brochure cites a "no smoking" sign affixed to a restaurant wall. Id. at 21. The only
successful prosecution reported to date is a case filed against a branch of "The Body Shop," an
English company. According to press reports, the Body Shop's Chamb6ry store was fined 1000
francs (about $200) for failing to include French language instructions in its products. P~roncel-
Hugoz, supra. Apparently, however, the magistrate refused to hold its decision applicable to the
entire organization, holding instead that each store would have to be pursued individually. Id. This
suggests that the French courts may still be reluctant to vigorously enforce language laws.
192. Like France before the coming of the Romans, the part of Britain now called England was
inhabited by peoples speaking a variation of Celtic. As the territory was conquered by the Romans, then
by Germanic tribes, Celtic died out and the Low WVest German dialects spoken by the Germanic tribes
later fused to become Old English (although regional differences remained, and still persist today).
England was subsequently conquered by the Danes, whose language also influenced Old English
greatly. L.M. Myers & Richard L. Hoffman, The Roots of Modern English 55-107 (2d ed. 1979). There
are suggestions that peoples speaking a language related to the Basques of modem Spain and France
inhabited England even prior to the Celts. Albert C. Baugh & Thomas Cable, A History of the English
Language 43-44 (3d. ed. 1978). Baugh & Cable write:
We are so accustomed to think of English as an inseparable adjunct to the English people that
we are likely to forget that it has been the language of England for a comparatively short period
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influenced by French, which came to England with the Norman invasion
in the eleventh century. 93 French became the language of the aristocracy,
the law, and the church,'94 and it was not until 1362 that an act of Edward
III provided that the official language of the English court system would
be English (and Latin), as opposed to French.'95
in the world's history. Since its introduction into the island about the middle of the fifth century
it has had a career extending through only fifteen hundred years. Yet this part of the world had
been inhabited by man for thousands of years, 50,000 according to more moderate estimates,
200,000 in the opinion of some.
Id. at42.
193. The conquest of England by William brought French to England, and English disappeared as
an official language (and practically as a written language, although it was still spoken by a majority
of the population). "For two hundred years after the Norman Conquest, French remained the
language of ordinary intercourse among the upper classes in England." Baugh & Cable, supra note
192, at 113. See also Margaret M. Bryant, Modern English and Its Heritage 58--59, 290 (1948).
When English writings reappeared, it was clear that French borrowings were extensive--indeed, "the
French borrowings were so extensive that they changed the whole balance of the language and
prepared the way for the incomparable hospitality to words from other languagcs that English has
shown ever since. The English vocabulary is now much the largest in the world, and well over half
of it comes from French and Latin sources." Myers & Hoffman, supra note 192, at 124. See also
Otto Jespersen, Growth and Structure of the English Language 91, 107 (9th ed. 1960). Of course,
one may recall, there was more than one version of "French" at that time. The French brought to
England was Norman French, not a particularly prestigious dialect of French. Particularly with the
loss of Normandy by John in 1204, Parisian French (the dialect spoken in the ile de France region)
rather than Norman French rose to preeminence, and its acquisition was sought after by English
elites. For a wonderful expos6 of this process from a linguist's perspective, see Barbara M. H.
Strang, A History of English 218-19 (1970). See also Thomas Lounsbury, History of the English
Language 75 (1907). French began to lose its hold in England with the loss of Normandy in 1204
and the ensuing separation of England and France.
194. Baugh & Cable, supra note 192, at 113-20. See also Jespersen, supra note 193, at 91, 107.
195. The act provided, inter alia:
[A]II pleas which shall be pleaded in [the King's] Courts whatsoever, before any of his justices
whatsoever, or in his other Places, or before any of his other Ministers whatsoever, or in the
Courts and Places of any other Lords whatsoever within the Realm, shall be pleaded, shewed,
defended, answered, debated, and judged in the English Tongue, and that they be entered and
inrolled in Latin.
Statute of Pleading, 1362, 36 Edw. 3, ch. 15 (Eng.), reprinted in I Statutes of the Realm 375-76
(London, 1810). Ironically, the original is in French. Like the ordonnance of Villers-Cotterrts, the
Statute of Pleading referred to the "mischiefs" that had arisen due to the use of French as the
language of the law. As was the case in France, custom died hard, and French continued to be used
for some time as the unofficial language of the law. See, e.g., W.J. Jones, The Elirabethan Court of
Chancery 193 n.5 (1967) ("Fifteenth-century bills were generally in law French or Latin. The first
bill in English dates from around the time of Henry V."); see also English for Lawyer's Act, 1731, 4
Geo. 2, ch. 26 (Eng.), reprinted in 16 Statutes in Large 248-49 (1765); An Act Turning the Books of
the Law and all Process and Proceedings in Court of Justice, into English, 1650, 2 Acts &
Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-60 (C.H. Firth & R.S. Rait eds., 1911).
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Linguistic minorities in the British Isles fared no better than their
French counterparts,"' and, although English was never formally
purified by an Academy created for that purpose,'97 certain dialects of
English, in particular the West Saxon dialect spoken at Court, became
"standard" English.'98 Efforts to standardize and improve the English
language led, in the eighteenth century, to the publication of Samuel
Johnson's A Dictionary of the English Language.'99 Grammars made
their appearance around the same time and included the highly influential
(and authoritarian) Short Introduction to English Grammar, published by
Robert Lowth, the rules of which have governed American as well as
English writing and have plagued writers ever since.2" In this way,
196. See infra note 215.
197. Although one might wish to attribute the failure to found an English Language Academy in
Britain to some noble sense of respect for personal liberty, see Perea, supra note 16, at 283-84, the
most probable reason is that the proposal for an English Language Academy, advocated by Dryden
and formally proposed by Dean Swift in 1712, would have been adopted (and the Academy
established) by Queen Anne, had she not died shortly after the plans had been made. Baugh & Cable,
supra note 192, at 265-67). (George I, who succeeded her, "was not sufficiently interested in the
English language even to learn to speak it himself. The movement accordingly died." Myers &
Hoffman, supra note 192, at 199.) Later proponents of an academy faced growing skepticism (the
value of the French Academy's work was doubted) and vigorous public resistance from Samuel
Johnson, who nevertheless wrote of his own dictionary that it was "a dictionary by which the
pronunciation of our language may be fixed, and its attainment facilitated; by which its purity may
be preserved, its use ascertained, and its duration lengthened." Baugh & Cable, supra note 192, at
272 (quoting Samuel Johnson, The Plan of an English Dictionary).
198. During the "English Renaissance," the period from 1500 to 1650, there were debates in
England, as well as France, about the English language. The spread of education, the introduction of
printing, the weakening of class distinctions, and a growing belief that the development of the
language could and should be controlled all contributed to a flowering of writing. At the same time,
while grammar essentially went unnoticed, spelling conventions were adopted. The general term
often used to describe Renaissance English is "luxuriant." As Myers and Hoffman note, this
"suggests both the richness of the language and its freedom from the sorts of restrictions that later
came to be applied to it. Although Court English had become a national standard, it was in itself not
nearly so rigid as it later became." Myers & Hoffman, supra note 192, at 193.
199. Published in London, in 1755. Id. at 205-10. Although not the first dictionary compiled in
England, Johnson's work was so influential that "he came to be regarded as a sort of semi-official
one-man academy." Id. at 205.
200. Id. at217:
Lowth either invented or gave general currency to a number of... shibboleths that have been
taking up a great deal of time in schools ever since, such as the distinction between will and
shall.... The result was that in many schoolrooms the study of grammar became an exercise in
fault-finding.
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standardization of English was accomplished, not by an Academy or by
the law, but by the schools.20'
B. Language Policy in the United States
1. Revolutionary Ideas
This article does not attempt to treat the history of language in the
United States completely, but confines itself to two general observations.
At the time of the first European immigration, over 500 Na:ive American
languages belonging to about fifteen language families may have been
spoken in North America.2"' In addition, many European languages,
including French, Spanish, German, and Dutch, competed with and
coexisted with English during the colonial period." 3 To colonial and
indigenous languages must be added the languages spoken by other
immigrants and the languages of West Africa." 4
But, while the Americans of colonial times may have been a "polyglot
people," English was the predominant language of public life.2" 5 Native
Americans continued using their languages in spite of enormous
obstacles to doing so. Yet, there has always been an implicit (and
sometimes explicit) assumption that Native Americans would exchange
their indigenous languages for English.0 6 Colonial and immigrant
201. Shirley Brice Heath, A National Language Academy? Debate in the New Nation, I I Int'l J.
Soc. Language 9. 15-16 (1976). The French also used the schools to achieve linguistic unity.
Flaherty, supra note 60, at 314-16.
202. William L. Leap, American Indian Languages, in Language in the USA 116, 129 (Charles A.
Ferguson & Shirley Brice Heath eds., 1981).
203. Dennis Baron, Federal English, in Language Loyalties, supra note 8, at 37,
204. Nancy Faires Conklin & Margaret A. Lourie, A Host of Tongues: Language Communities in
the United States 3-58 (1983).
205. Thus we have, for the most part, "conducted our public life as if we were all monolingual
English speakers." Id. at xiii.
206. The pressure exerted by the colonists on Native Americans was, with few exceptions,
enormous. Assimilation techniques (linguistic or otherwise) included genocide, forced removal, and
forced resettlement, followed later by the extremely rigid educational policies promoted by the
Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs. Leap, supra note 202, at 134-35. The situation with respect to
language has improved at least in law with the passage of the Native American Languages Act,
which provides:
(1) the status of the cultures and languages of Native Americans is unique and the United States
has the responsibility to act together with Native Americans to ensure the survival of these
unique cultures and languages;
(2) special status is accorded Native Americans in the United States, a status that recognizes
distinct cultural and political rights, including the right to continue separate identities;
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languages have not fared much better over the long term, although the
assimilation techniques used on their speakers were generally less
draconian. While monolinguilism was not a necessary choice," 7 and the
emerging nation could have actively encouraged multilingualism, it did
not: "[T]he imperative of American history and tradition has been an
inexorable movement from multilingualism to monolingualism. E
Pluribus Unum. The Tower of Babel in reverse."208
The American revolutionaries, consistent with the attitude of the
English before them, did not include an "official language" provision in
their Constitution. Early American language policy was thus the absence
of a policy, but it is hard to read much significance into this fact.2"9 The
(7) it is clearly in the interests of the United States, individual States, and territories to
encourage the full academic and human potential achievements of all students and citizens and
to take steps to realize these ends;
(8) acts of suppression and extermination directed against Native American languages and
cultures are in conflict with the United States policy of self-determination for Native Americans;
(9) languages are the means of communication for the full range of human experiences and are
critical to the survival of cultural and political integrity of any people; and
(10) language provides a direct and powerful means of promoting international communication
by people who share languages.
Native American Languages Act § 102,25 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994).
Section 104 of the act states that "it is the policy of the United States to (1) preserve, protect, and
promote the rights and freedom of Native Americans to use, practice, and develop Native American
languages." Section 105 adds that "the right of Native Americans to express themselves through the
use of Native American languages shall not be restricted in any public proceeding, including
publicly supported education programs." The contrast between the sentiments expressed in the
Native American Languages Act and those expressed by the sponsors of the ELA is remarkable, to
say the least.
207. Although most citizens of the United States, like most citizens of France, assume that
monolingualism is the natural and ideal state of human society, monolingual societies are in fact the
exception. Indeed, even officially monolingual countries such as the United States and France have
large bilingual communities within them. Frangois Grosjean, Life with Two Languages 1-41 (1982).
208. Denis P. Doyle, Bilingual Education in the Private Sector (1983), reprinted in Senate
Hearings, supra note 7, at 215, 223.
209. Perea argues that the fact that the Continental Congress had the Articles of Confederation
translated into French and German "explicitly recognized the linguistic and cultural pluralism within
the new American realm." Perea, supra note 16, at 286. This, I think, proves too much. While the
Continental Congress may have had the Articles of Confederation translated into French and
German, it did so mainly "in local areas where members recognized a need for spreading information
to promote loyalty to the cause of Independence." Shirley Brice Heath, Why No Official Tongue, in
Language Loyalties, supra note 8, at 20-23. For example, the order to translate the documents into
French was for the purpose of "conciliating the affections of the Canadians towards these United
States." 9 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789, at 981 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1907)
(1777). The record is silent as to why a German translation was made. Yet it is probably true that the
"nationalism" of the American revolutionaries, directed against absolute rulers and deeming that the
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reigning political elites of Revolutionary America were, with few
exceptions, of Anglo-Saxon origin."' 0 They may have thought that the
issue of an official language was self-evident-after all, the Constitution
and Declaration of Independence were written in English, not some other
tongue.
Some have argued that the failure to specify an official language was a
deliberate, carefully thought out political strategy on the part of the
founding fathers--that they did not adopt an official language policy
because the English had not2 and because "they felt language to be a
matter of individual choice." ' This view simply reads too much into the
record of the Continental Congress, relies on the fact thai certain states
with large immigrant populations, such as Pennsylvania nd Louisiana,
published their laws in second languages,213 and probably contains a
major legal misconception--the idea that a country would !ave to have a
statute (from a legislature) in order to have an official language.
Although individual freedom was a concept deeply embedded in the
American culture,214 and the Revolutionary period was clearly more
nation was a community of equal citizens capable of determining their own fate, was not the cultural
nationalism that became so important later in Europe. Cultural nationalism held tiat each people has
a language, history, world view, and culture of its own to protect and that each nition has a national
spirit (Volksgeist). A corollary of this was that national identity meant a sense of difference from
other nations and a fear of foreigners. Cultural nationalism evolved into a new form of political
nationalism during the nineteenth century. On this point, see R.R. Palmer & Joel Colton, A History of
the Modern World Since 1815, at 432-37 (5th ed. 1978).
210. If one takes as examples the signers of the Constitution and the first merbers of the United
States Supreme Court, for example, virtually all were of Anglo-Saxon origin. This follows from the
fact that English-speaking settlers outstripped by far settlers speaking other languages. By 1700, the
white English and African population of North American was 250,000 compared to 7500 French and
Spanish speakers; by 1790, the white population of the new nation was 76 percent English-speaking
(but not necessarily of English linguistic heritage, supra note 3). Conklin & Loudie, supra note 204,
at 64-65.
211. David F. Marshall, The Question of an Official Language: Language Rights and the English
Language Amendment, 60 Int'l J. Soc. Language 7,8-9 (1986).
212. Id. at I1. Shirley Brice Heath makes the same argument in her excellent article, A National
Language Academy?, supra note 201. She argues that there was an ideological climate favoring
linguistic diversity in the new nation, id. at 12-15, and that, "[w]hen political leaders recognized
language as a problem, they did so most consistently in the institutional contexts cf law and leaming;
and here they saw language as a pragmatic tool-not as an ideal or as an ideological 3ymbol" Id. at 11. I
do not really disagree with Brice's analysis, except to the extent that she ascribes an intent to promote
multiculturalism (in the twentieth century sense) and diversity to the founding fathers.
213. Pennsylvania published its laws in German during the first half of the nineteenth century, Heinz
Kloss, The American Bilingual Tradition 143-44 (1977), and Louisiana published in French until the 1864
Louisiana Constitutional Convention rejected the practice. Dennis Baron, The English-Only Question 85-
87(1990).
214. John Higham, Strangers in the Land 6 (1955).
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linguistically tolerant than either the late nineteenth or twentieth
centuries would prove to be, one must recall that the English adopted
policies of anglicization towards all indigenous linguistic minorities of
the British Isles. Gaelic, Welsh, Cornish, and Manx were all subjected to
intense pressure from English and are now either extinct or endangered
minority languages.215 These traditions are still present in British
culture216 and were part and parcel of the founding fathers' education and
understanding of the world.217
As has been noted elsewhere, political ideas about the role of the
English language were, at that time, characterized by two major
themes--pragmatism and universalism. 2 1 Pragmatism, because it was
215. The English, particularly under the Tudors, actively anglicized Wales, imposing English as
the language of government and the law; Welsh was maintained only as the language of the church.
Linguistic Minorities, supra note 37, at 183-86. Irish was officially proscribed by the English (see,
e.g., the "Act for the English order, habite and language" adopted in 1537 in which Irish was
henceforth excluded from government, administration and the law). Id. at 198-99. This policy
essentially continued until the twentieth century, when Irish began to make a comeback, particularly
with the founding of the Irish Free State in 1922. Id. at 200. In Great Britain itself:
Inasmuch as a language policy existed in ... the first half of the twentieth century, it focussed
on the unacceptability of Celtic languages and non-standard dialects of English in education,
and the importance of teaching the standard. British schools were monolingual, monocultural
institutions, one of whose functions was to enlighten those who departed from received
linguistic and cultural norms.
Viv Edwards, Language Policy in Multicultural Britain, in Linguistic Minorities, Policies and
Pluralism 49, 49 (John Edwards ed., 1984). Manx (which was spoken on the Isle of Man) and
Cornish (spoken in Cornwall) are now considered extinct, although Cornish language enthusiasts are
attempting to revive Cornish. Irish, Scots, and Welsh are still spoken to various degrees. See, e.g.,
Adam J. Aitkin, The Good Old Scots Tongue: Does Scots Have an Identity?, in Minority Languages
Today 72 (Einar Haugen et al. eds., 1980); Desmond Fennell, Can a Shrinking Linguistic Minority
Be Saved? Lessons from the Irish Experience, in Minority Languages Today, supra, at 32; David
Greene, The Atlantic Group: Neo-Celtic and Faroese, in Minority Languages Today. supra, at 1;
Bedwyr Lewis Jones, Welsh: Linguistic Conservatism and Shifting Bilingualism, in Minority
Languages Today, supra, at 40; Derick Thomson, Gaelic in Scotland: Assessment and Prognosis, in
Minority Languages Today, supra, at 10. In light of this history, it is almost unbelievable that
Marshall should point to Britain as an affirmatively multicultural, multilinguistic nation. See
Marshall, supra note 212, at 10.
216. Like the United States, Britain remains attached to its monolingualism. According to a recent
report by the British Department of Trade and Industry, one British company in four surveyed last
year lost business through difficulties with foreign languages. The report relates as an example the
discovery of a letter written in German locked away in a filing cabinet of a bankrupt company,
apparently because no one had been able to translate it. Had someone done so, the firm would have
had the largest order in its history. Those Strange Languages, Int'l Herald Trib., May 3, 1966, at 6.
217. As Dennis Baron points out, "[t]he English-first movement in America was reinforced by the
political identification of the American language with Americanism, but it began locally at least a
generation before the establishment of the United States, as a defensive reaction to German
immigration in Pennsylvania." Baron, supra note 213, at 64.
218. Heath, supra note 201, at 17.
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believed that English and, in particular, American English,219 would be a
practical vehicle to disseminate scientific knowledge and political
thought; universalism, because it was believed that English would spread
American views of "liberty, prosperity, and glory.' ' "o Some leaders even
proposed plans for purifying and standardizing the American English
language. With some foresight, John Adams, who would one day be
President, urged Congress to establish the "American Academy for
refining, improving, and ascertaining the English Language":
The honor of forming the first public institution for refining,
correcting, improving, and ascertaining the English language, I
hope is reserved for congress .... It will have a happy effect upon
the union of the States to have a public standard for all persons in
every part of the continent to appeal to, both for the signification
and pronunciation of the language....
... English is destined to be in the next and succeeding centuries
more generally the language of the world than Latin was in the last
or French is in the present age. The reason of this is obvious,
because the increasing population in America, and their universal
connection and correspondence with all nations will, aided by the
influence of England in the world, whether great or small, force
their language into general use, in spite of all the obstacles that may
be thrown in their way, if any such there should be.22'
Adams's proposal, like Swift's, was never consummated. 2 Instead,
the United States had to rely on its "one-man academy," Noah Webster,
219. For the founders then, the real language question, if any, was not really whether English
would be the country's official language, but what version of English it would be. That is, the real
issue (for any of those concerned with the question) was the emergence of a separate "American"
language--should British English be abandoned in favor of American English? James Crawford,
Historical Roots of U.S. Language Policy, in Language Loyalties, supra note 8, at 9-11. There was a
"tug between those urging America's linguistic independence and those calling for a return to the
.pure English' of England." Heath, supra note 201, at 27-28. There is even a (probably apocryphal)
story about a suggestion that Hebrew or Greek become the new nation's official tongue. Shirley
Brice Heath, English in our Language Heritage, in Language in the USA 6, 8-9 (Charles A.
Ferguson & Shirley Brice Heath eds., 1981).
220. 7 John Adams, Life and Works 249 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little Brown 1852).
221. Id. at 249-50. The academy would have differed from its European predecessors in that it
would have "provide[d] for the study of all languages and literatures while promoting the English
language of America as a public institution which embodied both the code and the content of United
States political ideology." Heath, supra note 201, at 19-20.
222. The proposal was sent to committee and never reemerged. Heath writes:
Adams' view of language as an instrument critical to a particular task, and the consequent need
for the national government to shape, mend and maintain that tool, could not overcome the
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for what standardization and purification of the American English
language there would be.'
2. Nativist Movements and Naturalization Laws
The nineteenth century saw the beginning of what is now termed
"nativism" in American politics." 4 German, French, and Spanish
continued to flourish (and remained official languages) in states in which
they had been colonial languages. At the same time, however, an Anglo-
Saxon cult developed which, particularly after the Civil War,225 led to
calls to restrict the use of foreign languages in the United States and to
restrict immigration and naturalization. By the end of the century,
virtually all the states having official languages other than English no
ideological blocks of other early national leaders to an American academy of language and the
hints of monarchicalism it carried.
Heath, supra note 201, at 22. There were also several private attempts to form academies to address
issues of language by organizations including the American Philosophical Society, The American
Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the American Academy of Language and Belles Lettres. None of
these attempts were ultimately successful. Id. at 26-35.
223. Webster published his American Dictionary of the English Language in 1828. See Heath,
supra note 201, at 23-26 (discussing Webster's work and place in history).
224. John Higham defines nativism as "intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of
its foreign (i.e., 'un-American') connections." Higham, supra note 214, at 4. He adds:
Continuous involvement in larger movements of American nationalism has meant that nativism
usually rises and falls in some relation to other intense kinds of national feeling. The nationalist
nexus has also meant that the nativist's most characteristic complaint runs against the loyalty of
some foreign (or allegedly foreign) group. Seeing or suspecting a failure of assimilation, he
fears disloyalty. Occasionally the charge of disloyalty may stand forth naked and unadorned, but
usually it is colored and focused by a persistent conception about what is un-American.
Id. at 4-5. That does not mean that many non-nativists did not support English language laws.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child As
Property, 33 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 1026-27 (1992).
225. Higham, supra note 214, at 32.
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longer did so,2" 6 and in 1906, knowledge of the English language was
made an explicit criterion for citizenship. 7
During World War I, the federal government undertook an
extraordinary effort to reach foreign language speaker;, encouraging
them in their own languages to buy Liberty Bonds and to support the war
effort." Much of this effort, however, was self-serving rather than some
generous recognition of cultural pluralism, for there was formidable
opposition to the war, opposition which the government sought to
suppress or dissuade." 9 Whatever tolerance there had been towards the
foreign languages still being read, spoken, and written in the United
States seemed to disappear after the war when anti-German hysteria
surfaced. At that time, according to one study, twenty-three states
enacted statutes that imposed restrictions upon instruction in (and of)
foreign languages, particularly German.230 These statutes -were generally
226. For example, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Hawaii are states that have been or
are officially bilingual. New Mexico is an interesting case. It was predominantly Spanish-speaking
when annexed by the United States with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 18,18. When time came
for the territory to become a state, however, language became an issue; indeed, the Spanish-speaking
characteristic of its people was one of the reasons statehood was originall) opposed by some
members of Congress during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Baron, sugra note 217, at 94-
101. When the enabling act for statehood was finally passed in 1910, it provided that there should be
"a system of free public schools that 'shall always be conducted in English,"' and that all state
officials would be proficient in English. Id. at 102 (quoting the act). The state nevertheless continued
to be effectively bilingual for quite some time afterwards. Louisiana (in certain limited respects) and
Hawaii continue to be bilingual--Pennsylvania does not.
227. Section 8 of the Naturalization Act of 1906 provided that "no alier shall hereafter be
naturalized or admitted as a citizen of the United States who can not speak the English language."
Naturalization Act of 1906, ch. 3592, § 8, 34 Stat. 596, 599. In 1950, the Subversive Activities
Control Act added reading and writing to the speaking requirement. Pub. L. No. 831, ch. 1024, § 30,
64 Stat. 1018, 1018 (1950) (repealed 1952). The law currently in force conditions naturalization on
the alien's demonstration of:
An understanding of the English language, including an ability to read, write, and speak words
in ordinary usage in the English language: Provided, That the requirements of this paragraph
relating to ability to read and write shall be met if the applicant can read or write simple words
and phrases to the end that a reasonable test of his literacy shall be made and that no
extraordinary or unreasonable condition shall be imposed upon the applicant.
8 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(1) (1994). These literacy requirements were upheld in Trujillo-Hemandez v.
Farrell, 503 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 977 (1975), and the implementing
regulations are codified at 8 C.F.R. § 312 (1995). See Charles Gordon et al., 4 I'mmigration Law &
Procedure § 95.03[4][a] (1995).
228. Heinz Kloss, supra note 213, at 33.
229. William G. Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical Perspective, 57 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 125, 128--29 (1988); 2 Frederic L. Paxson, American Democracy and the World War:
America at War 1917-1918, at 272-77 (1939).
230. Ross, supra note 229, at 133. Even prior to the war, many states had laws mandating English
as the language of instruction in schools. Frederick Luebke argues that:
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popular23' and supported by a broad cross-section of society, which
perceived them as a necessary means of "Americanization"--English
became "widely regarded as the key to fully realized citizenship. 232
Several of those statutes were challenged and invalidated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska 3 and its companion case, Bartels
v. Iowa."
a. Meyer v. Nebraska
Any study of language regulation in the United States would not be
complete without an examination of the decision in Meyer.235 Although
Meyer actually involved the statutes of several states, it is sufficient for
our purposes to examine only the law that was ultimately challenged by
[B]y the time World War I broke out in 1914, several separate trends in the regulation of foreign
languages could be discerned. First, there were laws that provided a legal basis for instruction in
foreign languages as a practical measure in communities dominated by non-English-speaking
people; second there was an opposite trend that favored laws to establish English as the
language of the schools; and third, some states passed laws that made foreign-language
instruction possible for English-speaking pupils.
Frederick C. Luebke, Legal Restrictions on Foreign Languages in the Great Plains States, 1917-
1923, in Languages in Conflict: Linguistic Acculturation on the Great Plains 1, 3 (Paul Schach ed.,
1980).
231. As Woodhouse points out, the Siman Act, see infra notes 236-38 and accompanying text,
was "not solely a response to wartime panic but reflected preexisting tensions-political,
educational, generational, and cultural--which the war had exacerbated but did not create."
Woodhouse, supra note 224, at 1009.
232. Woodhouse, supra note 224, at 1010-11.
233. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
234. 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
235. The specific holdings in Meyer and Bartels were followed in two similar cases: Farrington v.
Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (holding that Hawaii's "[A]ct relating to foreign language schools
and teachers thereof' violated the Fifth Amendment), and Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500
(1926) (holding that the "Chinese Bookkeeping Act," which forbade the keeping of books of account
in languages other than English, Spanish, or Filipino dialects, violated the due process clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights as a denial of equal protection). In addition, Meyer has been cited literally
hundreds of times in support of analogous propositions. Because the thrust of this article is the
comparison of French and U.S. language legislation, a detailed analysis of Meyer's place in
American Constitutional doctrine is not possible. Yet it is worth mentioning that Meyer, a case
typically cited for its tolerant view of intellectual freedom and liberal values, see, e.g., Peggy Cooper
Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1348, 1348,
1369-71 (1994) (stating that Meyer stands for individual and social autonomy), also has what
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse refers to as a "dark side": "Stamped on the reverse side of the coinage
of family privacy and parental rights are the child's voicelessness, objectification, and isolation from
the community." Woodhouse, supra note 224, at 1000-01.
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Robert Meyer--4he Nebraska statute known as the Siman Act,23 6 after the
Senator who introduced the bill.237 The Nebraska law provided:
Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall in any
private, denominational, parochial or public school, teach any
subject to any person in any language other than the English
language.
Section 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be
taught as languages only after a pupil shall have attained and
successfully passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate of
graduation issued by the county superintendent of the county in
which the child resides.
Section 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction,
shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25),
nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) or be con:ined in the
county jail for any period not exceeding thirty days for each
offense.
Section 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force
from and after its passage and approval.238
The similarity between the Siman Act and article 1.(I) of the loi
Toubon is striking.239 Both attempt to control the language of education
by imposing the use of one language in private as well as public
institutions. In addition, both ban the use of foreign languages as a
medium of instruction (subject to certain exceptions, in the case of the
French law). Finally, while it is not clear that a teacher violating the loi
236. 1919 Neb. Laws ch. 249.
237. Ross, supra note 229, at 140-41 n.81. See also Luebke, supra note 230, at 1.2.
238. Nebraska Dist. of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 175 N.W. 531, 532-33 (Neb.
1919) [hereinafter McKelvie 1] (quoting 1919 Neb. Laws ch. 249). While this statute did not
specifically attack the German language, others did, such as a Louisiana law that provided:
[l]t shall be unlawful for any teacher, professor, lecturer, person, or persons, employed in the
public or private elementary or high schools, colleges, universities, or other institutions in the
State of Louisiana that in any way form a part of the public or private eductional system, or
educational work, in the State of Louisiana, to teach the German language to any pupil or class.
1918 La. Acts 114, § 1 (repealed by 1921 La. Acts 71, § 1).
239. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. Although the loi Toubon does not ban the
teaching of foreign languages as languages, it appears to prohibit the teaching o:' other subjects in a
foreign language, subject to the exceptions listed in the statute.
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Toubon could be subject to criminal sanctions240 (as Robert Meyer was,
although ultimately unsuccessfully), the use of the criminal law to
enforce the use of a particular language is authorized by both legislative
enactments.
The Siman Act was initially upheld by the Nebraska Supreme Court in
Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie
("McKelvie p')241, which found the law within the state's power to
"protect the lives, liberty, and property of its citizens, and to promote
their health, morals, education, and good order."'242 The court explained:
It is a matter of general public information, of which the court is
entitled to take judicial knowledge, that it was disclosed that
thousands of men born in this country of foreign language speaking
parents and educated in schools taught in a foreign language were
unable to read, write, or speak the language of their country, or
understand words of command given in English. It was also
demonstrated that there were local foci of alien sentiment, and that,
where such instances occurred, the education given by private or
parochial schools in that community was usually found to be that
which had been given mainly in a foreign language.243
The court felt compelled to narrow the statute, however, by holding
that it applied only to education given during the compulsory educational
periods set out in state law.2" Thus, schools could offer foreign language
instruction "provided that such instruction is given at such time that it
will not interfere with the required studies."245
240. The absence of any penalties for violations of this article either in the Ioi Toubon or its
implementing decree suggests that criminal penalties could not be imposed.
241. 175N.W.531 (1919).
242. Id. at 536.
243. Id. at 533. The court added that the law aimed to "[upbuild] ... an intelligent American
citizenship, familiar with the principles and ideals upon which this government was founded, to
imbue the alien child with the tradition of our past." Id. at 534. This implies, of course, that such
ideals could only be transmitted in English and not some other language, a thesis of dubious validity.
244. Id. at 534.
245. Id. As Ross notes, this was a fairly tortured reading of the statute, designed to save it from
unconstitutionality. See Ross, supra note 229, at 144-45. The court suggested that had the statute
completely prohibited the teaching of a foreign language it would have been discriminatory as an
unreasonable exercise of the police power and overly burdensome interference with individual liberty.
McKelvie 1, 175 N.W. at 535. The suggestion seems to be that because a more restrictive reading would
allow the wealthy to instruct their children in foreign languages (by employing tutors) but deny that
possibility to "poorer men" who would have to employ teachers to give such instruction in a class or
school, the "obvious and necessary construction to be given is that which will uphold the statute.' Id. at
534.
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Following McKelvie I, German-American parochial schools began
offering German language instruction during special hours beyond the
school day. Thus, the board of education and congregation of the
Evangelical Lutheran Zion Church authorized their schools to offer
German instruction, on a voluntary basis, during recess." Robert Meyer
was observed teaching reading in the German language to Raymond
Parpart, a fourth-grader,247 during the recess period, which Zion's had
extended by one-half hour. Meyer was charged and convicted of
"unlawfully teaching German to a pupil who had not yet passed the
eighth grade." '248 He appealed his conviction to the Nebraska Supreme
Court and lost.249
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed Meyer's conviction by a margin of
seven to two.2"' Writing for the Court, Justice McReynolds framed the
issue to be decided as arising under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment: May the state, consistent with the liberty
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 25' ban the teaching of
246. Ross, supra note 229, at 146.
247. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,396 (1923); Luebke, supra note 230, at 14.
248. Ross. supra note 229, at 146.
249. Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100 (Neb. 1922), rev'd, 262 U.S. 390 (1923,. Meyer had argued
that although he was teaching German, he was also giving religious instruction, as the text he used
was a book of Bible stories. Thus, he argued that the statute interfered with religious freedom,
pointing out in his brief that the children needed to be educated in German so as to be able to receive
religious instruction from their parents and share in the devotional exercises of parents at home and
in public worship. Id. at 101. The court's response was unsympathetic:
The law affects few citizens, except those of foreign lineage. Other citizens, in their selection
of studies, except perhaps in rare instances, have never deemed it of import2nce to teach their
children foreign languages before such children have reached the eighth grade.
The statute prohibits the study of the German language and may, to an extent, limit the
younger children from as freely engaging in religious services, conducted in the German
language, as otherwise might be the case, we cannot say that such restriction is unwarranted.
The law in no way attempts to restrict religious teachings, nor to mold beliefs, nor interfere with
the entire freedom of religious worship.
Id. at 102.
250. Justices Holmes and Sutherland dissented. See 262 U.S. at 403. It is ironic that Meyer was
penned by Justice McReynolds, a justice not known for his tolerant views, and was an opinion from
which Justice Holmes dissented (although he adhered to the decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925)). For an analysis of Holmes's opinion in Meyer, see G. Edward White, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self43 8-40 (1993).
251. According to the Court, the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment include:
[N]ot merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
344
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modem languages in schools prior to the eighth grade?25 2 Although the
Court found that the state had the power to require instruction in English,
it also found that the statute at issue was, as applied, "arbitrary and
without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the
state. ' '23 Thus the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment by unduly
interfering with "the calling of modem language teachers, with the
opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of
parents to control the education of their own;" 4 privileges that the Court
felt were "long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men." '255
While a detailed discussion of the Meyer opinion must await another
day, Meyer's central thesis is that, although the use of English may be
required in certain aspects of public life, our constitutional scheme
forbids the legislature from interfering with fundamental liberties by
coercing citizens to speak English or to abandon their native tongues. 6
The implication, then, is that the legislature may not advance either the
acquisition or the use of English by banning foreign tongues: "Mere
knowledge" of a foreign language "cannot reasonably be regarded as
harmful." 7 Perhaps more importantly, in a now famous passage, Meyer
rejects the rationale upon which proponents of today's Official English
movement rely:
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
252. In a challenge to a successor of the Siman Act (the Reed-Norval Act, see Luebke, supra note
230, at 13-14), the Nebraska Supreme Court had limited the application of the law to modem
languages, holding that "[t]he so-called ancient or dead languages, not being, strictly speaking,
foreign languages, obviously do not come within the spirit or the purpose of the act." Nebraska Dist.
of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 187 N.W. 927, 928 (Neb. 1922), rev'd sub noa. Bartels
v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) [hereinafter McKelvie 17].
253. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403. As has been noted elsewhere, the Court did not apply heightened
scrutiny to the Nebraska law; rather, it applied a reasonableness test, much like its analysis in
economic due process cases. See id. at 400; see also G. Sidney Buchanan, A Very Rational Court, 30
Hous. L. Rev. 1509, 1516-18 (1993). The multi-tiered approach to review came later in the court's
history. Id. at 1520-25. See also Robert M. Cover, The Origins ofJudicial Activism in the Protection
of Minorities, 91 Yale LJ. 1287, 1289-97 (1982).
254. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
255. Id. at 399 (citations omitted). See supra note 251.
256. What Meyer does not speak to, however, is the suggestion in the Nebraska Supreme Court's
decisions that one's ability to express oneself is independent of the language in which one chooses to
do so; thus, the court's suggestion that the laws were not interfering with the freedom of religion
(and arguably of expression) by prohibiting the teaching of bible studies in German, as those stories
could be taught in English, arguably remains untouched by Meyer.
257. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
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It is said the purpose of the [Siman Act] was to promote civic
development by inhibiting training and education of the immature
in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and
acquire American ideals; and "that the English language should be
and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this State."
It is also affirmed that the foreign born population is very large,
that certain communities commonly use foreign words, follow
foreign leaders, move in a foreign atmosphere, and that the children
are thereby hindered from becoming citizens of the most useful
type and the public safety is imperiled.
That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to
improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and
morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundarnental rights
which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution
extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to
those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly
advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech,
but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the
Constitution-a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited
means.
258
There is, of course, much about the Meyer decision that weakens its
force as constitutional doctrine: As a substantive due process case, it is
tainted by the stigma of the economic due process theories articulated in
Lochner v. New York259 and its progeny.260 Too, some have interpreted it,
along with Pierce v. Society of Sisters,26" ' as an essentially conservative
decision, rendered by a conservative Supreme Court that defended
"traditions of private ownership, hierarchical structures, and individualist
values against claims of collective governance. 262 Finally, although
many Supreme Court decisions have relied on it to support protection of
258. Id. at 401.
259. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
260. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1921-1930, 1986 Duke LJ. 65,
80-82. But see, e.g., Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 941, 943
(arguing that proponents of substantive due process may find support in histor) for their position);
Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L.
Rev. I (1991) (arguing that Lochner era constitutionalism was a transitional era that was both explicable
and defensible).
261. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).




fundamental liberties of various kinds,263 Meyer is not a case that offers
speech any particular protection. Indeed, there is little if any First
Amendment content to Meyer,2" although it has been so interpreted on
occasion."' Yet, the fact remains that Meyer suggests a constitutional
tolerance for linguistic diversity that is in clear opposition to state laws
prohibiting the use of foreign tongues (at least in certain contexts). 266
b. America After Meyer
Following World War II, the United States became aware that it
lagged behind other countries in its citizens' abilities to speak foreign
languages. The National Defense Education Act of 1958267 was adopted
in response to public and congressional concern about America's place in
the world, after the launching of Sputnik by the Soviet Union in 1957.
Ten years later, federal support for bilingual education was introduced,
theoretically providing immigrants with the possibility of language
maintenance as well as the opportunity for English acquisition. 26' The
President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies
nevertheless concluded in 1979 that "Americans' incompetence in
foreign languages is nothing short of scandalous, and it is becoming
worse." '269 The situation has essentially remained unchanged since that
263. For example, Meyer is cited by Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S.
144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), and by Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-83
(1965).
264. The First Amendment was not "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment until Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), two years after Meyer was decided. For a discussion of the
First Amendment law of this period, see Howard 0. Hunter, Problems in Search of Principles: The
First Amendment in the Supreme Court from 1791-1930, 35 Emory L.J. 59, 128 (1986) (noting that
Meyer contained "incidental protection" for speech and religious interests).
265. See, e.g., David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1699, 1733 (1991);
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (stating that Meyer stands for the proposition that "the State may not,
consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge").
266. Unfortunately, despite Meyer, "the practical effect of World War I and the accompanying
state legislation resulted in the German language effectively being dropped from the high school
curriculum." Arnold H. Leibowitz, Educational Policy and Political Acceptance, The Imposition of
English As the Language of Instruction in American Schools, reprinted in House Hearings, supra
note 7, at 217, 237.
267. National Defense Educational Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, § 101, 72 Stat. 1580, 1581
(repealed 1970).
268. See Bilingual Education Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. §§ 3281-3291 (1988), and recodified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7480, 7491 (1994)). This article
does not attempt to evaluate the U.S. experiment with bilingual education since the 1960s.
269. President's Comm'n on Foreign Language & Int'l Studies, Strength Through Wisdom: A
Critique of U.S. Capability 5 (Nov. 1979). The study pointed out that only 15% of American high
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time-the United States has remained a profoundly monolingual nation,
despite claims to the contrary of "creeping bilingualism."
This monolingualism has not only been reinforced by naturalization
laws but also by state statutes consecrating the role of English as the
nation's language. Many states require jurors to be able to read, write,
and speak English,270 require court records to be in English,27' or have
various business regulations requiring the use of English.272 The
procedural rules of many states273 (and at least one federal circuit 74)
require that pleadings and evidence be filed in the English language, or,
if in a foreign language, be accompanied by a translation. For the
majority of states with no rule on the subject, it appears that, as a matter
of custom and with the significant exception of Puerto Rico,275 English
school students study a foreign language (as opposed to 24% in 1965), and that only 8% of
American colleges and universities required knowledge of a foreign language for admission
(compared with 34% in 1966). Id. at 7. See also Sen. Paul Simon, The Tongue-Tied American:
Confronting the Foreign Language Crisis (1992).
270. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:3041 (Nest 1991) (referring to La. Coie Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 401 (West 1991)).
271. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 476.050 (Vernon 1987).
272. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 20-27-205 (Michie 1991) (requiring that bedding be labeled in
English); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 140, §§ 62, 79 (1995) (requiring that used car vendors and
pawnbrokers keep records in the English language).
273. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 185 (West 1982) ("Every written proceeding in a court of
justice in this state shall be in the English language, and judicial proceedings shall be conducted,
preserved, and published in no other." The original version of this provision, in force from 1872 to
1880, permitted Spanish to be used in the counties of San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Los Angeles,
and San Diego. Id. (historical notes)); Idaho R. Civ. P. § l0(a)(3) ("Pleadings shall be in the English
language."); Mich. Ct. R. 2.113(B) ("Every pleading must be legibly typewritt, n or printed in the
English language."); Minn. Gen. R. Prac. for the Dist. Cts., § 403(c) ("Any document which is
written in a language other than English shall Te accompanied by a verified translation into the
English language."); Mont. Code Ann., § 3-1-314 (1995) (same as California. supra); N.Y. Civ.
Prac. L & R § 2101(b) (McKinney 1976) ("Each paper served or filed shal be in the English
language which, where practicable, shall be of ordinary usage. Where an affidavit or exhibit annexed
to a paper served or filed is in a foreign language, it shall be accompanied by an English translation
and an affidavit by the translator stating his qualifications and that the translation is accurate." The
advisory committee notes point out that this codifies the common law.).
274. Local Rule 30.7 of the First Circuit provides, inter alia, that "the court will not receive
documents not in the English language unless translations are furnished. Whenever an opinion of the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico is cited in a brief or oral argument which does not appear in the bound
volumes in English, an official, certified or stipulated translation thereof wih three conformed
copies shall be filed."
275. For a long part of its history, Puerto Rico was an officially bilingual jurisdiction. Puerto
Rican law provided:
In all the departments of the Commonwealth Government and in all the courts of this island, and
in all public offices the English language and the Spanish language shall be used
indiscriminately; and, when necessary, translations and oral interpretations shall be made from
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has generally been considered by the judiciary to be the official language
of the courts (and, by extension, the legal system):"27 6
English is the language of this country. This conception is
fundamental in the administration of all public affairs. It is an
elemental truth, so axiomatic in its nature as to need no supporting
authority. It is not declared in the Constitution nor enacted by
statute. It is so by the universal customs of our past in Colony,
Province and Commonwealth.
2 77
In the context of civil litigation,278 courts have generally followed this
rule even when doing so would injure an otherwise meritorious claimant
and even in cases where serious due process or equal protection concerns
have been raised. Thus, in Carmona v. Sheffield27 ' a district court
summarily rejected contentions made by Spanish-speaking plaintiffs that
they were denied the equal protection of the laws because the California
one language to the other so that all parties interested may understand any proceedings or
communications made therein.
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, § 51 (1982). In 1991, the Legislature of Puerto Rico repealed this provision,
passing a statute which established Spanish as the official language of Puerto Rico. 1991 P.R. Laws
Act No. 4. The preface to the law states that its purpose "is to abolish an anachronism and reaffirm
our historical condition as a Spanish-speaking people, freely united to the people of the United
States." Id. Section 1 makes Spanish the official language of all branches of government of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Id. § 1. Section 3 permits the use of other languages under certain
circumstances and provides that "the provisions of this Act shall not in any way limit the
Constitutional rights of any person on account of the language that is his/her vernacular or that
he/she uses as a means of expression." Id. § 3. Puerto Rico's status, as well as its legal relationship to
the United States, are ably explored in Jesds G. Roman, Comment, Does International Law Govern
Puerto Rico's November 1993 Plebescite?, 8 La Raza L.J. 98 (1995). As Heinz Kloss observes:
"Puerto Rico has what Quebec's leaders have been demanding for decades, a 'statut special'..
Kloss, supra note 9, at 173.
276. There are some exceptions to this rule. Hawaii, for example, is officially bilingual, but
Hawaiian is "not required for public acts and transactions." Haw. Rev. Stat. § 1-13 (1985).
Louisiana, while requiring legal advertisements to be published in English, permits duplicates to be
made in French. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43:204(A) (West 1982). Louisiana law also provides that
"State and local officials and public institutions are reconfirmed in the traditional right to publish
documents in the French language in addition to English." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43:204(B) (West
1982).
277. Conners v. City of Lowell, 95 N.E. 412, 415 (Mass. 1911) (holding that a general public
notice required by law to be published in a newspaper must be printed in an English newspaper even
if the statute is silent as to the language requirement, benefitting a party who challenged a sale by the
City tax inspector).
278. Criminal defendants have substantially more protection for obvious reasons. See, e.g., United
States er rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970) (establishing the right of a criminal
defendant to have a translator assist him throughout his trial if he cannot understand English); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1994) (providing for interpreters in both civil and criminal cases instituted by
the United States but not creating any constitutional entitlement to an interpreter).
279. 325 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1971), affd, 475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1973).
349
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Department of Human Resources Development conducted the state's
program of unemployment insurance benefits in the English language.
The court stated:
In essence, plaintiffs' contention would require the State of
California and, presumably, all other States and Ihe Federal
Government to provide forms and to conduct its affairs and
proceedings in whatever language is spoken and understood by any
person or group affected thereby. The breadth and scope of such a
contention is so staggering as virtually to constitute its own
refutation. If adopted in as cosmopolitan a society as ours, enriched
as it has been by the immigration of persons from many lands with
their distinctive linguistic and cultural heritages, it would virtually
cause the processes of government to grind to a halt....
For historical reasons too well-known to require review herein,
the United States is an English-speaking country ....
The extent to which special consideration should be given to
persons who have difficulty with the English language is a matter
of public policy for consideration by the appropriate legislative
bodies and not by the Courts.280
Virtually all the courts that have considered the issue under either a
due process or equal protection rubric have essentially agreed with the
Carmona court,2"' although many of them have admitted that either
280. Id. at 1342. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that California's decision to deal in English
only had a "reasonable basis," and that "the additional burdens imposed on California's finite
resources and California's interest in having to deal in only one language with all its citizens support
the conclusion of reasonableness." 475 F.2d at 739.
281. See, e.g., Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 299
(1984); Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1220 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding ihat the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require a city to give civil service examinations in Spanish to Spanish-speaking
applicants because "the common, national language of the United States is Engli:;h"); Vialez v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 783 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Jam v. Municipal Court, 578 P.2d 94, 95
(Cal. 1978) (holding that there is no common law right to an interpreter in a civil case and refusal to
appoint one is constitutional), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1067 (1979); Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d
833 (Cal. 1973) (holding that Spanish-speaking citizens are not entitled to notice in Spanish of
termination of welfare benefits, even where it was known that they were literate in Spanish only),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974); Hernandez v. Department of Labor, 416 N.E.2d 263 (I11. 1981)
(holding that even where notice in English to a non-English speaker has been mistranslated by a
friend, plaintiff may not require the state to provide notices in Spanish); Commonwealth v. Olivo,
337 N.E.2d 904, 911 (Mass. 1975) (holding that no bilingual notice is required even for a criminal
conviction because "[t]his is not an officially multilingual country, and notification of official
matters in the sole official language of both this nation and this Commonwealth is patently
reasonable."); accord DaLomba v. Director, Div. of Employment Sec., 337 N.E.2d 687 (Mass.
1975); In re Adoption of Hanna, 602 N.E.2d 588 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Alfonso v. Board of
Vol. 71:285, 1996
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"administrative and humanitarian considerations would warrant the use
of bilingual documents." 82  Such humanitarian considerations
notwithstanding, public and private pressures to Americanize have, since
the Revolution, produced a culture that is, for the most part, like that of
France, vigorously monolingual. What the French imposed through a
combination of royal fiat and decree, Americans have attained through a
relentless pressure to assimilate." 3
C. The Official English Movement
The most commonly asked question about the English language
amendment is why do we need it? And I would ust like to say, we
need it to provide English with legal protection as our national
language which will continue our heritage as a unilingual nation.
Rep. Norman D. Shumway2 .4
Review, Dep't. of Labor & Indus., 444 A.2d 1075 (NJ. 1982) (holding that there is no need for
notice of unemployment insurance benefits to be translated into beneficiaries' language), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 806 (1982).
But see Jara, 578 P.2d at 101 (Tobriner, J., dissenting); Guerrero, 512 P.2d at 840 (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting); Alfonso, 444 A.2d at 1078-79 (Wilentz, J., dissenting) (arguing that under Mullane and
its progeny, "[w]hen the state knows that a person does not understand English, it has an obligation
to provide notice in that person's language with a sufficient amount of information to trigger inquiry
or action that will result in an appeal, unless the burden of providing that notice is so great that it
outweighs the benefits of doing so."); Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Powell. 354
N.Y.S.2d 311, 316 (Civ. Ct. 1974).
Somewhat hypocritically, one court appeared to be a bit more indulgent in considering the case of
an English-speaking monolingual claiming linguistic discrimination (from Spanish speakers) in
Puerto Rico. See Smothers v. Benitez, 806 F. Supp. 299 (D.P.R. 1992).
282. Alfonso, 444 A.2d at 1077. See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). In Lau, the
Supreme Court held that the San Francisco schools were required to take affirmative measures to
accommodate the needs of some 1800 non-English speaking students of Chinese ancestry so that
they could obtain a meaningful educational experience (and presumably acquire English language
skills, although the opinion is a bit oblique as to this point). The Court held that English-only was
not enough. Id. at 566. The Court did not reach the constitutional questions presented, but decided
the case solely under § 601 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Id. Nor did the Court mandate any specific
remedy. Following Lau, the Office of Civil Rights, responsible for implementing the Bilingual
Education Act, promulgated "guidelines for districts to use in complying with Lau ... [which] went
well beyond the limited entitlement recognized in Lau." Rachel Moran, Bilingual Education As a
Status Conflict, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 321, 329 (1987). The guidelines "strongly endorsed bilingual-
bicultural education," but are no longer in effect today. Id. at 331.
283. As Denis Doyle comments, in comparing the monolingualism of the United States to the
linguistic repression of Franco's Spain, "America offers the cultural equivalent of a monolingual
administrative edict." Doyle, supra note 208, at 227.
284. House Hearings, supra note 7, at 33.
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1. The Federal English Language Amendment
Against this background, Official English comes as a surprise. Not
only has English essentially been the official language of the United
States, it has, in international affairs, come to supplant French as the
most widely used language of international discourse.285 Nevertheless,
many versions of the ELA have been introduced several tinies in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate,"' starting with Senator S.I.
Hayakawa's original proposal in 1981,2"7 and many states have adopted
either constitutional amendments, statutory provisions, or legislative
resolutions officializing English since that time.288 Congress's lack of
enthusiasm for constitutional measures has also sparked a rash of
legislative proposals seeking to establish English as the official language
of the government of the United States.
219
Yet the wide appeal of the Official English movement is explicable if
seen as a part of the recurrent pattern of nativism in American political
life. Also, it is probably a predictable reaction to the fact that the
introduction of limited special legal rights for speakers of foreign
languages in the United States, such as bilingual education, came about
essentially as part of the civil rights movement rather than from a
pedagogical imperative.29 Large numbers of Spanish-spealdng residents,
285. See supra note 78.
286. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 72, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); H.R.J. Res. 442, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982); H.R.J. Res. 169, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. Con. Res. 127, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); H.R.J. Res. 96, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935); S. Con. Res. 43, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985);
H.R. Con. Res. 129, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R.J. Res. 13, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987);
H.R.J. Res. 60, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R.J. Res. 83, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R.J.
Res. 656, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R.J. Res. 23, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R.J. Res.
48, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989); H.R.J. Res. 81, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989); F.R.J. Res. 81, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 171, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 109, 104th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1995).
287. S.J. Res. 72, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Hayakawa also founded a political organization to
support the "cause" of officializing the English Ianguage--"U.S. English." Cmford, supra note 8,
at 1-2. See also, Jamie Draper & Marth Jim6nez, A Chronology of the Official English Movement, in
Language Loyalties, supra note 8, at 89, 89-94.
288. See supra note 5.
289. See supra note 10. As the primary focus of this Article is on the proposed constitutional
amendments, legislative proposals to make English the "official" or national language of government
via a federal statute will not be discussed.
290. This point is masterfully made by Denis Doyle, who points out that chao3 is bound to result
if "bilingual education is a civil right rather than an instructional program, because then everyone'[s]
language and culture is equally valid." Doyle, supra note 208, at 226. Thus, he ccncludes that "there
is no rational basis for limiting bilingual education to Spanish or any other language." Id.
Bilingualism was not treated as a "purely pedagogical program .. . . driven by defense needs,
intellectual curiosity, or commercial interests.... In China, for example, more students are studying
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whose visibility may be greater than earlier waves of immigrants as a
result of technological change,2 9' give the impression of an
unprecedented deluge of foreigners who are unwilling or unable to
assimilate. Even politically moderate individuals are afraid: Drawing
from their own experiences and those of their families, they wonder why,
if they or their grandparents could learn English without bilingual
education, the newcomers cannot?292 Too, the very ubiquitousness of
English in American official and unofficial life may be seen as a reason
to support the ELA which, to many, simply codifies and enshrines the
obvious.293 Like France, the United States is both "hard pressed by
cultural demands from within" as well as "larger, supranational
associations with powerful cultural dimensions, such as the European
English than there are citizens of the United States; but that phenomenon has nothing whatsoever to
do with civil rights." Id. at 224.
291. Geoffrey Nunberg argues persuasively that new means of replicating experiences such as the
movies, radio, and television have imposed a high degree of cultural and ideological uniformity,
making departures from the norm seem all the more aberrant. He also points out that the new
technology makes it appear as if there is greater linguistic diversity than before, even though there
probably is not. Nunberg, supra note 13, at 490-92.
292. See, e.g., Letter from Helen Wong Jean, Executive Secretary, Chinese American Civic
Council, to Sen. Walter Huddleston (Apr. 23, 1984), in Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 30
(supporting the ELA because more than one language should be singled out for translation and she
speaks English); Letter from Michael Blichasz, President, Polish American Congress, Inc. (E.D. Pa.),
to Rep. Norman D. Shumway (Feb. 6, 1984), in Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 78 ("Those who
wish to spare their people the burden of learning a new language are either ignorant or tyrants
.... Who would be writing these words to you today if I had not been forced to learn English[?]");
Letter from Surendra K. Saxena, President, The Association of [Asian] Indians in America, Inc., to
Joseph E. Fallon (Oct. 25, 1983), in Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 113 (expressing similar
views). Of course, this ignores the difficulties of those who were unable to succeed. See supra note
15.
293. Opponents of Official English have proposed an "English-Plus" Resolution, which requests
the United States government to, inter alia:
(1) encourage all residents of this country to become fully proficient in English by expanding
educational opportunities;
(2) conserve and develop the Nation's linguistic resources by encouraging all residents of this
country to learn or maintain skills in a language other then English;
(3) assist Native Americans, Native Alaskans, Native Hawaiians, and other peoples indigenous
to the United States, in their efforts to prevent the extinction of their languages and cultures;
(4) continue to provide services in languages other than English as needed to facilitate access to
essential functions of government, promote public health and safety, ensure due process,
promote equal educational opportunity, and protect fundamental rights; and
(5) recognize the importance of multilingualism to vital American interests and individual rights,
and oppose "English-only" measures and similar language restrictionist measures.
H.R. Con. Res. 83, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995).
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Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement" 294 from
without-both phenomena threatening what Americans perceive to be
their national identity. It is not important whether this threat to national
identity is real or imagined for, as has been so persuasively argued
elsewhere, national identity is to some extent imaginary to begin with.295
What is essential is the perception that the threat is real. Viewed from
this perspective, the Official English movement is not only explicable-
it was inevitable.
Amendments proposed to the constitutions of either the states or
federal government generally take one of two forms. They either have a
simple, what some refer to as a primarily symbolic form, typified by
Senate Joint Resolution 167,296 or are more complex, ranging from that
typified by House Joint Resolution 13,297 introduced in 1987, to the more
extensive provisions of House Joint Resolution 81,29 introdaced in 1989.
Senate Resolution 167 was introduced by Senator Walter D.
Huddleston of Kentucky and others on September 21, 1983. It would add
the following amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
Section 1. The English language shall be the official language of
the United States.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation. 99
Proponents of the amendment claimed that it would not prohibit or
discourage the use of foreign languages in private contexts, or the
teaching of foreign languages in public schools or colleges, or prevent
the use of second languages for the purpose of public safety.3" Rather,
they argued, it would simply "establish a national consensus that a
common language is necessary to preserve the basic internal unity that is
required for a stable and growing nation;', 31' establish English as the
official language of federal, state, and local govermnmertts; eliminate
294. Tully, supra note 19, at 2.
295. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origih and Spread of
Nationalism (1983).
296. S.J. Res. 167, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
297. H.R.J. Res. 13, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987). This bill is similar to an earlier version
introduced in 1983. See infra note 307.
298. H.R.J. Res. 81, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
299. S.J. Res. 167, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
300. Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 23 (statement of Sen. Huddleston).
301. Id. (quoting Sen. Huddleston).
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bilingual ballots; and permit bilingual education only where it could be
"clearly demonstrated the primary objective and practical result is the
teaching of English to students as rapidly as possible and not of cultural
maintenance.""3 2
Yet, it is obvious that if the intent was to require the federal
government to act in English only (i.e., by eliminating bilingual ballots
and educational programs), other activities of the government would
necessarily be affected as well. Thus, the "simple form" of the ELA
could have far-reaching consequences. As Senator Orrin Hatch, chair of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, pointed out:
The Constitution provides a framework within which each
succeeding generation may resolve the social controversies unique
to that era. It is not the vehicle to make the adjustments in legal
policy necessitated by changing circumstances. Attempting to
inculcate the mores and perspectives of any particular time and
place in the Constitution will inhibit the document's usefulness for
resolving problems to arise in times and places we cannot now
foresee.3"3
Although it has often been stated that section 1 of Resolution 167,
alone, would be of little practical effect,30" that is not so clear. To give
the provision no effect would be counterintuitive: If it could muster the
votes for adoption, presumably it would be because the public thought it
meant something. Constitutional provisions generally do not require any
legislation for their implementation. If the contrary would be true in the
case of the ELA, it is only because of its inherent ambiguity: The
question becomes what meaning a court would attach to its provisions. In
any event, in none of the "simple" forms that the ELA has taken does
section 1 ever stand alone; it is always accompanied by a second section,
empowering Congress to enforce section 1 "by appropriate
legislation.""3 5 Section 2 does not limit its purview to civil legislation,
302. Id. at 24 (quoting Sen. Huddleston).
303. Id. at 6 (prepared statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch).
304. See, e.g., Charles Dale, Legal Analysis of SJ. Res. 167 Proposing an Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution To Make English the Official Language of the United States, in Senate Hearings, supra
note 7, at 32. This statement often is made in reliance on the fact that the state constitutional
provisions officializing English have had little immediate effect. See, e.g., Yniguez v. Arizonans for
Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 927 n.1 I (9th Cir. 1995) (en bane) (noting primarily symbolic effect
of Official English laws in other states), cert. granted, 1995 WL 761639 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996) (No.
95-974); accord Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action v. Kusper, 490 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1973).
305. This is true of most of the post-Civil War amendments.
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presumably permitting Congress to use criminal prosecutions to enforce
the law, should it so desire.
If Senate Resolution 167 enjoyed the advantage of simplicity as well
as the disadvantage of vagueness, other versions of the ELA manage to
combine vagueness with complexity.3"a For example, House Joint
Resolution 13,307 introduced on January 6, 1987, in addition to making
English the Official Language and granting specific enforcement power
to Congress, provides:
Section 2. Neither the United States nor any State shall require, by
law, ordinance, regulation, order, decree, program or policy, the use
in the United States of any language other than English.
Section 3. This article shall not prohibit any law, ordinance,
regulation, order, decree, program, or policy requiring educational
instruction in a language other than English for the purpose of
making students who use a language other than English proficient
in English.30 8
While the legislative history is silent on the rationale for the addition
of sections 2 and 3, one may infer that the supporters of House
Resolution 13 thought that section 2 was required to bolster section 1 's
effectiveness: to ensure that the government could not require any
services, even for health or safety purposes, to be offered or made
available in any language other than English. Section 3, apparently
permitting bilingual education for transitional purposes only, is the only
exception permitted.
Aside from the obvious problems with section 3,3 9 Section 2 is
particularly troubling.3"' While it appears to cover only the public sector
306. They were modeled after the bill, originally introduced into the Senate by Senator S.I.
Hayakawa, which included six sections. See S.J. Res. 72, 1st Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
307. This bill is the same as its predecessor, H.R.J. Res. 169, 98th Cong., "st Sess. (1983),
introduced on March 2, 1983.
308. H.R.J. Res. 13, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
309. Determining the intent of a particular educational program is a difficult task for the judiciary.
Indeed, one wonders how this provision would be enforced. "Proficiency" in English, would presumably
have to be authoritatively defined-in a court decision, a legislative enactment, or an administrative
regulation-as a matter of constitutional law! If a lozal school board or state attempted to require its
schools to provide bilingual education beyond the official definition of "proficient," could the teachers
doing so be punished as Robert Meyer was?
310. Presumably to correct some of these deficiencies, ELA sponsors proposed H.RJ. Res. 81,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), introduced on January 19, 1989. Section 3 of that bill is yet more
complicated, providing:
This article shall not prohibit any law, ordinance, regulation, order, decree, program, or policy-
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and not private activity, the distinction between the two is not always
clear:
[C]ould Congress or any state enforce the section 1 declaration of
English as the "official" national language by legislatively
restricting use of non-English by private persons in public places,
or bar judicial enforcement of private legal documents executed in
a language other than English? Concededly, such curbs on the
private use of foreign language would raise substantial First
Amendment questions, but just how the courts might reconcile the
apparent conflict between the demands of free speech, on the one
hand, and the constitutional interests protected by the proposed
amendment are unclear. The most that can be said is that, absent a
definitive legislative history, the two sets of interests would
presumably be of equivalent constitutional status, and the courts
would be left to strike the appropriate balance between them.3 '
Which is exactly what the French Constitutional Council did in
analyzing the Loi Toubon.312
2. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English
Most state constitutional amendments follow the general pattern of the
federal ELA proposals. Either they provide that, together with the state
song and state bird, English is the state's official language,3 a or they are
(1) to provide educational instruction in a language other than English for the purpose of making
students who use a language other than English proficient in English,
(2) to teach a foreign language to students who are already proficient in English,
(3) to protect public health and safety, or
(4) to allow translators for litigants, defendants, or witnesses in court cases.
H.R.J. Res. 81, 101st Cong. Ist Sess. § 3 (1989).
Again, one wonders what "proficiency" requires. Does it mean an eighth grade level (as the
Nebraska legislature apparently thought in 1923)? A second grade level? May kindergarten students
in public schools (who, in spite of having English as their mother tongue may not be "proficient" in
it) be taught foreign languages? Or must they wait until the eighth grade?
311. Charles Dale, Legal Analysis of HJ. Res. 169 Proposing an Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution to Make English the Official Language of the United States, in Senate Hearings, supra
note 7, at 89, 94-95 (emphasis added).
312. See supra part II.D.3.
313. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 1-4-117 (Michie Supp. 1993); Colo. Const. of 1876, art. 11,
§ 30A; Fla. Const. art. II § 9; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2.013 (Baldwin 1995); Miss. Code Ann. § 3-3-31
(1972); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 145-12 (1994); N.D. Cent. Code § 54-02-13 (1989).
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more explicit (and restrictive) in application, like House Resolution 13.2'"
The most restrictive state constitutional amendment to date has been
Arizona's English language amendment, Proposition 106, which was
narrowly adopted by referendum on November 8, 1988.3"5
Proposition 106 was incorporated into the Arizona State; Constitution
as Article XXVIII. It proclaims English to be the official language of
Arizona,316 and provides, inter alia, that the state and all its political
subdivisions, including its officials and employees, shall "aLct in English
and no other language"3 7 unless a constitutionally permissible exception
exists."' Article XXVIII requires the state to "preserve, protect, and
enhance the role of the English language" as the official language of the
state3 19 and grants standing to persons residing in or doing business in
Arizona to bring suit to enforce it.320 By its terms, Article XXVIII goes
even further than most of the federal ELA proposals. Yet, one wonders
whether Arizona's constitutional provision only makes explicit what is
implicit in the federal versions of the ELA--that the government and its
employees shall act in English only, unless one of a few constitutionally
permitted exceptions is present.
Article XXVIII was challenged by Maria-Kelley Yniguez, a bilingual
employee of the Risk Management Division of the Arizona Department
314. See supra notes 307-11 and accompanying text.
315. See Arizona State Publicity Pamphlet (on file with the author). Proposition 106 was adopted
by 50.5% of the voters. Editorial, Official English Ruling: Bien Hecho (Good Job), Ariz. Rep., Dec.
12, 1994, at B4.
316. Ariz. Const. art. XXVIII, § 1(1) (West Supp. 1995).
317. Id. § 3(l)(a).
318. Ariz. Const. art. XXVIII, § 3(2) provides:
This State and all political subdivisions of this State may act in a language other than English
under any of the following circumstances:
(a) to assist students who are not proficient in the English language, to the extent necessary to
comply with federal law, by giving educational instruction in a language other than English to
provide as rapid as possible a translation to English.
(b) to comply with other federal laws.
(c) to teach a student a foreign language as a part of a required or voluntary educational
curriculum.
(d) to protect public health or safety.
(e) to protect the rights of criminal defendants or victims of crime.
319. Id.§2.
320. Id. § 4.
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of Administration at the time Proposition 106 was approved.32" ' Yniguez
filed an action against three officials of the State of Arizona3" seeking an
injunction against state enforcement of the provision and a declaration
that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution and several federal civil rights laws.323 In a surprisingly
short opinion given the novelty of the issues presented,324 the district
court agreed with Yniguez, holding that the "sweeping language" of
Article XXVIII prohibited, by its terms, "the use of any language other
than English by all officers and employees of all political subdivisions in
Arizona while performing their official duties, save to the extent that
they may be allowed to use a foreign language by the limited exceptions
contained in § 3(2) of Article XXVIII., 325 There being no construction
capable of narrowing the provision,326 the court concluded that Article
321. Supplemental Brief on Rehearing En Banc for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 1, Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (on file with the author). The
parties stipulated that Yniguez was fluent in both English and Spanish and that her responsibilities
included adjusting medical malpractice claims. 69 F.3d at 924 n.4. Prior to the adoption of Article
XXVIII, she communicated with monolingual Spanish-speaking claimants in Spanish and with
bilingual claimants in a combination of English and Spanish. Id. State employees who fail to obey
the Arizona Constitution are subject to employment sanctions. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp.
309,311 (D. Ariz. 1990), afffdsub nom. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th
Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 1995 WL 761639 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996) (No. 95-974) [hereinafter Yniguez
J] (discussing this point in detail). Immediately upon passage of Article XXVIII, Yniguez stopped
speaking Spanish on the job. Id. at 310.
322. Yniguez sued Rose Mofford, Governor;, Robert Corbin, Attorney General; and Catherine
Eden, Director of the Arizona Department of Administration, in their individual and official
capacities. 730 F. Supp. at 310. The court found that Mofford, acting in her official capacity, was the
only appropriate defendant in the action. Id. at 310-13.
323. Yniguez was joined by a state legislator, Jaime Gutierrez, who communicates in Spanish
with his Spanish-speaking constituents. Id. at 310. Gutierrez's claim was dismissed on Eleventh
Amendment grounds. Id. at 311.
324. Prior to the Yniguez decision, no court had squarely addressed the issue whether choice of
language is entitled to First Amendment protection. Meyer, of course, was not a First Amendment
case, although it is occasionally referred to as such. David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91
Colum. L. Rev. 1699, 1733 (1991). There are hints in otherwise inapposite cases of the close
connection between choice of language and freedom of expression, but none addresses the issue
squarely. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated on grounds
of mootness, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989); Asian Am. Business Group v. City of Pomona, 716 F. Supp.
1328, 1330 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that regulation of language is a regulation of content).
Likewise, First Amendment scholarship raises comparable questions, but is not generally on point.
See, e.g., Owen Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 Yale L.J. 2087 (1991); Martin
Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 113 (1981).
325. Yniguez 1, 730 F. Supp. at 314.
326. The State Attorney General issued an advisory opinion arguing that Article XXVIII was
directed only towards sovereign governmental acts and did not prohibit the use of languages other
than English that were reasonably necessary to facilitate the day-to-day operation of government. Id.
at 315. However, not only was this opinion not binding under Arizona state law, but was, as Judge
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XXVIII was facially overbroad and invalid under the First
Amendment.3
27
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.328 Like the ccurt below, it
rejected the state Attorney Generals interpretation that the law would
permit the use of languages other than English whenever such use would
reasonably "facilitate the day-to-day operation of governir.ent," holding
that: "Article XXVIII plainly does not set forth an innocuous, pragmatic
rule that tolerates the use of languages other than English whenever
beneficial to the public welfare. Its mandate is precisely the opposite.
The use of languages other than English is banned except when expressly
permitted."3
29
The panel also concluded that the Arizona law was facially
overbroad 3" because it would chill the speech of third parties not before
the court, adversely affecting not only the speech rights af all Arizona
employees, officials, officers, judges, and legislators, but burdening the
interests of non-English-speaking Arizonans in receiving information, as
well.33' It then turned to the claims of the defendants: first, that the
Rosenblatt pointed out, a "remarkable job of plastic surgery." Id. at 316 (citing Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969)). The en banc court affirmed. Yniguet v. Arizonans for
Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 1995 WL 761639 (U.S. Mar. 25,
1996) (No. 95-974) [hereinafter Yniguez III].
327. Yniguez 1, 730 F. Supp. at 314. Having found that Article XXVIII violated the First
Amendment, the court declined to decide the other issues presented. Id. at 316.
328. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Yniguez
11], withdrawn, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995). Although the state declined to appeal, the Ninth Circuit
permitted the intervention of Arizonans for Official English for that purpose. Id. at 1233. Yniguez
subsequently cross-appealed for nominal damages. She was joined as a plaintiff-appellee by
Arizonans Against Constitutional Tampering, the principal opponent of Proposition 106, which the
court also permitted to intervene. Id. at 1223-24. The Supreme Court's order granting certiorari
suggests that the unusual procedural posture of this case may have troubled it, for it specifically
asked the parties to brief the issue of standing. 64 U.S.L.W. 3639 (1996).
329. Yniguez 11, 42 F.3d at 1226-27. In a footnote to the en banc decision, the majority noted that
there seemed to be a difference of opinion between the state Attorney General and Arizonans for
Official English as to the scope of Article XXVIII. Stating that both parties' e:planations "were
confused and contradictory," the court added: "At best, they shed little light on how the amendment
could rationally be construed in a limiting manner and at worst they helped make it clear that it could
not be." Yniguez 111, 69 F.3d at 928 n.12.
330. As the court pointed out, "Article XXVIII on its face applies to speech in a seemingly
limitless variety of governmental settings, from ministerial statements by civil seriants at the office
to teachers speaking in the classroom, from town-hall discussions between constituents and their
representatives to the translation of judicial proceedings in the courtroom." Ynigez H1, 42 F.3d at
1229. The court also got a bit carried away, adding that "[u]nder the article, the Arizona state
universities would be barred from issuing diplomas in Latin, and judges performing weddings would
be prohibited from saying "Mazel Tov" as part of the official marriage ceremony." Id.
331. Id. at 1230.
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decision of what language to speak is a matter of expressive conduct
rather than speech (and therefore entitled to less protection); second, that
what Yniguez was really seeking was to compel the state to furnish
information to all members of the public in their own language; finally,
that as a government employee, Yniguez's speech was simply not
entitled to First Amendment protection.332
Taking the second contention first, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that
the defendants' argument was based on an erroneous interpretation of the
facts, as Yniguez was seeking only to prevent the state from gagging the
employees currently providing members of the public with information
in other languages from continuing to do so."' As for the more
substantial argument made by the defendants, that the First Amendment
protected only the content of the speech and not the language in which it
was made, again the court found the defendants' position lacking:
[]e are entirely unpersuaded by the comparison between speaking
languages other than English and burning flags. Of course, speech
in any language consists of the "expressive conduct" of vibrating
one's vocal chords, moving one's mouth and thereby making
sounds, or of putting pen to paper, or hand to keyboard. Yet the fact
that such "conduct" is shaped by a language--that is, a
sophisticated and complex system of understood meanings-is
what makes it speech. Language is by definition speech, and the
regulation of any language is the regulation of speech.334
While space does not permit a detailed exploration of this point, it is
worth noting that this is an issue of enormous significance that has been
decided differently by different legal systems.335 Relying on Cohen v.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1233.
334. Id. at 1231 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
335. The problem of whether there is any right to speak one's own language is particularly acute
in Europe. See, e.g., Bruno de Witte, Surviving in Babel? Language Rights and European
Integration, 21 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 103, 106-09 (1992) (discussing the decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights in the Belgian Linguistic Cases and the European Court of Justice in X v.
Ireland as well as the Swiss position that linguistic freedom is an unwritten constitutional right);
Nathaniel Berman, Nationalism Legal and Linguistic: The Teachings of European Jurisprudence, 24
N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1515 (1992); Mala Tabory, Language Rights As Human Rights, 10 Isr. Y.B.
Hum. Rts. 167 (1980). It is also worth considering what effect, if any, article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976), might have on resolution of minority language issues. Article 27 provides:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.
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California,336 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that, just as a state may not
excise one particularly scurrilous epithet from public disco-arse, the State
of Arizona may not succeed in its attempt to single out n.Ot "one word
from repression, but rather entire vocabularies." '337
Finally, the court addressed the contention that the government was
entitled to control the content and manner of Yniguez's speech because
she was a government employee. While conceding this to be true, at least
within the limits established by the Supreme Court's line of government
employee speech cases,33 the court, relying on Meyer v. Nebraska,339
See also U.N. Charter arts. 1, T 3; 13, 1(b); 55(c); 76(c) (all stating that the purpose of the U.N.
includes promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or rligion); Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
art. 2, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prope-ty, birth or other
status."); Sym~on Karagiannis, La Protection des Langues Minoritaires au Titre de l'Article 27 du
Pacte International RelatifAux Droits Civils et Po!itiques, Rev. trim dr. h. 195 (1994).
336. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (upholding a "speaker's freedom to say 'fuck the d-aft' rather than 'I
strongly oppose the draft"' and reversing a conviction under the California "offensive conduct" law).
Although the Cohen decision was a controversial one, see, e.g., Jules B. Gerard, May Societ
,
Preserve a Modicum of Decorum in Public Discourse?, in The Bill of Rights 94 (Eugene W. Hickok,
Jr. ed., 1991), as Professor Laurence Tribe notes, Cohen recognizes "the emotive role of free
expression--its place in the evolution, definition, and proclamation of individual and group
identity." Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 787 (1988).
337. Yniguez 11, 42 F.3d at 1232. As the en banc opinion noted: "To call a prohibition that
precludes the conveying of information to thousands of Arizonans in a lniguage they can
comprehend a mere regulation of 'mode of expression' is to miss entirely the basic point of First
Amendment protections." Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. granted, 1995 WL 761639 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996) (No. 95-974).
338. Yniguez 17, 42 F.3d at 1237. Although the government may have "a freer hand in regulating
the speech of its employees than it has in regulating the speech of the public at large," Waters v.
Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1886 (1994), a state may not require all its officers and employees (no
matter what their job) to relinquish their First Amendment rights as a coidition of public
employment, Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977)), and it certainly may not apply stricter "First Amendment standards
to its legislators than it may to private citizens." Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309, 314 (D.
Ariz. 1990) (citing Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 132-33 (1966)), aff'd sub nom. Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 1995 WL 761639 (U.S.
Mar. 25, 1996) (No. 95-974). The Ninth Circuit also considered the other state interests advanced by
Arizonans for Official English: unity and political stability, encouraging a common language, and
protecting public confidence. The court pointed out that there were no facts that would support the
contention that Article XXVIII advanced any of tie purported state interests, bu: considered them
anyway, holding that none of them were sufficient to overcome the First Amendment rights
involved, whether a strict or a moderate form of scrutiny was applied. Yniguez I, 42 F.3d at 1238-
41; Yniguez 111, 69 F.3d at 943-47. Unfortunately, space does not permit a discussion of all the
employee speech cases cited by the court.
339. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
A French Lesson
responded that, although it recognized the importance of a common
language in promoting democracy and national unity:
[t]he state cannot achieve unity by prescribing orthodoxy.... [T]he
goals of protecting democracy and encouraging unity and stability
are at most indirectly related to the repressive means selected to
achieve them .... [T]he measure inhibits rather than advances the
state's interest in the efficient and effective performance of its
duties.... [T]he direct effect of the provision is not only to restrict
the rights of all state and local government servants in Arizona, but
also to severely impair the free speech interests of a portion of the
populace they serve.340
The court also pointed out that this was speech that members of the
public wished to hear34" ' and speech that furthered government efficiency
by providing the public with information it could not otherwise obtain.342
On rehearing en banc, the panel's decision was affirmed and most of
its opinion adopted by a vote of six to five.343 Of note, however, were the
separate opinion of Judge Brunetti, who concurred but wrote separately
"to emphasize that the article's unconstitutional effect on Arizona's
elected officials would alone be sufficient reason to strike the provision
down,"3" and the vigorous dissents penned by Judge Fernandez and
Judge Kozinski.345 Judge Fernandez defined the issue as one of employee
speech. Harkening back to the Nebraska Supreme Court in McKelvie /,346
he would find that the language chosen by the speaker is of no import to
the First Amendment.347 The only relevant factor, in his view, is the
340. Yniguez 11, 42 F.3d at 1241. The court's reference to Meyer is appropriate: Meyer rejects the
argument that the statute at issue was an appropriate means to "foster a homogenous people with
American ideals" 262 U.S. at 402.
341. Yniguez11,42F.3dat 1236.
342. The court dismissed an additional justification of the defendant-that allowing government
employees to speak foreign languages would undermine public confidence in government. Even if
that were true (which the court disputed), the court held that it would not justify the infringement of
constitutional rights. Id. at 1241.
343. Yniguez 111, 69 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1995) (en bane).
344. Id. at 950 (Brunetti, J., concurring). "By restricting the free communication of ideas between
elected officials and the people they serve, Article XXVIII threatens the very survival of our democratic
society." Id.
345. Chief Judge Wallace also dissented. He wrote separately, contending that, as Yniguez could
say in English what she wanted to say in Spanish, there was no First Amendment problem. Id. at 959
(Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
346. 175 N.W. 531 (Neb. 1919). See supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
347. Judge Fernandez's opinion is rather confusing on this issue. At one point he suggests that
content may differ from one language to another, if this is true, he says, Article XXVIII is constitutional
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content, that is, what the speaker says. And, if the speaker's words do not
involve public concern (as Judge Fernandez thought Yniguez's speech
did not),348 the state may "direct what that content must be." '349 This
would leave Yniguez only the protection of the Supreme Court's line of
expressive conduct cases, which Judge Fernandez found inapplicable.
According to him, there is no "First Amendment protection of the pure
mode element of a language."35
Finally, Judge Kozinski entered the throe.35' As he sees it, the
government essentially owns the speech of its employees,3 52 who lose
most, if not all, of their First Amendment rights t.pon entering
government service. 35' As Yniguez worked for the government, she does
not have the right to decide what she will say (nor, implicitly, the
language she shall say it in); to hold otherwise would, in Judge
Kozinski's view, give "bureaucrats the right to turn every policy
disagreement into a federal lawsuit."
354
Judge Kozinski's opinion failed to see the forest for the Irees. Yniguez
asserted that Article XXVIII was facially overbroad becaase it trod on
the First Amendment rights, not only of all those who might "act" for the
government in any way (including, as Judge Brunetti makes clear, state
because "the State has the right to control the content of what it is paying for." Yniguez 111, 69 F.3d at
957 (Fernandez, J., dissenting). If this is not true. and choice of language is just conduct, ordering
Yniguez to speak English, in Judge Fernandez's view, is no different than the state "direct[ing] that its
ditches be dug and that its contracts be let in particular ways." Id. (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
348. Judge Fernandez admitted some difficulty in deciding whether Yniguez's speech was
"public" or "private" but concluded that it was "more like a case of private concern speech." Id. at
956.
349. Id. at 957.
350. Id. at 958.
351. His opinion did not address many of the important issues raised by the case, but did lengthen the
debate considerably, his hyperbole causing Judge Reinhardt to pen a particularly cE.ustic response. See
id. at 952-54 (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially).
352. Id. at 961 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that since Arizonans pay Yniguez's salary, it is
"their call whether Yniguez spen[d] her work-time processing claims, proroting English or
twiddling her thumbs").
353. Judge Kozinski does not really explain why the First Amendment does not apply to
government employees, but implicit in his discussion are a couple of predominan: themes: first, that
if the First Amendment did apply, the government would become hostage to the rights of its
employees, id. ("This case is about whether state employees may arrest the gears of government by
refusing to say or do what the state chooses to have said or done."); second, that the Arizona
constitutional amendment was appropriate, id. at 960, 963 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (saying that he is
nYt sure whether it is constitutional, but opening his opinion with the following quote: "A house
ivided against itself cannot stand.").
354. Id. at 961. Judge Kozinski does not discuss how this might affect judges, who are also
government employees.
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legislators and judges), but of all those who might receive government
services.355 Judge Kozinski suggested that the fact that Article XXVIII
was democratically enacted vouches for its constitutionality.356 Yet it is
hornbook law that the provisions of the Bill of Rights are specifically
designed to protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority. Judge
Kozinski's dissent disappoints in failing to address the really thorny
question that the majority identifies: Is one's choice of language
protected by the First Amendment?
357
As the debate between the majority and dissenting judges suggests,
the answers to a legal problem, whether substantive or procedural,
depend on the question asked. The dissenting judges frame the question
narrowly: What may the state, as Yniguez's employer, compel her to do?
Th6 majority sees the case in the context of a broader question: May the
state banish foreign languages from public life? The majority properly
refused to be manipulated into restricting the scope of its inquiry (and
thus the response given). Note that the majority's position does not in
any way undermine the government's power to regulate, within the
constitutional limits set by the Supreme Court's line of employee speech
cases, the speech of its employees and subject them to discipline if "the
employee's interest in expressing herself on [a] matter . . . [is]
outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to 'the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees.'
358
But, let us take this case one step further. Suppose that the Arizona
law were indeed constitutional and that Yniguez were still at her post,
handling medical malpractice claims brought to her by private citizens
speaking English, Spanish, and various Native American languages.
355. Curiously, Judge Kozinski suggests that there may be other constitutional problems with
Article XXVIII, but indicates that this is not the case in which to raise them. Id. at 963 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
356. Id. at 961.
357. As Professor Laurence Tribe has pointed out: "Expression and conduct, message and medium, are
... inextricably tied together in all communicative behavior." Tribe, supra note 336, at 827.
358. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1884 (1994) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
142 (1983)). Unfortunately, although the majority recognized the broader implications of Yniguez's
claims, its opinion does not recognize the doctrinal complexities and implications of its holding. That
is, the Ninth Circuit did not articulate a test that could guide either state legislatures or other courts in
defining the limits of the First Amendment right it identifies. The court's holding rests on a finding
that Arizona's constitutional amendment was overbroad because it would prohibit protected speech
merely because the speech was uttered in a foreign language. But the opinion does not really define
what speech is protected, nor identify under what circumstances, if any, the government would be
able to impose an English language requirement. Of course, those issues were not directly before the
court. Yet, more guidance on this question would have been useful.
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Yniguez has recently received a pamphlet from the director of civil
service that specifically requires employees to promote the English
language and admonishes them to "act in English and no olher language"
unless one of the exceptions listed in section 3 of Article XXVIII applies.
A claimant enters and addresses Yniguez in Spanish. Yniguez smiles and
responds in Spanish, the language in which she was addressed, as
bilinguals often do.359 Of course, it might matter whether Yniguez's
response is a simple "hola, '36 ° an "hola" accompanied by a longer
greeting, such as, "Hola. jComo esti?,' '36 or a greeting combined with
something more substantial, such as, "Hola. gEn qug puedo
ayudarle?'' 36 A monolingual English-speaking coworker glowers at her.
Suddenly mindful of her mistake, Yniguez switches to English.363 The
claimant cannot speak English and continues to address her in Spanish.
Variations on the above theme are obviously infinite," yet one thing
is clear: Under Judge Kozinski's analysis, Yniguez could be fired,365 the
claimant would not receive satisfaction,366 and if Yniguez's employer
359. There is a large body of fascinating research on how bilinguals actually tse their languages.
See, e.g., Grosjean, supra note 207, at 228-88.
360. "Hello."
361. "Hello, how are you?"
362. "Hello. How can I help you?"
363. The above hypothetical differs from Yniguez's case in that Yniguez claimed that her use of
Spanish was intentional.
364. Judge Reinhardt addresses the possible variations in his concurring opinion, stating:
If Judge Kozinski had his way, bilingual government clerks would not be able to advise persons
who can speak only Spanish-or Chinese or Navajo-how to apply for food s~amps, or aid for
their children, or unemployment or disability benefits. Public employees would be prohibited
from helping non-English speaking residents file complaints against those who mistreat them or
who violate their rights or even from helping them secure driver's licenses or permits to open
small businesses. Bilingual traffic officers would not be able to give directions to nearby
medical clinics or schools. Migrant farm workers who cannot speak English would find
themselves cut off from almost all government assistance by an impenetrable language barrier.
Recent immigrants in general, including many who fled persecution, would find their lives in
their adopted land unduly harsh and bewildering-
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 952-53 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(Reinhardt, J., concurring specially), cert. granted, 1995 WL 761639 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996) (No. 95-
974).
365. Note that under Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and its progeny, it is hard
to see how she could be fired for saying any of the above in English, although the government
clearly has the right to exercise greater control over the speech of its employees than over the speech
of private citizens. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983).
366. As the Yniguez II court explained:
[A]rticle [XXVIII] effectively requires that.., employees remain mute before members of the
non-English speaking public who seek their assistance. At such moments of awkward silence
A French Lesson
does not fire her, the annoyed coworker could perhaps sue Yniguez (or,
more probably, her employer) under section 4 of Article XXVIII for
speaking Spanish on the job. Of course, the courts will have to decide
whether a mixture of Spanish and English violates the law. Is a salutation
alone ("hola") enough grounds for dismissal, or must Yniguez say
something more substantive? In the above hypothetical, Yniguez's use of
Spanish was accidental-would that make a difference? 67
Now suppose that, pursuant to section 2 of Article XXVIII, a blue-
ribbon commission appointed by the state proposes various laws that will
help to "preserve, protect and enhance the role of the English language as
the official language of the state of Arizona." One of these laws requires
all advertising on public property, such as buses, to be in English only.
Suppose that instead of limiting the law to public property, the law
applies to all public fora: newspapers, theatres, restaurants, etc. This
would, of course, be even more restrictive than the 1994 French law36
(which does permit translations under certain conditions), 69 but suppose
further that the legislative history suggests that the Arizona legislature
thought the law "necessary to oblige non-English speakers to learn
English." One might question whether the law is within the scope of the
power granted to the Arizona legislature by section 2, but in Judge
Fernandez's view, it would clearly not pose any constitutional problem
under the First Amendment, as the law would not go to the content of the
advertisement, only the language in which the advertising appeared.
Similarly, it is hard to see why the state could not make violation of the
law a misdemeanor and authorize the police to issue citations for "illegal
use of the [your foreign language here] language in a public place."
Finally, those who were particularly recalcitrant could be jailed for a few
between government employees and those they serve, it will be strikingly clear to all concerned
that vital speech that individuals desire both to provide and to hear has been stifled by the state.
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217, 1237 (9th Cir. 1994), withdrawn, 69 F.3d
920 (9th Cir. 1995).
367. In the Title VII context, at least one court has intimated that the employee's volition is
irrelevant: "The fact that an employee may have to catch himself or herself from occasionally
slipping into Spanish does not impose a burden significant enough to amount to the denial of equal
opportunity." Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2726 (1994). That decision, however, should have little bearing on our hypothetical, for, not only did
the Garcia court admit that it was holding as it did essentially without reference to the facts of the
particular case, but that it was only responding to the question whether English-only rules may have
a discriminatory impact on bilingual employees in the context of Title VII, not the First Amendment.
Id. at 1490.
368. Compare article 3 of the 1994 French law concerning the use of the French language. See
supra note 153 and accompanying text.
369. See Law No. 94-665 of Aug. 4, 1994, art. 4, J.O. Aug. 5, 1994.
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months. That would surely teach them to renounce their native
tongues.370 While the French Constitution may permit this kind of
Orwellian world, in which "Big Brother could compel its minions to say
War is Peace and Peace is War,"37' the U.S. Constitution does not and
should not.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that, for better or worse, both the United States and
France are essentially monolingual countries, deeply suspicious of
foreign tongues. Yet they have arrived at this state in different ways. The
French have seen culture and language as essentially within the state's
purview; cultural norms are to be protected, are to be enforced, are to be
channeled and controlled. Moreover, the French maintain a firm belief
that this can be accomplished by law.
Americans, more pragmatic perhaps, and from a more liberal political
tradition, have not traditionally perceived culture as within the purview
of the state. Nor have they sought to regulate language by using the law
as a tool, although certainly the common law absorbed cultural ideas
about language and turned them into legal precedent, building, one could
say, from the ground up rather than from the top down. The French
experience should demonstrate that legislating about language is really
quite futile, at least in a free society. Language is something that lives
and breathes, that simply cannot be controlled by legal institutions. The
key phrase, of course, is "in a free society." To the extent that we are
willing to make society less free in order to impose monolingualism,
some "progress" towards monolingualism could perhaps b- made." 2 As
370. Compare articles 16 and 17 of the 1994 French law. See supra rotes 150-51 and
accompanying text.
371. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cii. 1995) (en banc)
(Reinhardt, J., concurring specially), cert. granted, 1995 WL 761639 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996) (No. 95-
974).
372. In a similar vein but in a different context, the Second Senate of the German Constitutional
Court recently suggested in its decision on the Maastricht Treaty that a polity (referring to the
European Union) in which citizens may not address public authorities in their own language
(thinking of German) is lacking a fundamental element of democracy:
Democracy, if it is not to remain a merely formal principle of accountability, is c'ependent on the
presence of certain pre-legal conditions, such as a continuous free debate between opposing
social forces, interests and ideas, in which political goals also become clarified and change
course and out of which comes a public opinion which forms the beginnings of political
intentions. That also entails that the decision-making processes of the organs exercising
sovereign powers and the various political objectives pursued can be generally perceived and
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English is disappearing from advertisements in the French m6tro,
Spanish could disappear from signs in the New York subway. Yet, in
spite of all their attempts at rigorous language legislation, the French
have not been able either to maintain their international linguistic
hegemony, or to insure cultural harmony and economic bliss at home. To
chip away at the First Amendment in pursuit of some elusive goal of
cultural harmony or national unity then, is self-defeating as well as
dangerous.
Courts in the United States have chosen to see choice of language as
part of the speech interests protected by the Constitution. Meyer places
this protection somewhere in the Due Process Clause; Yniguez locates it
directly in the First Amendment. Despite the provisions of the
Declaration of the Rights of Man, however, the French Constitutional
Council does not recognize choice of language as protected-only
choices of words within a language. This is more than a semantic
difference, going to fundamentally different views of freedom and of life
in civil society.
The French Constitutional Council might have ruled as it did even
without the recent amendment to the French Constitution. The
supremacy of the French language has been a principle of French public
law for a long time. What one can surely say, however, is that if the U.S.
Constitution were ever amended to enshrine English as an official
language, Meyer and Yniguez might not be decided as they were-and
America could be a very different place than it is now. What proponents
of Official English need to recognize is that the English language and the
American people have prospered precisely because of their freedom, not
in spite of it.
understood, and therefore that the citizen entitled to vote can communicate in his own language
with the sovereign authority to which he is subject.
Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, (Brunner v. the European Unity Treaty), BVerfG 2 Sen. [Fed. Const. Ct.
2d Chamber], [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57.
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APPENDIX: THE LOI TOUBON
Law No. 94-665 of August 4, 1994, Concerning the use of the
French language:373
Article 1. Language of the Republic by virtue of the Constitution,
the French language is a fundamental element of France's
personality and heritage (patrimoine).
It is the language of teaching, of labor, of commerce (6changes)
and of public services.
It is the privileged link between the nations of the French-
speaking community (lafrancophonie).
Article 2. Use of the French language is compulsory with respect to
the name, the offer, the presentation, the instructions, the
description of the scope and the conditions of the warranties of a
good, a product or a service, as well as with respect to invoices and
receipts.
[Provisions declared unconstitutional by Constitutional Council
Decision No. 94-345 of July 29, 1994 are omitted.]
The above provisions apply to any advertising, wheher written,
spoken or audio-visual.
This article does not apply to the designation of well-known
typical products and foreign specialties (sp~cialit~s d'appellation
6trang~re).
Nothing in the trademark laws prevents the application of the first
and third paragraphs of this article with respect to any declarations
(mentions) or slogans registered with the brand or trade name.
Article 3. Any inscription or announcement which is intended for
the public's information, and which is posted or made on a public
street, in a location open to the public or in any means of public
transportation, must be in the French language. [Provisions
373. J.O. Aug. 5, 1994, at 11,392 (translated from the French). The text is how the law appears
following invalidation of certain provisions by French Constitutional Council Decision of July 29, 1994,
1994 Recueil Dalloz, No. 94-345.
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declared unconstitutional by Constitutional Council Decision No.
94-345 of July 29, 1994 are omitted.]
Article 4. When any of the inscriptions or announcements referred
to in article 3 have been translated and are posted or made by
public entities or by private persons acting in a public capacity, at
least two translations must be made.
Where the declarations, announcements and inscriptions referred
to in articles 2 and 3 of this law are accompanied by one or more
translations, the French version must be as legible, audible and
intelligible as the foreign language version.
A decree from the Council of State shall specify the cases and
conditions in which departures from the provisions of this article in
the area of international transportation [shall be authorized].
Article 5. Whatever the object and terms, contracts to which a
public entity or a private person acting in a public capacity are
parties shall be written in the French language. Such contracts may
not contain any foreign expression or term if there exists any
French expression or term having the same meaning and approved
according to the regulations (dispositions rbglementaires) on the
enrichment of the French language.
These provisions do not apply to contracts to be performed
entirely outside of the national territory which are entered into by
public entities acting in an industrial or commercial capacity.
The contracts referred to in this article, if entered into with one or
more foreign parties, may be executed, in addition to the French
version, in one or more equally authentic foreign versions.
A party to a contract entered into in violation of paragraph one of
this article may not rely upon a provision [of the contract that is] in
a foreign language if it would be prejudicial to the opposing party.
Article 6. Any participant in a demonstration, a colloquium or a
conference organized in France by persons or entities of French
nationality has the right to express himself in French. Documents
distributed to participants before and during the meeting to present
the agenda (programme) must be written in French and may be
translated into one or more foreign languages.
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When preparatory documents or working documents are
distributed to the participants or minutes and records of a
demonstration, colloquium or conference are published, all texts or
presentations made in a foreign language must be accompanied by
at least a summary in French.
These provisions do not apply to demonstrations, colloquia or
conferences that only concern foreigners, nor are these provisions
applicable to conferences promoting French foreign trade.
Article 7. When written in a foreign language, publications,
reviews and communications distributed in France and issued by a
public entity, a private person acting in a public capacity or a
private person receiving public funds, must include at least a
summary in French. [Provisions declared unconstitutional by
Constitutional Council Decision No. 94-345 of July 29, 1994 are
omitted.]
Article 8. The last three paragraphs of article L. 121-1 of the labor
code are replaced by the following four paragraphs:
"An employment contract which is in writing must be in
French. [Provisions declared unconstitutional by
Constitutional Council Decision No. 94-345 of July 29, 1994
are omitted.]
When the work to be performed under the contract can only
be designated by a foreign term without a French equivalent,
the employment contract shall include an explanation of the
foreign term in French.
When the employee is a foreigner and the employment
contract is in writing, the employee may request a. written
translation of the contract in the employee's language. The
two texts shall be of equal legal validity. In case of a
discrepancy between the two texts, only the text in the foreign
employee's language may be used against him.
The employer may not use otherwise prejudicial clauses of




Article 9. I. Article L. 122-3 5 of the labor code is completed by the
following paragraph:
"Workplace regulations (r~glement interieur) shall be in
French. [Provisions declared unconstitutional by
Constitutional Council Decision No. 94-345 of July 29, 1994
are omitted.] Such regulations may be accompanied by
translations into one or more foreign languages."
II. After article L.122-39 of the labor code, article L.122-39-1 is
inserted as follows:
"Art. L.122-39-1. Any documents which contain obligations
of an employee or clauses which the employee must
understand to be able to perform his job must be in French.
[Provisions declared unconstitutional by Constitutional
Council Decision No. 94-345 of July 29, 1994 are omitted.]
Such documents may be accompanied by translations into one
or more foreign languages.
"These provisions do not apply to documents received from
foreign countries or intended for foreigners."
III. [omitted]
IV. After article L.132-2 of the labor code, article L.132-2-1 is
inserted, as follows:
"Art. L. 132-2-1. Collective bargaining agreements.., must
be in French. Any provision in a foreign language [Provisions
declared unconstitutional by Constitutional Council Decision
No. 94-345 of July 29, 1994 are omitted.] may not be used
against an employee as to whom the clause would be
prejudicial."
Article 10. Article L.311-4, 3' of the labor code [pertaining to
offers of employment] is written as follows:
"3 A text in a foreign language [Provisions declared
unconstitutional by Constitutional Council Decision No. 94-
345 of July 29, 1994 are omitted.]
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When the employment or the job offered can only be
designated by a foreign term without a French equivalent, the
French text must contain a description sufficiently detailed so
as not to lead to error within the meaning of 2'.
The prescriptions of the two preceding paragraphs apply to
services to be performed on French territory, whatever the
nationality of the offeror or of the employer, and apply to
services to be performed outside of French territory when the
offeror or the employer is French, even if perfect knowledge
of a foreign language is one of the conditions required for the
employment offered. Notwithstanding, directors of
publications written, in whole or in part, in a foreign language
may, in France, receive employment offers writtea in that
[foreign] language."
Article 11. I. French is the language of teaching, of examinations
and competitions, and of theses and dissertations in public and
private educational institutions, except where necessary for the
teaching of regional or foreign languages and cultures or where the
teachers are associated or visiting foreign professors.
Foreign schools or special schools which receive students of
foreign nationality, as well as educational institutions where
teaching is of an international character, are not subject to the
above requirement.
II. After the second paragraph of article 1 of law no. 89-486 dated
July 10, 1989, on orientation and education, this paragraph is
inserted as follows:
"Mastery of the French language and knowledge of two
other languages are fundamental objectives of [the French
educational system]."
Article 12. Before chapter I of title II of law no. 86-1067 dated
September 30, 1986 on freedom of communication, article 20-1 is
inserted as follows:
"Art. 20-1. The use of French is compulsory in all radio and
television programs and advertising, regardless of the mode of
broadcast or distribution, except for films and audiovisual
works in their original versions.
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Subject to the provisions of 20 bis of article 28 of this law,
the preceding paragraph does not apply to musical works the
text of which, in whole or in part, is in a foreign language.
The obligation imposed by paragraph one does not apply to
programs, partial programs or advertising included in these
programs or partial programs intended to be broadcast entirely
in a foreign language or the goal of which is to teach a
[foreign] language, nor to broadcasts of religious ceremonies.
[Provisions declared unconstitutional by Constitutional
Council Decision No. 94-345 ofJuly 29, 1994 are omitted.]
When any of the programs or advertising referred to in
paragraph one of this article are accompanied by French
translations, the French version must be as legible, audible or
intelligible as the foreign language version."
Article 13. [On thefrancophone community is omitted.]
Article 14. I. The use of a trademark, a brand name or trade name
composed of a foreign expression or term is forbidden to public
entities if there exists any French expression or term having the
same meaning and approved according to the regulations on the
enrichment of the French language.
This prohibition applies to private entities acting in a public
capacity.
II. The provisions of this article do not apply to trademarks used
for the first time prior to the enactment of this law.
Article 15. All public subsidies [by collectivitds and 6tablissements
publics] are conditioned upon respect by the beneficiaries of all of
the provisions of this law.
Any violation may lead, after the beneficiary has been invited to
present his comments, to total or partial restitution of the funds.
Article 16. In addition to officers and agents of the police
judiciaire acting pursuant to the provisions of the code of criminal
procedure, the agents listed in paragraphs 10, 30 and 40 of article
L.215-1 of the consumer protection code may investigate and
record violations of the texts enacted in application of article 2 of
this law.
Washington Law Review
To this end, agents may enter, during the day time, [certain]
locations and vehicles .. except for dwelling places. Agents may
examine any documents necessary to carry out their mission, make
copies of those documents, and receive, either by appointment or at
that same location, information necessary to carry out their task.
They may also take a sample of the goods or any products that are
involved, under conditions to be set forth in a decree of the Council
of State.
Article 17. Whoever may obstruct, either directly or indirectly, the
agents from accomplishing their mission referred to in paragraph
one of article 16, or does not provide them with all of the necessary
means to carry out their mission, is subject to the punishments set
out in paragraph two of article 433-5 of the criminal code.
Article 18. Violations of the texts enacted in application of this law
shall be recorded by a statement in writing (procs-verbal) which
writing shall conclusively establish the violation, unti. and unless
there is some other proof to the contrary.
.... These statements must be sent to the Public Prosecutor (le
Procureur) within five days of their definitive establishment
(cl6ture).
The party concerned must receive a copy of the statement within
the same five-day period.
Article 19. After article 2-13 of the Code of Criminal. Procedure,
article 2-14 is inserted as follows:
"Art. 2-14. Any properly established association whose goal
is, according to its charter (statuts), to defend the French
language, and which has been approved (agr6e) under
conditions set out by a decree of the Council of State, may
exercise the rights of a civil party (partie civile) with respect
to violations of the texts enacted in application of articles 2, 3,
4, 6, 7 and 10 of [the 1994 law concerning the uWe of the
French language]."
Article 20. This law is a matter of public policy (ordre public). It
applies to contracts entered into after its entry into force.
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Article 21. The provisions of this law apply without prejudice to
the legislation and regulations in force concerning the regional
languages of France and are not intended to oppose their use.
Article 22. Prior to September 15 of each year, the Government
shall present a report to Parliament on the application of this law
and on the provisions of any Convention or international treaty
concerning the status of the French language in international
institutions.
Article 23. The provisions of article 2 will become effective as of
the date of the publication of the decree of the Council of State
defining the sanctions accompanying that article, and, at the latest,
twelve months after the publication of this law in the Official
Journal (Journal Officiel).
Articles 3 and 4 of this law will enter into force six months after
article 2 takes effect.
Article 24. Law no. 75-1349 dated December 31, 1975 on the use
of the French language is repealed, except for articles 1 to 3 which
will be repealed when article 2 of this law becomes effective;
Provided that article 6 of Law no. 75-1349 will be repealed when
article 3 of this law becomes effective.

